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ABSTRACT
AGENCY AND REASONS IN EPISTEMOLOGY
MAY 2016
LUIS R.G. OLIVEIRA
B.A., CALVIN COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith
Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative
epistemology : are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy
of belief and disbelief? Locke’s influential answer was evidentialist : we have
an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this
dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at
the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of
obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the
implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, and some of the alleged connections
between agency and justification.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Meta-Normative Big Picture
My dissertation centers around a familiar experience and a hypothesized relation
underlying it. The familiar experience is that of being required to perform an
action or to take on an attitude. We experience the authority of this requirement
in feeling, in belief, and in discourse. The hypothesized relation underlying it is
what I call a normative requirement. The hypothesis, more exactly, is that our
varied feelings, beliefs, and discourse about what is required of us and others
are at bottom feelings, beliefs, and discourse about an authoritative relation of
normative requirement that holds between individuals and acts or attitudes.
I attempt to characterize this experience and this relation in various ways
throughout the following chapters, but I do not defend directly the hypothesis
that the latter truly underlies the former.
My dissertation also accepts that this hypothesized relation between indi-
viduals and acts or attitudes can be characterized by two substantive principles.
One of these principles is what I call normative rationalism. The other is what
I call normative consequentialism:
1
(NR) There is a normative requirement for S to φ if and only if (and
because) there is most normative reason for S to φ.1
(NC) There is a normative reason for S to φ only if (and because) S
φ-ing promotes some value v.2
The first principle hypothesizes that our multi-faceted experience of normative
requirements is, fundamentally, a rational experience. The existence of the
relation of normative requirement, that is, depends on the prior existence of
normative reasons. The second principle hypothesizes that value, whatever
that turns out to be, is the most fundamental feature of the normative aspect
of the world. The existence of normative reasons, that is, depends on the
prior existence of values. These two principles are neither idiosyncratic nor
uncontroversial. I attempt to draw modest support for these principles here
and there, but I do not offer a sustained defense of them. Instead, (NR) and
(NC) form the starting position from which I launch into my discussions.3
1I take this to be one way of expressing the view made famous by W.D. Ross (1930). For
more recent developments, see Broome (1999), Raz (2002), Skorupski (2010), Parfit (2011),
and Smith (2013). See Schroeder (2007) for the contrast between normative, explanatory,
and motivating reasons.
2See Raz (2001).
3My dissertation thereby enjoins the reader in a way familiar from Peter Railton (1999,
341): “for now, let us cheerfully assume that we dont mind mystery, as long as its name
is rationality.” Various aspects of the mystery of rationality, however, are here prodded
and pulled and stretched—for verification, that is, of their cost and plausibility. What my
chapters below reveal is what is and what is not compatible with it. The reader is thus
invited to make her own appraisals of what is worth retaining and what is worth abandoning
in these packages of incompatibilities.
2
1.2 The Meta-Normative Extensions
(NR) and (NC) are my background assumptions throughout. From them, my
dissertation defends a further principle:
(NC*) There is a normative reason for S to φ only if S φ-ing promotes
some privileged value pv.
The key motivation behind (NC*) is the fact that ‘value’ is very often used
in a normatively thin sense, where it only indicates what is guiding a certain
class of evaluations. I argue that the kind of value that is at the foundation
of our experience of normative requirements is somehow privileged over these
more ordinary kinds.
One of my chapters, moreover, rejects an influential argument against the
converse of (NC*). Since I think this argument is in fact one of the main
arguments against the converse of (NC*), I take its rejection as indirect support
for it. If I am right about this, then the following principle is true:
(NC**) There is a normative reason for S to φ if and only if (and
because) S φ-ing promotes some privileged value pv.4
Together, (NR) and (NC**) form the position that I call Reasons Consequen-
tialism. This dissertation is by no means a full defense of this position. But it
inches towards it at every step.
4Drawing on Feldman (1986), I take it that φ-ing promotes some privileged value pv if
and only if there are no accessible possible worlds where I do not φ that are ranked higher
by pv than accessible possible worlds where I φ
3
Many of my chapters focus on the English ‘ought’. In every case, I am
assuming two things about it. First, that ‘ought’ is ambiguous between a
variety of different meanings. Second, that ‘ought’ sometimes expresses the
hypothesized relation of normative requirement. When used in this way, ‘ought’
is used as the ought of most reason. The need for being careful about which
sense of ‘ought’ is at play—and being careful about which senses of ‘ought’
could or could not be at play—is a major theme throughout.
1.3 The Epistemological Focus
My dissertation avoids the assumption that there is a “most natural” meaning
for epistemological terms. It also avoid the assumption that there is a “shared
concept” behind our epistemological terms. Instead, I assume that epistemo-
logical terms are largely technical terms, flexible to the ends of the technicians
that are using them. I thus avoid the general argumentative strategy: “since
term t means/implies/expresses p, then...” Instead, I employ the alternative
strategy: “if we take term t to mean/imply/express p, then...” At times I
try to make explicit the value of using a term for a certain purpose; at times
I settle for evidence that many others in fact seem to use it in that way. In
either case, my aim is to make clear how exactly I am using my epistemological
terminology.
From the standpoint of Reason Consequentialism, my dissertation examines
what it would look like for epistemology to take itself as making claims about
normative requirements—and what it would look like otherwise. As I read them,
the so-called fathers of contemporary epistemology—Descartes and Locke—
4
took their claims as more than parochial evaluations from an idiosyncratic
point-of-view. They rather took themselves as identifying what was required
of our ordinary practices of belief. In a representative passage, for example,
John Locke in fact prescribes a close connection between evidence and belief
that is not at all out of step with contemporary epistemology:
We should keep a perfect indifference for all opinions, not wish any
of them true, or try to make them appear so; but being indifferent,
receive and embrace them according as evidence, and that alone,
gives the attestation of truth. (Conduct, $34)
Here and elsewhere, we can say, Descartes and Locke were after an “ethics of
belief.” My dissertation examines different aspects of epistemology, understood
in this traditional way, from the standpoint of Reason Consequentialism.
One obvious consequence of my method is that one can simply reject
my explicit assumptions at every turn. One can say that epistemology, or a
certain term, is not about normative requirements; one can say that normative
requirements are not about reasons; and so on. Most of my arguments can be
blocked that way. I think thats fair. In fact, I think this is true of much of
philosophy: we hypothesize certain fundamental explanatory elements, take
on certain methodological commitments, and draw their consequences. How
one frames a certain problem in fact reveals as much about ones philosophy
as how one solves it. I do my best throughout to be crystal clear about the
salient background assumptions and the arguments that I launch from them.
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1.4 Brief Summary of Each Chapter
In chapter 1, I discuss the uniformity view : the claim that the English ‘ought’
is always a raising verb expressing a propositional operator. I here examine
what this view would have to look like if it were to allow for the expression of
the ‘ought’ of most reason. After arguing that two recently influential versions
of the uniformity view—due to John Horty (2001) and Stephen Finlay & Justin
Snedegar (2014)—cannot succeed, I articulate a version that can. My diagnosis
is that too little attention has been paid, so far, to the contextual standards of
evaluation that figure into ought-claims. I conclude by arguing that allowing
for the expression of the ‘ought’ of most reason forces the uniformity view into
a dilemma.
In chapter 2, I discuss the deontic puzzle: the tension between Doxastic
Involuntarism (the claim that we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs),
Epistemic Deontology (the claim that ‘S ought to believe that p’ is sometimes
true), and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. More exactly, I here criticize
what I call the evasive strategy against this puzzle: taking doxastic ought-
claims as evaluative instead of prescriptive employments of the English ‘ought’.
Philosophers as different as Hilary Kornblith (2001), Richard Feldman (2008),
and Matthew Chrisman (2012) think that evasion is the least controversial and
least theoretically expensive strategy against the deontic puzzle. In reply, I
argue that it comes at the costly price of normative reasons for belief.
In chapter 3, I discuss deontological evidentialism: the claim that we ought
to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. More exactly,
I here criticize three arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit
6
Broogard’s (2014) use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope
requirements against W.K. Clifford’s well-known moral defense of deontological
evidentialism. I then use this very distinction against a defense of deontological
evidentialism inspired by Stephen Grimm’s (2009) more recent claims about the
moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue
that Hilary Kornblith’s (2001) criticism of Richard Feldman’s (2000) defense
of deontological evidentialism is incomplete. Finally, I ague that Feldman’s
defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and what
I will call privileged values : values that have normative authority over us.
In chapter 4, I continue to discuss deontological evidentialism. I here
discuss a promising argument for it, whose central premise says the following:
consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p
only if c is evidence that p is true. More exactly, I here discuss the relation
between a recent argument for this key premise—offered separately by Nishi
Shah (2006) and Ward E. Jones (2009)—and the principle that ought implies
can. I argue that anyone who antecendently accepts or rejects this principle
already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its intended
epistemological implications.
In chapter 5, I discuss deontological internalism: the family of views where
justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone’s epistemic agency.
According to these views, S is justified in believing that p, that is, when S is
blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson
(2008) discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission
reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of
7
epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal
similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this chapter, I argue that
plausible principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological
internalism in general.
In chapter 6, I discuss Paul Silva’s (2015) recent claim that doxastic justifi-
cation does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument
depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility must have a
parallel structure. I here reply to Silva’s argument by challenging this assump-
tion. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic
permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and
briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
8
CHAPTER 2
EXPRESSING THE ‘OUGHT’ OF MOST REASON
2.1 Introduction
Declarative sentences employing the English ‘ought’—ought-claims—display a
remarkable grammatical variety. We sometimes say of someone in particular
that she ought to volunteer at the local shelter; we sometimes say abstractly
that it ought to be that someone volunteers; we sometimes say of the state
of things in general that there ought to be volunteers; and so on. Some
of these various ought-claims, moreover, can be ambiguous in familiar and
uncontroversial ways. An utterance of ‘it ought to rain tomorrow’ sometimes
expresses a claim about what would be best to happen (as in ‘it ought to rain
tomorrow, if we are to survive this drought’), and it sometimes expresses a
claim about what is likely to occur (as in ‘it ought to rain tomorrow, if the
readings of the Doppler radar are correct’). According to a widely accepted
view, nonetheless, these two familiar features of ought-claims do not reflect an
underlying semantic or syntactic difference. At the semantic level, the English
‘ought’ always represents a propositional operator; at the syntactic level, the
9
English ‘ought’ always functions as a raising verb. Call this the uniformity
view.1
According to the orthodox variety of the uniformity view, ought-claims
always express that some proposition p is true in all the best contextually
salient possible worlds, given a contextually salient standard of evaluation.2
Let ‘W’ stand for the set of contextually salient worlds, and let ‘S’ stand for the
contextually salient standard of evaluation. We can then say that, according to
the orthodox variety of the uniformity view, the semantic structure of (simple)
ought-claims is always: O(p)W, S. Call ought-claims with such underlying
semantic structure evaluative ought-claims.3
The uniformity view is capable of explaining both the grammatical variety
and the common ambiguities of ought-claims by adding a raising verb syntax
to this semantic picture. Since English grammar does not allow for sentences
without subjects, sentences mirroring the semantic form of evaluative ought-
claims—such as ‘ought Sarah volunteers at the local shelter’ or ‘ought to
be volunteers at the local shelter’—are ungrammatical. As a result, the
grammatical expression of evaluative ought-claims raises the subject of the
prejacent proposition to the head of the whole sentence, when a subject is
1For some proponents, see Horty (2001), Chrisman (2012), and Finlay & Snedegar (2014).
For proponents of similar claims about the semantics of the English ‘ought’, see Chisholm
(1964), Kratzer (1977), Williams (1981a), Broome (1999), and Wedgwood (2007).
2On Kratzer’s (1977; 1981) terminology, the contextually salient worlds form a modal
base (a set of possible worlds which the ‘ought’ operator quantifies over), and the contextually
salient standard consists of an ordering source (a conversational background inducing a
partial ranking of the worlds in the modal base).
3I will hereafter mean this orthodox variety when I say ‘uniformity view’.
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available: ‘Sarah ought to volunteer at the local shelter’. In cases where the
prejacent has no subject, the grammatical expression of evaluative ought-claims
appends to the whole sentence a non-referring ‘there’ or ‘it’: ‘there ought to
be volunteers’. Such raising verb syntax thus explains how claims sharing
the same underlying semantic structure (O(p)W, S) can look so grammatically
various as ought-claims do. Just as easily, the uniformity view explains common
ambiguities by noticing that different contexts can make salient different kinds
of standards (epistemic, deontic, prudential, etc.).
Some, however, have claimed that the uniformity view faces the following
challenge: certain claims about what an agent ought to do cannot be expressed
with ought-claims if ‘ought’ is always a raising verb expressing a propositional
operator.4 This is far from a settled debate and my aim here is more modest
than taking a stand on it. Instead, my aim is twofold: (a) clarifying how at least
one of these challenges to the uniformity view gives way to a general challenge
to contextualist accounts of the English ‘ought’ (of which the uniformity view is
but one example); and (b) exploring what it would take for such contextualist
accounts to meet this nearby challenge.
Here is how I proceed. In section 1, I outline Mark Schroeder’s (2011)
argument against the uniformity view. In section 2, I clarify how his argument
against the uniformity view gives way to what I call the normative challenge
against contextualist views in general: providing a principled distinction be-
4Versions of this challenge have been suggested with some frequency: see Geach (1982),
Harman (1986, appendix B), Feldman (1986, ch. 8), Ross (2010), and Schroeder (2011).
Replies have been proposed as well: see Horty (2001, ch. 4), Chrisman (2012), and Finlay &
Snedegar (2014).
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tween ought-claims that express the ‘ought’ of most reason and those that
don’t. In section 3, I argue that two strategies available to the uniformity view
against Schroeder’s original challenge (from Horty 2001 and Finlay & Snedegar
2014) cannot succeed against the modified challenge under consideration. My
diagnosis of these shortcomings is that not enough attention has been paid
to the standards of evaluation that figure into ought-claims. In section 4, I
articulate a strategy that can, in fact, succeed against the normative challenge
set up in section 2. In section 5, however, I consider the way in which succeeding
against the normative challenge forces contextualist accounts of the English
‘ought’ into a new dilemma about the contextual availability of normative
standards. I do not think that this dilemma is fatal to these accounts, but
I take it to reveal some of its hidden costs and to point the way for further
exploration.
2.2 Schroeder Against the Uniformity View
Some ought-claims have an agent as their grammatical subject. This allows
us to distinguish ‘Sarah ought to volunteer at the local shelter’ from ‘there
ought to be volunteers at the local shelter’: the former is an agential ought-
claim while the latter is a non-agential ought-claim. There is a sense in
which this is merely a superficial distinction, however, given that any agential
ought-claim can be turned into a non-agential ought-claim without thereby
becoming ungrammatical. There is nothing ungrammatical about ‘it ought to
be that Sarah volunteers at the local shelter’, for example. We can capture
this sense of superficiality by saying that every agential ought-claim has a
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non-agential grammatical equivalence. In fact, according to the uniformity
view, this seemingly superficial distinction is really just that: superficial. That
is because the following is a consequence of the uniformity view:
(equivalence) The meaning of an agential ought-claim is preserved by
its non-agential grammatical equivalence.
According to the uniformity view, that is, ‘Sarah ought to volunteer at the
local shelter’ and ‘it ought to be that Sarah volunteers at the local shelter’ are
not just grammatically equivalent but also, all else being equal, equivalent in
meaning.
According to Mark Schroeder, however, (equivalence) is false and the uni-
formity view therefore incorrect. Some agential ought-claims have a meaning
that is not preserved by their non-agential grammatical equivalence. Schroeder
(2011, 9-11) attempts to focus our attention on this distinct meaning of some
agential ought-claims by noting that these are uniquely appropriate in con-
versational contexts of advice. Only some agential ought-claims (i) matter
directly for advice, (ii) are the right kind of thing to close deliberation, (iii)
correctly indicate accountability, (iv) appropriately track what the agent is
able to perform, and (v) are closely connected to the notion of obligation. We
can follow Schroeder in referring to agential ought-claims expressing a claim
that is appropriate (in these five ways) in conversational contexts of advice as
deliberative agential ought-claims. According to Schroeder, then, deliberative
agential ought-claims have a meaning that is not preserved by their non-agential
grammatical equivalence.
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Consider the following example. Suppose a good friend is facing financial
hardships. Suppose the following two agential ought-claims are then true:
(a) Larry ought to win the lottery.
(b) Larry ought to file for a loan.
Perhaps (a) is true since Larry is in every respect the most deserving ticket
holder. Perhaps (b) is true since filing for a loan is the safest and most effective
way for Larry to turn around his awful luck. No doubt (a) and (b) express very
different propositions. But at the level of syntactic and semantic structure,
according to the uniformity view, they are both the same: they both employ
‘ought’ as a raising verb and have the semantic form O(p)W, S. Their meaning
is thus preserved in their non-agential grammatical equivalences, which share
the same syntactic and semantic structure as well:
(a*) It ought to be that Larry wins the lottery.
(b*) It ought to be that Larry files for a loan.
But suppose Larry comes to you for advice. Here, according to Schroeder,
there seems to be nothing that we can mean by (a) such that it would matter
directly for advice, be the right kind of thing to close Larry’s deliberation,
correctly indicate accountability, appropriately respect Larry’s abilities, and
relate to Larry’s obligations. On the other hand, there seems to be an available
meaning of (b) that would be perfectly appropriate on all four counts. Moreover,
when (b) is taken as expressing this distinct meaning—the meaning that is
appropriate (in the five ways indicated) in conversational contexts of advice—
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Schroeder’s claim is that it is then taken as expressing something that cannot be
expressed by (b*): (b), in this distinct sense, is a claim about the requirements
on Larry’s agency, while (b*) is merely an evaluation of a possible state of
affairs. Schroeder’s (2011, 13-19) argument against the uniformity view, in
short, turns on identifying a class of counterexamples to (equivalence), and
on offering linguistic evidence for an alternative view of their semantics and
syntax.5
2.3 The Normative Challenge
Notice that the debate between those who are sympathetic to the uniformity
view and those who are not is more than a merely linguistic dispute. This
is because both sides acknowledge that the distinct meaning of deliberative
agential ought-claims is precisely the meaning that matters most to normative
philosophy. It is here, in fact, that we can begin to extract a different challenge
from Schroeder’s claims. Though not much of substance is said explicitly
about this subtle meaning that competent English speakers are supposed to
grasp—on either side of the debate—I will here take it that deliberative agential
ought-claims express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do. Call
this the normative assumption:
5Schroeder suggests that deliberative agential ought-claims employ the English ‘ought’
with a control verb syntax. A control verb—like ‘wants’—is a verb which (i) can take a
further verb as an argument, and (ii) when it does, it has as its subject the same subject
as its verb argument. This is supposed to explain why their meaning is not preserved in
their non-agential grammatical equivalences. Both Chrisman (2012) and Finlay & Snedegar
(2014) challenge the linguistic evidence offered by Schroeder.
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The Normative Assumption: Deliberative agential ought-claims ex-
press a claim about what an agent has most reason to do.
Here, recall, an agential ought-claim is any declarative sentence employing the
English ‘ought’ with an agent as its grammatical subject, and a deliberative
agential ought-claim is one that is appropriate in conversational contexts of
advice in the characteristic ways suggested by Schroeder. This assumption, of
course, requires some defense.
There are at least two reasons for accepting the normative assumption.
First, this is the sense of ‘ought’ that those within and those outside of
this linguistic dispute have acknowledged as the sense that matters most to
normative philosophy.6 The ‘ought’ of most reason, so to speak, is the sense of
‘ought’ where it expresses an authoritative relation of normative requirement or
obligation, where it picks out a “specifically practical relation holding between
agents and actions that is relevant to ethics” (Chrisman 2012, 436). As some
have put it in different contexts, this notion of normative requirement is the
notion of something “having a grip” on us (cf. Korsgaard 1996, 44-6), or
being “demanded” of us (cf. Street 2012, 44). Since it is this notion—and
the ‘ought’ of most reason that serves as its expression—that matters most
6See Harman (1986, 132-3), Broome (1999, 399-400), Zimmerman (2006, 329), Finlay
(2009, 316), Ross (2010, 309), Schroeder (2011, 36), and Finlay & Snedegar (2014, 104; 122).
Here and throughout this paper I will mean normative reasons when I speak of reasons of
any kind, as opposed to explanatory or motivating reasons (cf. Schroeder 2007, 10-15). It is
notoriously hard to say something informative about normative reasons that is neither vague
or metaphorical. A grip on the pre-theoretical and paradigmatic sense in which a innocent
person’s unnecessary suffering is a normative reason against torturing her for fun—the sense
in which that fact is an objectively authoritative consideration against that action—will be
enough for present purposes.
16
to normative philosophy, and since it is what matters most to normative
philosophy that the uniformity view is challenged by deliberative agential
ought-claims to accommodate, we have here one good reason to accept the
normative assumption.
The second reason is that this is the only sense of ‘ought’ that could make
ought-claims appropriate, on a normative reading of ‘appropriate’, in conver-
sational contexts of advice in the characteristic ways suggested by Schroeder.
Given idiosyncratic contexts and psychologies, nearly anything can be effective
as advice—nearly anything can be taken as indicating what to do. But notice
how deliberative agential ought-claims, according to Schroeder, are supposed
to be more than merely effective in this way: they “matter directly”, they are
“the right kind of thing”, they “correctly indicate”, they are closely connected to
“obligation,” and so on. These are plausibly expressions of normative success.
Yet it is only when an ought-claim expresses a claim about what an agent has
most reason to do that it is appropriate, or normatively successful, in these
ways.7 This is another good reason to accept the normative assumption.
If the normative assumption is correct, however, then the distinct meaning
of (b) that according to Schroeder cannot be captured by (b*) is: filing for a
loan is what Larry has most reason to do. The challenge I am here offering
to the uniformity view, then, is explaining how some but not all evaluative
ought-claims can express a claim about what one has most reason to do by
providing a principled way to distinguish between those that do and those that
7See Zimmerman (2008, 6-8), for example, for discussion of the close connection between
the ought of most reason and the kind of advice sought by the “conscientious person”.
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don’t. This is different but related to Schroeder’s denial of (equivalence). Call
it the normative challenge. Importantly, this challenge targets more than just
the uniformity view. Any contextualist account of the semantics of the English
‘ought’ owes a similar explanation.
Let me note one more way in which the normative challenge is distinct from
Schroeder’s denial of (equivalence). As a reply to Schroeder, Chrisman (2012)
suggests that non-agential ought-claims (such as ‘rump roast ought to cook
slowly’) can sometimes carry the kind of meaning that makes it appropriate
in conversational contexts of advice. In this way, he intends to cast suspicion
on the linguistic intuitions at the foundation of Schroeder’s claims. But it is
harder to see this maneuver as successful once we have it clear in mind that
the distinct meaning under consideration is a claim about what an agent has
most reason to do. Consider Chrisman’s (2012, 443) example:
If, for example, I’ve called my mother for advice about how to cook
rump roast, and she asserts [‘rump roast ought to cook slowly’],
knowing it to be true, then surely this settles the question of what
is advisable for me to do regarding the rump roast.
Chrisman is here running together two distinct matters: whether his mother’s
utterance settles what is advisable for him, and whether her utterance settles
what is advisable for him simply by virtue of what it expresses. Certainly the
former can be true without the latter being the case. Perhaps, unbeknownst to
my mother, I haven’t yet decided if I wish to cook the rump roast as it ought
to be cooked or if I want to ruin the roast as a fun prank on a friend (after
arranging for better food to be delivered). This shows that telling me truly and
knowingly that ‘rump roast ought to cook slowly’ does not simply by virtue of
18
what it expresses settle what is advisable for me to do: its truth will sometimes
determine what is advisable—a further claim about what I have most reason to
do—but sometimes will not. Contrary to Chrisman’s suggestion, then, ‘rump
roast ought to cook slowly’ is not an example of a non-agential ought-claim
that has the kind of meaning the uniformity view (and contextualist views in
general) is here challenged to accommodate. The challenge is not to explain
how ought-claims can somehow play roles in settling what is advisable for one
to do; the challenge is to explain how ought-claims can sometimes do this
simply by virtue of what they express.8
Since evaluative ought-claims have only three structural elements that can
vary with the context of utterance, there are only three general strategies
available to the uniformity view against the normative challenge. The first
strategy is identifying some possible feature of prejacent propositions that
separates deliberative from non-deliberative agential ought-claims. The second
strategy is identifying some similar feature of contextually salient set of worlds,
and the third is identifying some similar feature of contextually salient standards
of evaluation. (These are the only pure general strategies.) In the next section,
I argue that the first two of these strategies, though recently influential, cannot
succeed. My focus throughout will be on the uniformity view, but it will be
clear that similar arguments afflict alternative contextualist accounts.
8Perhaps this serves as the kind of non question-begging account of mattering directly
and indirectly for advice that Chrisman (2012, 444) asks of Schroeder.
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2.4 Privileged Standards of Evaluation
Consider one natural way of developing the first strategy against the normative
challenge:
(prejacent) Agential ought-claims are deliberative when the prejacent
proposition makes explicit reference to the agent’s agency.
The suggestion here is that an agential ought-claim such as ‘Sarah ought to
volunteer at the local shelter’ sometimes takes ‘Sarah volunteers at the local
shelter’ as its prejacent proposition, and sometimes takes ‘Sarah sees to it
that she volunteers at the local shelter’ instead (cf. Horty 2001, 53). There
is an explicit reference to Sarah’s agency in the latter but not in the former,
even though the surface grammar is the same in either case. As I will put it,
(prejacent) claims that all agential ought-claims whose prejacent proposition
makes explicit reference to the agent’s agency—call these evaluativeP ought-
claims (where ‘P’ stands for ‘prejacent’)—are deliberative agential ought-claims.
Now consider a natural way of developing the second strategy against the
normative challenge:
(world) Agential ought-claims are deliberative when the contextually
salient set of possible worlds only contains worlds the grammatical agent
has the power to bring about.
The suggestion here is that an agential ought-claim such as ‘Larry ought to
file for a loan’ sometimes takes a set of possible worlds all of which are within
the agent’s power to bring about, and sometimes not (cf. Finlay & Snedegar
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2014, 113). A bit differently, an agential ought-claim such as ‘Larry ought to
win the lottery’ never takes a set of possible worlds all of which are within the
agent’s power to bring about, since the prejacent proposition itself refers to
a world which is beyond the agent’s powers. As I will put it, (world) claims
that all agential ought-claims whose contextually salient set of possible worlds
only contains worlds the grammatical agent has the power to bring about—call
these evaluativeW ought-claims (where ‘W’ stands for ‘world’)—are deliberative
agential ought-claims.9
My argument against both these strategies aims to show that there are
evaluativeP and evaluativeW ought-claims that do not express a claim about
what an agent has most reason to do. Consider a case that I will call Tavern.
Suppose Hans and Franz are having some drinks at a German tavern during
the time of the second world war. Suppose they notice that a mob is forming:
some local has been discovered to be Jewish and drunken men now plan to
kill him. If the uniformity view is correct, then it is possible that Hans says
something true when he says the following in Tavern:
(join) Franz ought to join the mob.
9I am ignoring some differences between Finlay & Snedegar’s (2014) suggestion and
(world). First, while the orthodox variety takes ought-claims to be about what’s contextually
best, Finlay & Snedegar are contrastivists who take ought-claims to be about what’s
contextually better (more exactly, they are about what is best in the contrast set). They
leave open, however, whether the contrast class is realized syntactically or semantically (cf. fn.
19). Second, Finlay & Snedegar take themselves to be offering merely a necessary condition,
whereas (world) offers a sufficient condition. This is because they are attempting to meet
Schroeder’s original challenge, and not the normative challenge presently under consideration.
What follows is not, therefore, a argument against their reply to Schroeder, but rather an
argument against the use of this reply as a resource against the normative challenge.
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If the uniformity view is correct, recall, what (join) expresses is merely that
‘Franz joins the mob’ is true in all of the best ranked worlds given a contextually
salient set of worlds and a contextually salient standard of evaluation. But
notice that there is a possible standard of evaluation S1 that takes anti-Semitism
as its guiding value. Given any set of possible worlds, S1 ranks them according
to how much suffering is experienced by Jewish people in those worlds. If the
conversational context provides S1 as the relevant standard of evaluation, and
provides a set of worlds W1 such that ‘Franz joins the mob’ is true in all the
worlds that are ranked highest by S1, then (join) is true in Tavern. Call the
conversational context that would provide S1 and W1 to an utterance of (join)
in Tavern the Nazi context. There is nothing impossible about Hans and Franz
being in the Nazi context, so nothing impossible about (join) being true in
Tavern.
Similarly, if the uniformity view is correct, then it is possible that Hans
says something true when he says the following in Tavern as well:
(no-join) Franz ought not to join the mob.
What (no-join) expresses, after all, is that ‘Franz does not join the mob’ is
true in all of the best ranked worlds given a contextually salient set of worlds
and a contextually salient standard of evaluation. But notice that there is a
possible standard of evaluation S2 that takes humanitarianism as its guiding
value. Given any set of possible worlds, S2 ranks them according to how little
harm is done to others in those worlds. If the conversational context provides
S2 as the relevant standard of evaluation, and provides a set of worlds W2 such
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that ‘Franz does not join the mob’ is true in all the worlds that are ranked
highest by S2, then (no-join) is true in Tavern. Call the conversational context
that would provide S2 and W2 in Tavern the Humanitarian context. There is
nothing impossible about Hans and Franz being in the Humanitarian context
either, so nothing impossible about (no-join) being true in Tavern.10
Though it seems perfectly possible for Hans and Franz to be in either the
Nazi or the Humanitarian contexts, it seems nonetheless false that what Franz
has most reason to do in Tavern is different in each case. In both the Nazi
and the Humanitarian contexts, that is, Franz has most reason to not join the
mob. This is an intuitively plausible judgment, I think, but also a judgment
that is buttressed by most accounts of reasons. Whatever we say about the
semantics of ought-claims, reasons—the building blocks of that “specifically
practical relation holding between agents and actions that is relevant to ethics”
(Chrisman 2012, 436)—are simply not context-sensitive in this way. So we can
draw the following lesson from reflection on Tavern:
Lesson1: Not every standard of evaluation has the power to generate
reasons.
10Ross (2010, 308-9) accepts and makes good use of a principle claiming that “there is no
proposition, p, such that it ought to be the case that (p and not-p).” This is not in tension
with my claims here about (join) and (no-join) both being possibly true in Tavern. My claim
is rather that, if the uniformity view is correct, then there can be propositions p such that in
a certain conversational context it ought to be the case that p and in another conversational
context it ought to be the case that not-p. It does not follow from this that there can be a
conversational context where it ought to be the case that p and not-p.
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The fact that a certain action of mine scores highly with respect to a certain
standard S, or the fact that a certain world is ranked highest given S, is not
sufficient to make it the case that I have reasons to perform that action, or
to bring about the actions that I perform in that highest ranked world.11 Not
every standard, we can say, is privileged in this way. In Tavern, it seems clear
that S1 is not a privileged standard: the fact that joining the mob scores highly
with respect to S1 in no way gives Franz reasons to act in that way, even if
Hans and Franz are in a conversational context that provides S1 as the relevant
standard of evaluation and W1 as the relevant set of worlds.12
The first lesson from Tavern is a general lesson about standards and their
powers to generate reasons. But we can also draw a lesson from Tavern that is
more specifically about evaluativeP and evaluativeW ought-claims:
Lesson2: Not all evaluativeP ought-claims and not all evaluativeW ought-
claims express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do.
11Human-independent accounts most clearly think of reasons non-contextually in this way
(cf. Skorupski 2010, Enoch 2011, Dworkin 2011, Parfit 2011, and Scanlon 2014). Human-
dependent accounts of almost all sorts think of them in this way as well (cf. McDowell 1995,
Scanlon 1998, and Gert 2004). Henning (2014), however, argues that normative reasons are,
in fact, context-sensitive. But what he has in mind is the view that which reasons there are
varies with “the information available from a contextually relevant point of view” (601, my
italics). Since there is no variation in the information that Hans and Franz have available in
the Nazi and the Humanitarian contexts, there is in fact no shift in the kind of context that
Henning thinks can affect the existence of reasons. (The same point addresses an extension
of the assessor-relativism we find in MacFarlane (2009) to deontic modals, where truth is
relative to the information that is available in the context of assessment.) The exception,
perhaps, are so-called desire-based accounts (cf. Williams 1981b and Schroeder 2007). I will
address these exceptions very briefly at the end of this section.
12Strictly speaking, what I am calling standards of evaluation rank possible worlds with
respect to a certain value, and not actions. When I speak of an action of mine being ranked
highly by a certain standard, I mean this derivatively: I perform that action in the worlds
ranked highest by that standard.
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Suppose (join), in the Nazi context, takes ‘Franz sees to it that he joins the
mob’ as its prejacent proposition. Here’s what results: given the uniformity
view, (join) is true; given the normative facts, Franz does not have most reason
to join the mob. So (join) is here a true evaluativeP ought-claim that does
not express a claim about what Franz has most reason to do. Now suppose
(join), in the Nazi context, takes a set of possible worlds all of which are within
Franz’s power to bring about. Here’s what results: given the uniformity view,
(join) is once again true; given the normative facts, Franz still does not have
most reason to join the mob. So (join) is here a true evaluativeW ought-claim
that does not express a claim about what Franz has most reason to do.
The second lesson from Tavern, however, is problematic for (prejacent) and
(world). If evaluativeP and evaluativeW ought-claims sometimes fail to express
a claim about what an agent has most reason to do, then sometimes they are
not appropriate in conversational contexts of advice in the characteristic ways
suggested by Schroeder. More importantly, they are then not the kinds of
claims that pick out that practical relation that matters so much to normative
philosophy. We can state this argument more precisely:
The Privileged Standards Argument
1. Not every standard of evaluation is privileged. (Lesson 1)
2. If not every standard of evaluation is privileged, then not all evaluativeP
ought-claims and not all evaluativeW ought-claims express a claim about
what an agent has most reason to do. (Lesson 2)
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3. If not all evaluativeP ought-claims and not all evaluativeW ought-
claims express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do, then
not all evaluativeP ought-claims and not all evaluativeW ought-claims are
deliberative ought-claims. (by The Normative Assumption)
C. So not all evaluativeP ought-claims and not all evaluativeW ought-
claims are deliberative ought-claims.
If the Privileged Standards Argument is sound, then it is clear that further
refinements of (prejacent) and (world)—or their combination, or further de-
ployments of the first and second strategies in general—will fail as well. The
problem with these strategies is not that they identify the wrong feature of
the prejacent proposition or of the relevant set of worlds, but rather that
features of those parameters are not enough to determine whether an evaluative
ought-claim is deliberative or not.13
Let me put aside one possible maneuver against the Privileged Standards
Argument. My defense of premise 1 depends on the following being a normative
fact:
(fact) Franz does not have most reason to join the mob in the Nazi
context of Tavern.
13Another strategy—though one that departs slightly from the orthodox variety of the
uniformity view—fails for the same reason: simply adding a further contextual parameter that
explicitly identifies an agent for the evaluative ought-claim (cf. Broome 1999 and Wedgwood
2007) will similarly fail to distinguish between those with privileged and unprivileged
standards, and so fail to distinguish between those that express a claim about what that
agent has most reason to do and those that don’t.
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Perhaps some will think that (fact) is not a fact. I have indeed assumed that
the ‘has most reason to’ relation is an external relation in the following sense: it
holds between a certain person and a certain action irrespective of that person’s
actual beliefs and desires. I’m not alone in this assumption. Perhaps this
external relation holds because the person would be motivated to perform that
action if she had an ideal moral upbringing (cf. McDowell 1995, 74); perhaps it
so holds because the person would be motivated to perform that action if her
“dispositions of evaluation” were not defective (cf. Scanlon 1998, 371); perhaps
it so holds for reasons completely independent of that person’s psychology,
even in its idealized forms (cf. Parfit 1997, 129; Scanlon 2014, 44). On any
of these externalist accounts, (fact) is a fact. But according to desire-based
accounts of reasons, the ‘has most reason to’ relation is an internal relation in
the following sense: it holds between a certain person and a certain action by
virtue of the actual beliefs and desires of that person (cf. Williams 1981b and
Schroeder 2007). If these accounts are correct, then perhaps (fact) is not a fact.
If joining the mob is what most advances Franz’ terrible desires in the Nazi
context, then Franz, on these accounts, has most reason to join the mob.14
I find this kind of internalism hard to accept, but I do not wish to argue
against it here. I take myself to be addressing my fellow externalists instead.
What the Privileged Standards Argument shows, then, is that (prejacent) and
14Notice the similarities between Tavern and Bernard Williams’ (1995, 39) discussion of
a man who is cruel to his wife. According to Williams, we can make very many negative
evaluations of this man: “that he is ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, sexist, nasty, selfish,
brutal...” But, according to Williams, we cannot say that he has a reason not to be cruel.
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(world) should be rejected by anyone who pairs the Normative Assumption
with externalism about reasons.15
2.5 Super Standards of Evaluation
Recall the normative challenge: identifying the feature of evaluative ought-
claims that distinguishes those that are deliberative from those that are not—
those that express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do and
those that don’t. In the previous section, we’ve seen that, given plausible
assumptions about the nature of reasons, variations in the prejacent proposition
or in the contextually salient set of worlds cannot by themselves account for
this distinction. Meeting the normative challenge, it turns out, requires paying
close attention to the (so far ignored) standards of evaluation that figure into
ought-claims.
Consider one natural suggestion:
(standard) Evaluative ought-claims are deliberative when the contex-
tually salient standard of evaluation is privileged.
15Internalists about reasons, however, should not dismiss the Privileged Standards Ar-
gument too quickly. Recall that the uniformity view is supposed to capture all uses of
the English ‘ought’. One such use, notice, indicates all and only our epistemic reasons for
believing a certain proposition. When we say ‘S ought to believe that p’, we are typically not
claiming that S has most reason of all kinds to believing that p, but rather that S has most
reason of a certain specific kind (the epistemic ones) to believe that p. But when we restrict
ourselves to epistemic ought-claims in this way, externalism about reasons becomes even
harder to reject. Few are willing to accept that which epistemic reasons we have for believing
that p depends on our actual beliefs and desires. So while pairing the uniformity view with
internalism about practical reasons may help avoid the Privileged Standards Argument (by
way of denying that (fact) is a fact), it seems much less plausible to suppose that such
internalism would help the uniformity view against a version of the same argument that was
constructed with claims about epistemic reasons.
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According to (standard), (no-join) is deliberative since S2 is privileged: it has
the power to generate reasons. Similarly, (join) is not deliberative since S1 is
not privileged: it does not have the power to generate reasons. As I will put
it, (standard) claims that all agential ought-claims whose contextually salient
standard of evaluation is privileged—call these evaluativeS ought-claims (where
‘S’ stands for ‘standard’)—are deliberative agential ought-claims.
This natural suggestion, however, will not do. To claim that a certain action
is what Franz has most reason to do, after all, is to make a comparative claim
about the balance of reasons, as opposed to a claim about what is issued by
just one source of reasons. We can here welcome a bit of familiar terminology:
to claim that not joining the mob is what Franz has most reason to do is to
claim that not joining the mob is what Franz has all-things-considered reason
to do, and not just to claim that it is what Franz has a pro tanto reason to do.
The fact that some action φ scores highly with respect to a privileged standard
always gives you a pro tanto reason to perform it, but it does not always give
you an all-things-considered reason to perform it as well. (standard) pays no
attention to this important distinction. As a consequence, some evaluativeS
ought-claims simply do not express a claim about what an agent has most
reason to do.
It pays to illustrate this point. Recall the Humanitarian context of Tavern.
If the uniformity view is correct, then this is a case where (no-join) is true:
‘Franz does not join the mob’ is true in all the best possible worlds given W2 and
S2. If (standard) is correct, moreover, then this is also a case where (no-join) is
a claim about what Franz has most reason to do: S2 is a privileged standard,
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and all agential ought-claims whose contextually salient standard of evaluation
is privileged are deliberative. Now consider three further assumptions. First:
A1: There are privileged standards beside S2.
We know that there are standards of evaluation besides S2—terrible ones like
S1, for example. But perhaps there are privileged standards besides S2 as well.
Perhaps there is a privileged standard of evaluation S3 that takes fidelity (the
keeping of promises) as its guiding value. In that case, we have reasons to
perform an action that scores highly with respect to S3. Perhaps there is also a
privileged standard of evaluation S4 that takes beneficence (the maximization
of what’s good) as its guiding value. In that case, we have reasons to perform
an action that scores highly with respect to S4. Perhaps there are even more
privileged standards.16 Second:
A2: ‘Franz does not join the mob’ is false in all the best contextually
salient possible worlds given S3 and S4.
Perhaps Franz had promised the men now forming a mob that he was going
to participate in whatever affair they decided to conduct after a few drinks.
(This is an odd promise, alright, but hardly one that has never been made.)
Perhaps Franz’s refusal to join the mob would cause the belligerent Nazis to
direct their anger at him, at Hans, and at their families, instead of having it
directed at just one person. In that case, not joining the mob does not at all
16It should be clear that I am here drawing on Ross’s (1930, esp. ch. 2) framework of
prima facie duties.
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advance fidelity and beneficence values. So given (A1) and (A2), Franz has at
least pro tanto reasons to join the mob. Finally:
A3: Ranking highly with respect to S3 and S4 outweighs ranking highly
with respect to just S2.
Perhaps the fact that an action φ advances promise-keeping and the maximiza-
tion of the good at the cost of humanitarianism gives one reasons to φ that are
stronger than those given by the fact that not φ-ing advances humanitarianism
at the cost of promise-keeping and the maximization of the good. As I see it,
there is nothing impossible about these three assumptions being true in the
Humanitarian context of Tavern.17 But if they are true, then the Humanitarian
context of Tavern is now a case where ‘Franz does not join the mob’ is true
in all the best possible worlds given one privileged standard—the one that
happens to be contextually salient in Hans’ utterance of (no-join)—and yet
(no-join), though true, is not a claim about what Franz has most reason to do.
So (standard) is false: not every evaluativeS ought-claim is deliberative.
18
There is, however, nothing impossible about standards of evaluation that
always create all-things-considered reasons. Call such standards super standards.
Those who think that there is just one source of reasons—just one privileged
standard—will already think that such standard is a super standard. Perhaps
17At any rate, there is nothing impossible about some version of these assumptions being
true. Ross (1930, 19-22) himself would disagree with how I have stipulated the weights of
S2, S3, and S4, but the argument can be modified to suit his or anyone’s views on which
standards are privileged and which standards outweigh which.
18Ross (2010, 317) seems to think that these considerations create a serious worry for the
uniformity view. As we will see presently, this verdict is premature.
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consequentialists are correct, for example, in taking S4 as the uniquely privileged
standard. If scoring highly with respect to a standard taking beneficence as
its guiding value is the only thing that can give us a reason to perform a
certain action φ, then that reason will always be an all-things-considered reason
to φ. But those who think that there are a variety of privileged standards
should welcome the existence of super standards just as well. While some
standards rank possible worlds with respect to their advancement of just
one value—beneficence, for example—some standards rank possible worlds
with respect to their advancement of a variety of values—humanitarianism,
beneficence, fidelity, and so on. While privileged standards measuring how well
actions advance each of these values indicate our separate pro tanto reasons
for action, privileged standards measuring how alternative actions score with
respect to all of them, and weighing those scores correctly against each other,
indicate our all-things-considered reasons for action. However one thinks about
the metaphysics of value—baring axiological nihilism—the existence of super
standards of evaluation seems unproblematic.19
This suggests a second natural way of developing the third strategy:
(super standard) Evaluative ought-claims are deliberative when the
contextually salient standard of evaluation is a super standard.
19I am staying silent on the axiological question: what explains the aggregative and
non-aggregative normative relations of relative importance between the relevant values that
super standards of evaluation use in their ranking of salient possible worlds? See Chang
(2004, 18) for a defense of the interesting claim that these normative relations are determined
by the unity of a (sometimes nameless) comprehensive value.
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According to (super standard), (no-join) is deliberative since it takes not S2
but rather SS2: a standard of evaluation that always generates all-things-
considered reasons (either by being the only privileged standard, or by correctly
ranking worlds with respect to how well they score with respect to all privileged
standards). As I will put it, (super-standard) claims that all agential ought-
claims whose contextually salient standard of evaluation is a super standard—
call these evaluativeSS ought-claims (where ‘SS’ stands for ‘super standard’)—are
deliberative agential ought-claims.
If the uniformity view is correct in taking all ought-claims as evaluative
ought-claims, and if some of these ought-claims are sometimes appropriate
in conversational contexts of advice in the characteristic ways suggested by
Schroeder, and if those ought-claims are precisely the ones that normative
philosophy is interested in—and so ones that express a claim about what
an agent has most reason to do—then I suggest that (super standard) must
be true.20 If you come to me for advice, what is appropriate from me is a
claim about what you have most reason to do, a claim about what you have
all-things-considered reason to do. Only evaluative ought-claims contextually
resolved with super standards can truly or falsely express those kinds of claims.
Once again, this is a result that any contextualist account of the English ‘ought’
must accommodate.
20Some may complain that I am ignoring the grain of truth in (prejacent) and (world)
by not even taking them as stating necessary conditions. But it is not clear to me that
they do. Either way, my critical point is that succeeding against the normative challenge
requires close attention to the standards of evaluation that figure into ought-claims. (super
standard) brings this point home in bold terms. The same point, however, can be used for
the development of a position that incorporates either (prejacent), or (world), or both.
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Notice how (super standard) mirrors the view of the structure of overall
moral obligation that Zimmerman (2008, 5) has called the “ought-value-stuff
framework”. According to this view, “any substantive theory of obligation can
be cast as one according to which what one ought to do is ranked higher than
any alternative.” This may be right, provided we assume that super standards
are responsible for these rankings.21 Of course, the semantic structure of a claim
about what an agent has most reason to do—about the act which is obligatory
for an agent, on Zimmerman’s terms—may well differ from the metaphysical
structure of what makes an act φ the act which that agent has most reason
to do. But there is no such difference if (super-standard) is true: what makes
φ-ing the act I have most reason to do is the fact that φ-ing is well-ranked by
a super standard, and the semantic structure of my claim expressing that fact
similarly indicates that φ-ing is well-ranked by a super standard. No doubt
there is something attractive about this resulting parallel structure.
2.6 The Contextual Standards Dilemma
As presented in section 1, the normative challenge is met: super-standard
gives us a principled account of how some but not all evaluative ought-claims
can express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do. This is
progress, since previous discussions of the uniformity view did not produce the
resources required to succeed against that challenge. Nonetheless, accepting
21See also Feldman (1986) for the view that what we ought to do is what we do in the
best possible accessible worlds.
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super-standard forces contextualist views in general into a new dilemma.
This is not a fatal dilemma, but it nonetheless reveals some of their hidden
costs. In what follows, the uniformity view is once again my focus.
If the uniformity view is correct, then we have seen that the following is
true in the Nazi context in Tavern:
(join) Franz ought to join the mob.
This is because the Nazi context provides S1 as the relevant standard of
evaluation, and provides a set of worlds W1 such that ‘Franz joins the mob’
is true in all the worlds that are ranked highest by S1. An utterance of (join)
merely expresses that this is the case. But now consider a variation on the
original Tavern case. Suppose that Hans and Franz are hopelessly misguided
conscientious Nazis: they are sincerely attempting to figure out what Franz
has most reason to do, but unfortunately endorse the terrible values embodied
in S1. Suppose that, after some deliberation, Hans forms the explicit belief
that joining the mob is what Franz has most reason to do and proceeds to
utter (join). Call this the conscientious variation of Tavern. What should the
uniformity view say about this conscientious variation? I want to consider two
alternative accounts. One of these accounts, I think, is very problematic. The
other account requires a substantive commitment that shouldn’t go unnoticed.
Here is the first account. Since Hans and Franz explicitly endorse the terrible
values embodied in S1, the conscientious variation of Tavern is still a case where
Hans and Frans are in the Nazi context. By explicitly considering which
action will further what they believe is valuable, Hans and Franz have thereby
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made S1 the contextually salient standard of evaluation in their conversational
background. For many who accept the uniformity view, this is in fact the
most natural thing to say. According to Finlay (2009, 328), for example,
“every normative ‘ought’ is simply the ordinary modal ‘ought’ under an ‘in
order that...’ modifier.” More exactly, Finlay’s view is that the truth of
every ought-claim, including those used categorically, is partly determined by
the contextually salient ends that the speaker intends to promote.22 In the
conscientious variation of Tavern, it is hard to see whose ends would be more
relevant than Hans’ and Franz’, and hard to see how those terrible ends would
not determine the standard of evaluation that is relevant for Hans’ ought-claim.
But accepting this first account forces the uniformity view to say that (join)
is true in the conscientious variation of Tavern. After all, (join) is true in the
Nazi Context. And since joining the mob is not what Franz has most reason
to do—this is (fact)—the uniformity view cannot as well say that (join) is
a claim about what Franz has most reason to do. So, in accepting this first
account of the conscientious variation of Tavern, the uniformity view is forced
to say that Hans has here tried but failed to express a claim about what Franz
has most reason to do, expressing instead a true claim that does not express
what he intended. Even though Hans considered which values where relevant
to his situation, reflected on their weights and bearings, and conscientiously
22There are no truly categorical ought-claims on Finlay’s view, merely categorical uses
of normal end-relational ought-claims. Categorical use is characterized as use where one
“presupposes” the relevant ends (Finlay 2009, 331). When the ends that are presupposed are
not shared by the audience, moreover, a speaker’s categorical use of an ought-claim “expresses
the demand that his audience share his concern for the relevant end, and consequently for
the behavior at issue” (Finlay 2009, 333).
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formed the belief that joining the mob is what Franz had most reason to do,
his attempt to express that belief with an ought-claim was frustrated by the
nature of those values, his context, and his choice of words.
This, I think, is a pretty implausible account of what happens in the
conscientious variation of Tavern. What happened, rather, is that Hans said
something that was false: he claimed, with his ought-claim, that joining the
mob is what Franz had most reason to do, and he was wrong. This is so despite
the fact that joining the mob scores highly with respect to all the contextually
salient standards of evaluation which Hans misguidedly endorses (the ones
relevant in the Nazi context). But the uniformity view cannot buttress this
judgment if Hans is truly in the Nazi context. So if this first account of the
conscientious variation of Tavern is correct, then the uniformity view remains
problematic, despite having already escaped the normative challenge.
Here is the second account. What seems to generate a problem in the
conscientious variation of Tavern is the assumption that the contextually
salient standard of evaluation is S1—which is admittedly not a privileged
standard. This is a plausible assumption, of course, since Hans himself—being
a hopelessly misguided Nazi—values such terrible things as the suffering of
Jewish people. But this assumption is nonetheless mistaken. By ostensibly
considering the balance of relevant values, and by explicitly considering what
Franz has most reason to do, Hans has thereby removed himself from the
Nazi context and placed himself into a context providing a super standard of
evaluation instead of S1. Despite Hans’ terrible values, and despite his focus
on those very values, the contextually salient standard of evaluation playing a
37
role in his utterance of ‘Franz ought to join the mob’ is a standard that does
not rank as highest the worlds in which Franz joins the mob.
This account of the conscientious variation avoids the problematic feature
just discussed. It turns out that the uniformity view can, after all, allow for
Hans’ false claim about what Franz has most reason to do. According to
super-standard, recall, any ought-claim contextually resolved with a super
standard is a claim about what an agent has most reason to do. According
to the second account of the conscientious variation of Tavern, conscientiously
attempting to make a claim about what someone has most reason to do thereby
places one in a conversational context providing a super standard for one’s
ought-claims. So Hans’ hopelessly misguided conscientious claim that Franz
ought to join the mob is a false claim about what Franz has most reason to do.
Hans correctly noticed that Franz joins the mob in the worlds ranked highest
by the values he endorses; nonetheless, worlds in which Franz joins the mob
rank quite low given the standard of evaluation contextually provided for his
ought-claim.
This, I think, is not an implausible account of what happens in the con-
scientious variation of Tavern. But it requires the uniformity view to take
up certain commitments about the pragmatic mechanisms that determine the
contextually relevant standard of evaluation. Consider Robert Stalnaker (2014,
24) on contextual relevance in general:
If communication is to be successful the contextual information on
which the content of a speech act depends must be information that
is available to the addressee.
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Call this the Stalnaker Constraint. If the content of an ought-claim depends
on a standard of evaluation that is provided by context, as the uniformity
view suggests, and if the content of Hans’ particular ought-claim is successfully
communicated in the conscientious variation of Tavern, as it is plausible to
assume, then the Stalnaker Constraint tells us that the standard of evaluation
employed by Hans’ ought-claim is one that is in some sense available to Hans
and Franz. But how should we understand this notion of availability?
One natural position would be that, after explicit consideration and en-
dorsement of a certain set of terrible values, the standard of evaluation that is
available to Hans and Franz is S1 and not some super standard taking values
they neither endorse nor have considered. But this natural position is incom-
patible with the plausible assumption that Hans makes a false claim about
what Franz has most reason to do in the conscientious variation of Tavern, and
so incompatible with the second account under consideration. This natural
notion of availability, more exactly, would make it the case that Hans and Franz
are once again in the Nazi Context. This reveals that accepting the second
account of the conscientious variation of Tavern—where Hans and Franz are
not in the Nazi Context—requires accepting a weaker and perhaps less natural
notion of contextual availability. This is a non-trivial commitment, but not
obviously a commitment that leads to serious trouble.
We can generalize my claims in this section and state them in the form of
a dilemma. Call it the contextual standards dilemma:
The Contextual Standards Dilemma: If contextual accounts of the
English ‘ought’ are correct, then misguided conscientious people either
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(a) never make claims about what one has most reason to do, or (b)
are placed in a conversational context providing a super standard of
evaluation by virtue of their conscientiousness.
(Horn #1) If (a), then contextualist accounts seem exposed to coun-
terexamples.
(Horn #2) If (b), then contextualist accounts depend on a yet to be
articulated notion of weak contextual availability.
The context dilemma follows from the fact that only evaluativeSS ought-claims
can express a claim about what an agent has most reason to do. That is, it
follows from my argument in sections 2 and 3 that the uniformity view must
accept super-standard in order to escape the normative challenge. I am not
suggesting that either horn is fatal, though I think embracing (Horn #1) is
more problematic than embracing (Horn #2). Exactly how problematic it is to
embrace (Horn #2), of course, depends on further examination of a carefully
articulated notion of weak contextual availability.23
23Notice how this dilemma differs from the kind of contextual challenge that Dowell (2013,
150-2) has tried to meet. That challenge has to do with the relation between contextual
salience and information that is not available. (Think here of how the challenge originates in
Frank Jackson’s (1991) consequentialist discussion of Dr. Jill.) The challenge I am discussing
here, however, is instead about the relation between contextual salience and normative
standards. This is a challenge that arises, importantly, even for cases where there is no bit
of relevant information that is lacking. (Think here of an omniscient but devious Dr. Jill.)
Relatedly, notice that Finlay’s (2014, 231-236) discussion of “pragmatic disagreements from
different ends” is a discussion about interpersonal disagreement. His discussion, therefore, is
not directly relevant to a dilemma about the pragmatic mechanisms required for placing
speakers in contexts that match our intuitive evaluation of the truth-value of their claims.
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2.7 Conclusion
Let me summarize my argument. Normative philosophy gives pride of place
to the ‘has most reason to’ relation. In its discussion of this central relation,
normative philosophy typically employs the English ‘ought’. Yet it is remarkably
difficult to explain how ‘ought’ could at times express this relation and at
times not. I have here called this explanatory difficulty the normative challenge
and I have claimed that it is a challenge to any contextualist account of the
semantics of the English ‘ought’. As I see it, moreover, succeeding against
this challenge recalls going beyond recent deployments of one widely accepted
contextualist account—the uniformity view. My diagnosis is that not enough
attention has been paid to the contextually relevant standards of evaluation
that figure into ought-claims. Accordingly, I have argued that we can succeed
against the normative challenge by examining the kinds of standards that can
issue in a claim about what someone has most reason to do. But succeeding
against the normative challenge forces the uniformity view into what I have
called the contextual standards dilemma. I do not think that this is fatal to
the uniformity view, but I take it to reveal some of its hidden costs and to
point the way for further exploration.
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CHAPTER 3
ON EVADING THE DEONTIC PUZZLE
3.1 Introduction
Consider the following three claims:
Epistemic Involuntarism (I): It is not the case that believing that p
is within S’s voluntary control.
Epistemic Deontology (D): Some claims of the form ‘S ought to be-
lieve that p’ are true.
The Ought-Implies-Can Principle (OIC): If φ-ing is not within S’s
voluntary control, then it is not the case that the claim ‘S ought to φ’ is
true.
Each is independently plausible. But if (I) is true, then the antecedent of
(OIC) is always true when φ is believing that p; and if (D) is true, then the
consequent of (OIC) sometimes is false when φ is believing that p. Yet the
antecedent of (OIC) cannot always be true and its consequent sometimes false
for the same φ. So while (OIC), (D), and (I) all seem true, at least one them
must be false. Call this The Deontic Puzzle.
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Some have attempted to dispel the deontic puzzle by denying either (I),
(D), or (OIC).1 Yet none of these options is uncontroversial or theoretically
inexpensive: each denial requires silencing strong intuitions, as well as modifying
central aspects of one’s epistemology. Others have attempted to evade the
deontic puzzle by suggesting that, properly understood, (I), (D), and (OIC) are
not in tension in the first place. This alternative has been recently influential,
in fact, with advocates as diverse as Richard Feldman (2000, 2008), Hilary
Kornblith (2001), and Matthew Chrisman (2008, 2012). Evasion has seemed
to many to be the least controversial and the least costly of the available
maneuvers against the puzzle: it does not require silencing strong intuitions
(or not as many, or not as strong), and it does not require modifying central
aspects of one’s epistemology (or not as many, or not as central). Nonetheless,
I will here argue that evading the deontic puzzle is much more costly than
advertised. More exactly, I will argue that evading the deontic puzzle comes
at the cost of normative reasons for belief. The evasive strategy has seemed
attractive to many in part because the severity of its consequences has not
been fully appreciated.
Here is how I proceed. In the first section, I distinguish two aspects
of our normative experience that are too often obscured by generic talk of
normativity: evaluations and prescriptions. In the second section, I make use of
this distinction to shed light on how the evasive strategy disambiguates (D) and
1See Steup (2000, 2008, 2012) and Ryan (2003) for denials of (I), Alston (1988, 2005)
and Papineau (2014) for denials of (D), and Saka (2000) and Graham (2011) for denials of
(OIC).
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(OIC): the former as a claim about evaluative normativity and the latter as a
claim about prescriptive normativity. In the third section, I discuss and criticize
Rik Peels’ (2014) attempt to show that the evasive strategy comes at the cost
of epistemic responsibility. Here I claim that Peels fails to show that this is
truly a consequence of the evasive strategy. In the fourth section, I identify
what I take to be the real cost of the evasive strategy: normative reasons for
belief. My argument here turns on the claim that normative reasons are the
building-blocks of prescriptive normativity. In the fifth and final section, I resist
several attempts to brush aside this consequence as not too uncontroversial
and not too costly after all.
3.2 Evaluations and Prescriptions
Talk of normativity is often obscure. Sometimes such talk is about certain
speech acts ; sometimes it is about certain judgments expressed by certain speech
acts; sometimes it is about certain concepts deployed in certain judgments;
sometimes it is about certain properties captured by certain concepts. Even
worse, it is often unclear what philosophers are indicating when they claim
that a speech act, a judgment, a concept, or a property is normative in the
first place. I want to avoid this kind of obscurity, so I begin by discussing what
I mean by talk of normativity in this paper.
At bottom, talk of normativity is talk of two familiar kinds of experiences.
We experience what I will call evaluative-normativity when we judge a state of
affairs by some standard that we endorse (tacitly or otherwise). When I say
sincerely of a guest that she is extremely polite, for example, I am evaluating
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her behavior with respect to some standard of etiquette that I find appropriate.
When I say sincerely of an actress that she does not deserve to win the award,
for another example, I am evaluating her acting with respect to some artistic
standard that I find appropriate as well. In one case, the evaluation is positive;
in the other, the evaluation is negative. In both cases, I take it, the evaluation
is quite familiar.
Ernest Sosa (2009, 70) has in mind precisely these experiences of evaluative-
normativity when he says:
We humans are zestfully judgmental across the gamut of our ex-
perience: in art, literature, science, politics, sports, food, wine,
and even coffee; and so on, across many other domains. We love
to evaluate even when no practical interest is in play. We judge
performances, whether artistic or athletic; grade products of craft
or ingenuity; evaluate attitudes, emotions, institutions, and much
more.
So when we say that some speech act, judgment, concept, or property is
normative, sometimes we simply mean to indicate their place within these
familiar experiences of evaluative-normativity.
A bit differently, we experience what I will call prescriptive-normativity
whenever we judge that some action or attitude is required of someone or
to be done. When I say sincerely to a friend that he ought to be faithful to
his partner, for example, I typically don’t take myself as merely saying that
cheating scores poorly with respect to a standard that I happen to endorse.
Some such claim seems too parochial to capture what I am trying to convey.
What is characteristic of our experiences of prescriptive-normativity—and
what distinguishes them from our experiences of evaluative-normativity—is
a perception of certain actions as “having a grip” on us (cf. Korsgaard 1996,
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44-6) or being “demanded” of us (cf. Street 2012, 44); a perception of “being
called on” to behave in a certain way (cf. Thomson 2008, 207).2
Stephen Grimm (2009, 253-4) is alluding to these experiences of prescriptive-
normativity when he says:
When we judge a belief to be unjustified or irrational, we seem
to be doing more than just evaluating (in this case, in a negative
way) the skill or virtuosity of the believer’s performance... To judge
someone’s belief to be unjustified or irrational is thus to judge that
the person’s attitude towards the content of the belief should be
reconsidered, in some apparently binding sense of ‘should.’
So when we say that some speech act, or judgment, or concept, or property is
normative, sometimes we mean to indicate something more than merely the fact
that they belong to our familiar experiences of evaluative-normativity. Some-
times we mean to indicate their place within our equally familiar experiences
of prescriptive-normativity instead.
So talk of normativity is at times talk of our experiences of evaluative-
normativity and at times talk of our experiences of prescriptive-normativity.
Sometimes we simply mean to indicate our personal endorsement of some
standard (tacit or otherwise); sometimes we also mean to indicate the perception
of something a bit more binding. A theory of normativity, of course, aims at
explaining what makes it appropriate for some speech act, or judgment, or
concept, or property to play a role in these familiar experiences. But simply
2It is this feature of morality—the fact that we experience its claims as prescriptive-
normative—that Kant (1788, 86) eulogized (“Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that
dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating but requirest submission”) and that Mackie
(1977, 38) took as “utterly different from anything else in the universe,” and as ultimately
reflecting some of our mistaken beliefs about a purely natural world.
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distinguishing between these two kinds of normativity will be sufficient for
now.3
Passages such as the above by Grimm, however, may seem to suggest that
the English ‘ought’ is only appropriate in the context of prescriptive-normativity.
The passage may suggest, that is, that ‘ought’ always serves to express that
something is required or to be done. But this is not the case.
No doubt there is a use of ‘ought’ closely connected to our experiences of
prescriptive-normativity. ‘Ought’, in what we can call prescriptive-normative
ought-claims, expresses that there is an authoritative relation of normative
requirement or obligation holding between a certain agent S and a certain
action φ. This is likely what we mean when we tell a tempted friend that he
ought to be faithful to his partner.4 But there are uses of the English ‘ought’
closely connected to our experiences of evaluative-normativity as well. ‘Ought’,
in what we can call evaluative-normative ought-claims, merely expresses the
ranking of a state of affairs with respect to a standard that is being endorsed
(tacitly or otherwise). This is likely what we mean when we tell a visiting friend
that she ought to take the second exit on the left. The English ‘ought’ is thus
appropriate in contexts of prescriptive-normativity as well as in contexts of
3See Nolfi (2014, 98) for the claim that our experience of prescriptive-normativity is
connected to the giving of advice, guidance, or direction. See Eklund (2013) for discussion of
alternative explanations of what makes speech acts, concepts, or properties appropriate in
normative contexts.
4The source of this normative authority is a matter of debate. Since the term ‘obligation’
is so often and so naturally associated with moral obligation, I will here give preference
to the more neutral term ‘normative requirement’. I will elide the ‘authoritative’ qualifier
throughout.
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evaluative-normativity, depending on what it is used, at that time, to express:
a relation of normative requirement between agents and actions, or merely a
ranking-relation between standards and states of affairs.5
This feature of the English ‘ought’ is quite important. Since evaluative-
normative ought-claims and prescriptive-normative ought-claims express differ-
ent kinds of relations, they can be expected to have different truth conditions.
In particular, it is plausible that only evaluative-normative ought-claims can
be true even when the grammatical subject of the sentence is not capable of
bringing about the relevant state of affairs (cf. Chrisman 2008, 56-7). Consider
the claims:
(C1) The clock ought to strike on the quarter hour.
(C2) Wealthy Americans ought to donate to Oxfam.
Since clocks have no agency, and since striking on the quarter hour is not
an action which clocks can choose to perform or not, (C1) would be false
or incoherent if it claimed that there is a relation of normative requirement
holding between a certain agent (clocks) and a certain action (striking on the
quarter hour). Yet (C2) seems coherent and even true when taken in that way.
Wealthy Americans are agents, after all, and we typically think of them as
perfectly capable of choosing from alternative actions. But the surface-grammar
similarity between (C1) and (C2) does not reflect a normative similarity. While
(C1) is simply an evaluative-normative claim, (C2) is a prescriptive-normative
5See Schroeder (2011) for the claim that this distinction reflects a distinction in the
underlying semantic structure of ought-claims; see Chrisman (2012a) for resistance.
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claim; while (C1) is simply a positive evaluation of a certain state of affairs,
(C2) is a claim about a certain relation of normative requirement that holds
between certain agents and a certain action. As a consequence, claims like (C1)
can be true in kinds of situations where claims like (C2) cannot.
The English ‘ought’ is thus an instructive example of the importance of
being clear about our talk of normativity. I have suggested that, at bottom,
such talk is about our familiar experiences of what I have called evaluative- and
prescriptive-normativity. What the English ‘ought’ illustrates, however, is that
what makes a speech act, a judgment, a concept, or a property appropriate
in the context of one of these experiences may well differ from what makes
it appropriate in the context of the other. This general distinction and this
particular illustration will both be instrumental in the discussion of the evasive
strategy that follows below.6
3.3 The Evasive Strategy
Recall the deontic puzzle: if (I) is true—if it is not the case that forming the
belief that p is within S’s voluntary control—then the antecedent of (OIC) is
always true when φ is believing that p. And if (D) is true—if some claims of
the form ‘S ought to believe that p’ are true—then the consequent of (OIC)
is sometimes false when φ is believing that p. Since the antecedent of (OIC)
6Passages such as the above by Grimm also suggest that speech acts, judgments, concepts,
or properties other than those related to the English ‘ought’ can be part of our experience of
prescriptive-normativity. This suggestion will be important for the discussion in section 5
below.
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cannot always be true and its consequent sometimes false for the same φ, at
least one of the independently plausible (OIC), (D), and (I) must be false.
We can turn the deontic puzzle into an argument against (D):
The Main Argument Against Epistemic Deontology:
1. If φ-ing is not within S’s voluntary control, then it is not the case that
the claim ‘S ought to φ’ is true.
2. It is not the case that believing that p is within S’s voluntary control.
3. So it is not the case that the claim ‘S ought to believe that p’ is true.
The Main Argument seems to show that a commitment to (OIC) and (I) forces
a rejection of (D). But this appraisal is premature. We have already noted the
surface-grammar ambiguity between evaluative-normative ought-claims and
prescriptive-normative ought-claims. Now we must clarify which of these two
kinds of ought-claims are being deployed in the premises of the Main Argument.
The first stage of the evasive strategy is precisely the suggestion that true
claims of the form ‘S ought to believe that p’ are always evaluative-normative
ought-claims and never prescriptive-normative ought-claims. When we say
truly that S ought to believe that p, that is, we are always expressing something
of a kind with what we express by saying that the clock ought to strike on
the quarter hour; we are always merely claiming that S’s believing that p is
well-ranked by a certain standard we endorse, and we are never claiming that
there is a relation of normative requirement holding between S and believing
that p. Let ‘oughtE’ stand for the evaluative-normative sense of the English
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‘ought’ and let ‘oughtP’ stand for the prescriptive-normative sense. We can
then say that, according to the evasive strategy, the proper understanding of
(D) is this:
Epistemic Evaluative-normative Deontology (DE): Some claims
of the form ‘S oughtE to believe that p’ are true.
And not this:
Epistemic prescriptive-normative Deontology (DP): Some claims
of the form ‘S oughtP to believe that p’ are true.
If this interpretation is correct, then the truth of claims of the form ‘S ought to
believe that p’ does not require that S be capable of bringing about the state
of affairs of believing that p.7
The second stage of the evasive strategy is the suggestion that (OIC) cannot
be true if its consequent refers to evaluative-normative ought-claims. Having
voluntary control, after all, is not required for their truth. According to the
evasive strategy, that is, the proper understanding of (OIC) is this:
(OICP): If φ-ing is not within S’s voluntary control, then it is not the
case that the claim ‘S oughtP to φ’ is true.
And not this:
7Kornblith (2001, 238) takes true doxastic ought-claims as expressions of our epistemic
ideals, Chrisman (2008, 364; 2012b, 603) takes them as rules of criticism or state-norms
(respectively), and Feldman (2008, 351) takes them as role oughts. These are three different
accounts of why doxastic oughts are not the kind of ought that requires voluntary control.
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(OICE): If φ-ing is not within S’s voluntary control, then it is not the
case that the claim ‘S oughtE to φ’ is true.
Properly understood, (OIC) is the claim that a certain relation of normative
requirement holds between an agent and an action only if that action is
within that agent’s voluntary control. Properly understood, (OIC) places no
constraints on the truth of any positive or negative mere evaluation.
The third and final stage of the evasive strategy simply replaces the original
premises of the Main Argument with their appropriate disambiguations:
1*. If φ-ing is not within S’s voluntary control, then it is not the case
that the claim ‘S oughtP to φ’ is true.
2. It is not the case that believing that p is within S’s voluntary control.
3*. So it is not the case that the claim ‘S oughtP to believe that p’ is
true.
(3*), however, is no denial of (DE). While (I) and (OICP) show that no
prescriptive-normative ought-claims are true about an individual and her
beliefs, they nonetheless spell no trouble for (DE). Whatever we say about S’s
agency, sometimes it is true that S believing that p is well-ranked according to
the standards that we endorse. The evasive strategy thus amounts to accepting
the conjunction of two claims:
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The Evasive Strategy:
(ES1) (I), (OICP), and (DE).
(ES2) ¬(OICE) and ¬(DP)
This is why evasion has seemed to many to be the least controversial and the
least costly of the available maneuvers against the deontic puzzle: it does not
require a rejection of (I), it does not require a rejection of (OIC), and it does
not require abandoning normative talk of ‘ought to believe’.
3.4 Epistemic Responsibility
My aim is to argue that the evasive strategy is, nonetheless, quite costly and
controversial. This means, first, identifying some controversial consequence of
it and, second, making the case that this consequence is in fact costly. In this
section, I will consider and criticize Rik Peels’ recent attempt to do just that.
According to Peels (2014, 682-3), the evasive strategy comes at the cost
of epistemic responsibility : of it being appropriate to praise or blame S for,
specifically, having the belief that p. You may think, for example, that some
racists are blameworthy for their racist beliefs. That is, you may think that it
is appropriate to blame them for their beliefs and not just for whichever actions
(if any) result from those beliefs. In such a case, you will thereby think that
some racists are epistemically responsible for their racist beliefs. According to
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Peels, the evasive strategy comes at the cost of holding people responsible in
this way.8
The heart of Peels’ (2014, 691) argument is the claim that responsibility,
thus understood, requires voluntary control:
(control) S is responsible for φ-ing only if φ-ing is under S’s voluntary
control.9
There is nothing implausible about (control). But part of the attraction of the
evasive strategy, part of what makes it less costly than alternative strategies
against the deontic puzzle, is that it accepts (I); it accepts that believing that
p is not within our voluntary control. So if (control) is true, then the evasive
strategy comes at the cost of the possibility of being responsible for believing
that p. If (control) is true, that is, then the evasive strategy comes at the cost
of the possibility of ever being blameworthy or praiseworthy for our beliefs.
If both (I) and (control) are true, then, whatever we say about the racist’s
actions, it is simply inappropriate to blame him for what he believes.
Perhaps this is, in fact, a costly consequence of the evasive strategy. Perhaps
we (or some or many of us) have strong intuitions that there really is such a
thing as epistemic responsibility; perhaps sacrificing epistemic responsibility
amounts to, or leads to, modifications in central aspects of our epistemology.
8See Van Woudenberg (2009) for the claim that we do, ordinarily, hold people responsible
for their beliefs in precisely this way.
9According to Peels (2014, 691), moreover, “someone has voluntary control over φ-ing
if and only if one can φ as the result of an intention to φ and one can ¬φ as the result of
an intention to ¬φ.” My criticisms will not turn on whether one accepts this or alternative
accounts of voluntary control.
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I do not wish to consider these possibilities at length here. Instead, my aim
is showing that Peels’ argument has a serious shortcoming. There are widely
accepted reasons for thinking that (control) is false, and Peels has not succeeded
in his attempt to resist them.
According to a widely accepted account, what responsibility requires is
not voluntary control, but rather reason-responsiveness. When S φ’s as a
result of responding to what S perceives as sufficient reasons to φ, according
to this account, then S is the proper subject of praise and blame for φ-ing.
This is because assessments of responsibility are assessments of the quality of
someone’s will, and because the quality of someone’s will is revealed by how
one responds to what one perceives as one’s reasons.10
A reason-responsiveness account of responsibility, in fact, not only motivates
a denial of (control), but it also explains why it is appropriate to hold people
responsible, specifically, for their beliefs. That’s because we typically form
beliefs as a result of appreciating our reasons. As Ryan (2003, 65) puts it, “my
doxastic decisions are guided by what seems to me to be good evidence.” This
hardly seems controversial. But in believing that p as a result of appreciating
our reasons, we thereby reveal something about “our take on the world, on
what is or is not true or important or worthwhile in it” (cf. Hieronymi 2008,
370). So just as we can be blameworthy for how we respond to our perceived
reasons for punching someone in the face, we can be blameworthy for how
we respond to our perceived reasons for believing that p. In believing that p,
10There is a variety of such accounts on offer. See, e. g., Fischer & Ravizza (1998, 62-91),
Ryan (2003, 70-74), Arpaly (2006, 16-7; 19), and Hieronymi (2008, 359-363).
55
just as much, we typically reveal something about the quality of our will. Yet
in both the punching and believing cases, according to reason-responsiveness
accounts, the question of whether the relevant φ-ing was under our voluntary
control is simply irrelevant for assessments of praise and blame.
Since Peels’ argument against the evasive strategy depends on (control), his
argument falls short if such a reason-responsiveness account of responsibility is
correct. Peels (2014, 693) is sensitive to this. He offers the following dilemma
as a reply:
Peels’ Dilemma: S either has or does not have voluntary control over
the higher-order beliefs and reason-responsive processes responsible for
S’s belief that p.
(Horn #1) If S does, then S’s belief that p is under S’s voluntary control
after all.
(Horn #2) If S does not, then S is simply not responsible for S’s belief
that p.
(Horn #1) allows for what we can call indirect voluntary control. The idea
is that our beliefs are under our indirect voluntary control in the same way
that a certain arrangement of furniture in our living room is under our indirect
voluntary control: in both cases, we have control by virtue of several other
actions over which we have direct voluntary control. (Horn #2) claims that
there simply cannot be any responsibility in the absence of either direct or
indirect control.
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I think this reply by Peels is seriously misguided. Peels’ Dilemma fails to
appreciate the full force of the reason-responsiveness account. This account,
after all, is formulated in the backdrop of causal determinism; it is intended to
deliver responsibility, that is, in the absence of any kind of voluntary control.
These accounts, that is, are compatibilist. Consider Ryan (2003, 71):
We cannot, except in unusual cases, control the fact that our beliefs
will be determined by our awareness of the evidence in much the
same way that we cannot control the fact that our actions will
be determined by the laws of nature, and events in the past, if
determinism is true. (My emphasis)
The reason-responsiveness account grants from the very beginning that re-
sponsibility is compatible with complete lack of control. So (Horn #2) simply
begs the question against their very central claim, namely, that responding
to reasons—qua response to reasons, and not qua voluntary action—reveals
something about the quality of our will, and is thus an appropriate object of
praise and blame.11 My claim here, notice, is not that these considerations
settle whether (control) is false. My claim is merely that Peels’ Dilemma
places no pressure on those already committed to a denial of (control). Peels’
Dilemma does not motivate a rejection of the reason-responsiveness account,
that is, it merely assumes it.
So Peels fails to show that the evasive strategy comes at the cost of epis-
temic responsibility. His argument depends on the plausible but widely rejected
11Peels is no doubt entitled to his recalcitrant intuitions. (See, e.g., Peels’ (2014, 693-4)
thought experiment.) But Ryan (2003, 70) is quite explicit about her intentions when she
says: “I do not expect anyone who is unmoved by compatibilism to find plausible the view
I am about to articulate and defend.” See also Steup (2012, 153) for the claim that what
matters for control is not whether our actions are determined but how they are determined.
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(control), and his argument against this widespread rejection falls short. Im-
portantly, this is not to say that the evasive strategy does not come at the cost
of epistemic responsibility. In fact, I will briefly suggest a different argument
for this conclusion at the end of the next section. But appealing to (control),
for the reasons just mentioned, is a dead end.
Before moving on, let me note one more reason for thinking that Peels’
argument against the evasive strategy is less than overwhelming. Suppose
that sacrificing epistemic responsibility is a real consequence of the evasive
strategy. Even then, it is not clear that this is a costly consequence. Both
Kornblith and Feldman, in fact, are quite willing to concede that there is no
such thing as epistemic responsibility: as being praiseworthy or blameworthy
for one’s beliefs.12 Whatever the plausibility of their dismissal of the notion
of epistemic responsibility, there is something at least dialectically misguided
about claiming that a costly consequence of the evasive strategy is something
that two of the three most prominent evaders are antecendently quite willing to
give up. They may well reply that this is not a bug but rather a feature of their
views. So even if Peels had succeeded in showing that sacrificing epistemic
responsibility was a consequence of the evasive strategy—which I have argued
he did not—his argument would still fall short of showing that, by requiring
extensive modifications to central aspects of one’s epistemology, the evasive
12Kornblith (1983, 38) accepts that being justified for believing that p is (at least partially)
a matter of being responsible, but he takes the relevant kind of responsibility here as notion
that applies to epistemically-relevant actions other than belief formation and maintenance.
Feldman (2008, 353) is quite explicit about his doubts regarding ordinary talk of epistemic
responsibility, as well as about what would be lost if such talk turned out to be inappropriate
after all.
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strategy has a consequence that is costly. Much better, that is, if we can
identify a consequence that will seem costly even to those attracted to the
evasive strategy in the first place.
3.5 Undefeated Normative Reasons
I think the real price of the evasive strategy lies elsewhere: it sacrifices the
possibility of normative reasons for belief.13 In this section, I will argue that
this is really a consequence of the evasive strategy. In this next and final section,
I will argue that it is a consequence that is truly costly. My argument here
turns on understanding how normative reasons belong within our experiences
of prescriptive-normativity. While Peels identifies (I) as the commitment that
is problematic for the evasive strategy, I identify ¬(DP) instead. We will arrive
at my argument in three steps.
The first step is accepting the familiar picture of normative reasons as the
building blocks of relations of normative requirement: it is precisely because S
has undefeated authoritative considerations in favor of φ-ing that an author-
itative relation of normative requirement holds between S and φ-ing. While
our reasons are considerations of various strengths in favor of various actions
at a certain time, the balance of these considerations determines what we are
13See Schroeder (2007, 10-15; 2015, sec. 3.1) for the contrast between normative, explana-
tory, and motivating reasons. It is notoriously hard to say something informative about
normative reasons that is neither vague or metaphorical. A grip on the pre-theoretical and
paradigmatic sense in which an innocent person’s unnecessary suffering is a normative reason
against torturing her for fun—the sense in which that fact is an authoritative consideration
against that action—will be enough for present purposes.
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required to do. As Broome (1999, 400) puts it, “If you have a reason to q and
no reason not to q, then you ought to q.” As Skorupski (2010, 48) puts it, “‘x
should ψ’, ‘x ought to ψ’ and ‘it is right for x to ψ’ can all be used to say that
there is a sufficient reason for x to ψ.” Using familiar terminology, the idea
we find here in both Broome and Skorupski is that the prescriptive-normative
English ‘ought’—oughtP, the ‘ought’ that expresses the existence of a relation
of normative requirement between an agent and an action—expresses what we
have all-things-considered reasons to do. I will call this normative rationalism:
(NR) There is a normative requirement for S to φ if and only if (and
because) there is most normative reason for S to φ.14
Accepting (NR), notice, does not require taking a stand on the controversial
question of whether considerations other than evidence can count as a reason
to believe that p.15 It also does not require taking a stand on whether reasons
for belief are reasons to promote some value or to respect some norm.16 (NR)
is simply an account of the source of normative requirements, of the kind of
normativity that we experience as binding. As such, (NR) is compatible with
whatever views one has about what counts as reasons to believe, as well as
whatever views one has about the sources of these reasons. It is important not
14I take this to be one way of expressing the view made famous by W.D. Ross (1930). For
more recent developments, see Broome (1999), Raz (2002), Skorupski (2010), Parfit (2011),
and Smith (2013). See Schroeder (2007) for the contrast between normative, explanatory,
and motivating reasons.
15See Raz (2011, 36) for a negative answer; see Schroeder (2012, 471) for a positive answer.
16See Talbot (2014, 602-3) for defense of the promotion account; see LittleJohn (2013,
359) for defense of the respect account.
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to confuse one’s reasons for rejecting one of these other views with a reason to
reject (NR).
The second step towards my argument is noticing an implication of (NR):
if there is no relation of normative requirement holding between S and φ-ing,
then either (a) there is no reason for S to φ or (b) these reasons are defeated by
reasons in favor of doing something else. At nearly all times, there are available
actions such that it is not the case that S oughtP to perform them at that time.
But this can be so for different reasons. Sometimes this is the case because S
has no reason whatsoever to perform them. Perhaps right now, for example,
I have absolutely no reason to raise my index finger straight up into the air;
consequently, it is not the case that I oughtP to raise my finger in that way:
raising my finger, right now, is not something that I am required to do. But
sometimes it is not the case that S oughtP to perform a certain action despite
in fact having reasons for performing it. Perhaps right now, for example, I
have a reason to have a cup of coffee (say, because I have a certain desire for
it), but have even stronger reasons not to have it (say, because I’ve already had
too many); consequently, once again, it is not the case that I oughtP to have a
cup of coffee: having a cup of coffee is not something that I am required to do.
It is worth stressing that this implication of (NR) does not show that
(NR) forces a choice on the two controversial questions mentioned just above.
Consider Littlejohn (2013, 359):
To think of epistemic reasons as reasons to promote the attaining of
an end, one must think that there is ‘room’ to explain an epistemic
ought in terms of a kind of weighing explanation that’s common
from the practical case. There is no room for that sort of reasoning
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in the theoretical sphere because unlike action, belief serves a single
master.
Littlejohn seems to be making two suggestions here. First, that since only
evidence can be a reason for belief (that is the “single master” he is alluding to
in this passage), a relation of normative requirement holding between S and a
certain belief cannot be explained in terms of the weighing of reasons. Second,
that since a relation of normative requirement holding between S and a certain
belief cannot be explained in terms of the weighing of reasons, reasons for belief
cannot be reasons to promote. If Littlejohn is correct in his first suggestion,
however, then the implication of (NR) under consideration forces a rejection
of the view that only evidence can be a reason for belief. But Littlejohn is
not correct in his first suggestion. Suppose only evidence can be a reason for
belief; suppose some of my evidence points to the butler being guilty and some
of it points to the driver. I see no conceptual reason to think that this could
not be case where my evidence for the butler being guilty is stronger than my
evidence for the driver being guilty, and that therefore my reasons for believing
that the butler did it outweigh my reasons for believing that he did not. So
even if only evidence can be a reason for belief, a requirement-relation holding
between S and a certain belief can nonetheless be explained in terms of the
weighing of reasons.
The third and final step towards my argument is noticing an implication of
the conjunction of (NR) and the evasive strategy’s denial that it is ever true
that S oughtP to believe that p. Given the implication of (NR) just mentioned,
this denial means accepting that it is always true that either:
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(a1) There is no reason for S to believe that p.
Or:
(b1) S’s reasons for believing that p are defeated by S’s reasons in favor
of doing something else.
Since reasons are the building blocks of relations of normative requirement,
denying that a certain relation of normative requirement holds between S and φ
means denying that there are undefeated reasons for S to φ. Denying that there
is ever a relation of normative requirement holding between S and φ, similarly,
means denying that there are ever undefeated reasons for S to φ. It is here that
we see the true cost of the evasive strategy: while it succeeds at escaping the
deontic puzzle by taking doxastic oughts as evaluative-normative ought-claims
that do not require agency, it sacrifices the existence of undefeated normative
reasons for believing that p. It thus retains one kind of epistemic normativity,
alright, but it abandons the kind of epistemic normativity that we experience
as binding.
We can state my argument more precisely in the following way:
The Undefeated Reasons Argument
1. If the evasive strategy is correct, then claims of the form ‘S oughtP to
believe that p’ are always false.
2. If claims of the form ‘S oughtP to believe that p’ are always false, then
there are never undefeated normative reasons for believing that p.
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3. If the evasive strategy is correct, then there are never undefeated
normative reasons for believing that p.
Premise 1 follows from the fact that the evasive strategy accepts both (I) and
(OICP). This is an important element of the evasive strategy, since it thereby
avoids some of the costs of alternative strategies against the deontic puzzle.
Premise 2 follows from the familiar picture of normative reasons as the building
blocks of requirement-relations: (NR). The conclusion is not a rejection of the
evasive strategy, of course, but it may well be taken as good grounds for it.17
Before moving on, let me indicate rather briefly how (NR) can be used in two
further arguments against the evasive strategy. The first argument is similar to
the Undefeated Reasons argument, but stronger. Its strength, however, comes
from accepting two further claims. First, that only evidence can be a reason
for believing that p. Second, that one’s evidence always supports believing,
disbelieving, or suspending judgment with respect to p—alternatively, that
one’s evidence always supports having a specific degree of confidence regarding
p. There is nothing implausible about either of these claims, but they of course
require some defense.18 At any rate, if (NR) and both these claims are true,
17Notice that there is nothing odd or unusual about bits of evaluative-normativity that are
disconnected from normative reasons. Certain thick-concepts—slurs, for example—are clear
examples: they are often sincere evaluations of φ-ing, but evaluations that nonetheless fail
to indicate normative reasons for φ-ing or not. So my argument is not that it is in principle
implausible to claim, as the evasive strategy does, that certain evaluations can be normative
(in one sense) without indicating the existence of normative reasons. See Papineau (2014),
in fact, for an explicit endorsement of the claim that epistemic evaluations do not indicate
normative reasons for belief.
18Schroeder (2015, sec. 4.2), in fact, suggests that these two claims cannot be held together
since evidence can only be a reason for a belief or its negation. He does not, however, consider
the possibility of higher-order evidence being a reason for suspending judgment.
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then the cost of the evasive strategy is not only the possibility of undefeated
normative reasons for belief, but the possibility of normative reasons for belief
altogether. I will not, however, pursue this stronger argument here.
The second argument has the same conclusion as Peels’ argument. The
argument, however, does not depend on Peels’ (control), but rather on the
claim that S is epistemically responsible for believing that p only if there are
reasons for S to believe that p. There is nothing implausible about this claim
either. As Skorupski (2010, 295) puts it: “there can be no reason to blame
someone who had no reason not to do what he did.” This claim, in fact, is not
only compatible with the reason-responsiveness account of responsibility—the
account that allows one to resist Peels’ argument—it may even be essential
to it. (This will depend on whether one takes responding to reasons as one
of or the only way in which we reveal the quality of our will.) But if (NR)
and this claim are both true, then the evasive strategy sacrifices not only the
existence of normative reasons for belief, but also the possibility of epistemic
responsibility. I will also not pursue this argument here.
3.6 Letting Reasons Go
I have suggested that it is a consequence of the evasive strategy that we never
have undefeated normative reasons to believe that p. I now wish to consider two
defensive maneuvers. These are not, however, attempts to reject the Undefeated
Reasons argument. Instead, these are attempts to show that denying that we
ever have reasons to believe that p is not so costly after all. The first maneuver
is to claim that while we can never have reasons to believe that p, we can
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nonetheless have reasons to perform other epistemically relevant actions. The
second maneuver is to claim that while we can never have reasons to believe
that p, in some sense, we can nonetheless have constitutive reasons to believe
that p. I will suggest that neither of these maneuvers succeeds.
Chrisman (2008, 369-70) suggests that evaluative-normative doxastic ought-
claims materially imply prescriptive-normative non-doxastic ought-claims. Con-
sider:
When we say, ‘You ought to disbelieve that the earth is flat’, it is
plausible to suppose that this... implies both intra-personal rules
of action such as ‘You ought to have read your science books and
listened to your parents and teachers’ and inter-personal rules of
action such as ‘Your parents and teachers ought to have taught you
that the earth is not flat’.
Here the first use of the English ‘ought’ is an evaluative-normative ought-claim,
while the second and third uses are prescriptive-normative ought-claims.19 If
Chrisman is correct, then true claims of the form ‘S oughtE to believe that
p’ imply true claims of the form ‘S oughtP to φ’ (where φ is not believing
that p). While we may never have reasons to believe that p, that is, we may
nonetheless have reasons to perform a host of epistemically relevant actions such
as re-considering the evidence as to whether p, gathering more evidence as to
whether p, disseminating reliable information as to whether p to those around
us, and so on. Perhaps the existence of reasons for epistemically relevant actions
19See also Chrisman (2012b, 609): “The validity of state-norms would, I think, come into
question if there were no discernable connection between things that people can choose to
do and conformity to state-norms.”
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makes the consequence of the evasive strategy brought out by the Undefeated
Reasons argument seem less significant.
Whatever we say about the implications of evaluative-normative ought-
claims, I think they hardly suffice as substitutes for the typical role that talk of
reasons has played in epistemology. I have in mind the way that many take the
fact that ‘there is evidence for p’ as either identical or constitutive of the fact
that ‘there is a reason for believing that p’. Call this the evidence principle:
(evidence) If e is evidence for S that p, then e is a reason for S to
believe that p.
There are competing accounts of what can constitute S’s evidence for p, of
course, but (evidence) is compatible with all of them.20 What the Undefeated
Reasons argument shows, however, is that the evasive strategy is committed to
a denial of (evidence). Whatever we say about our reasons to gather evidence
and think carefully about it, I suggest that it is a costly consequence of evasion
that we cannot as well say that the evidence gathered and considered is a
reason to believe that p.
There is, however, another reason why appealing to the implications of
evaluative-normative ought-claims is not enough as a defensive maneuver
20See Turri (2009, 503-504) and Conee & Feldman (2011, 321-23) for the claim that S’s
evidence consists of some of S’s mental states; See Dougherty (2011, 230-31) and Littlejohn
(2012, 99-109) for the claim that S’s evidence consists of certain propositions. All of these
author’s subscribe to (evidence). (evidence) is also neutral on the further question, mentioned
above, of whether only evidence provides reasons for belief.
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against the Undefeated Reasons argument. Recall the passage from Grimm
(2009, 254) quoted in section 1 above:
To judge someone’s belief to be unjustified or irrational is thus
to judge that the person’s attitude towards the content of the
belief should be reconsidered, in some apparently binding sense of
‘should.’
Grimm is here giving expression to a widely accepted picture of epistemic
evaluations as belonging to our experiences of prescriptive-normativity. To say
that someone’s belief is unjustified, according to Grimm, is to indicate that
there is a relation of normative requirement between S and that belief. Given
(NR), this picture of epistemic evaluations thus entails that we sometimes
have undefeated normative reasons for believing (or not believing) that p.
Cuneo (2007, 58) goes so far as calling this feature of epistemic evaluations
a “platitude.”21 So another consequence of the evasive strategy brought out
by the Undefeated Reasons argument is the denial of this picture of epistemic
evaluations as binding. I suggest that this is also a costly consequence of
evasion.
I have suggested that even if Chrisman is correct in his claim that evaluative-
normative ought-claims imply prescriptive-normative ought-claims, this is
not enough to mitigate the cost of the evasive strategy brought out by the
Undefeated Reasons argument. This first defensive maneuver, that is, provides
21Cuneo (2007, 58-9) says “epistemic facts are authoritative in the following twofold sense.
They are authoritative, in the first place, insofar as they are prescriptive. That is to say,
epistemic facts are, imply, or indicate reasons for properly situated agents to behave in
certain ways... The second sense in which epistemic facts are authoritative is that some
such facts inescapably govern our conduct. The fundamental idea in this case is that some
epistemic facts are, imply, or indicate categorical reasons for agents to behave in certain
ways.”
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no defense at all. There is, however, a second defensive maneuver available to
the evasive strategy. Consider Chrisman’s (2008, 349-50) distinction between
extrinsic reasons for believing that p and constitutive reasons for believing that
p:
Constitutive reasons for the belief that p are reasons that bear on the
question whether p... By contrast, extrinsic reasons for the belief
that p are reasons that count in favor of believing p independently
of whether p... Evidence provides constitutive reasons for belief,
while other considerations provide (if anything) extrinsic reasons
for belief.
Perhaps the Undefeated Reasons argument shows only that the evasive strategy
comes at the cost of extrinsic reasons to believe that p; perhaps there is
then room for the claim that we can nonetheless have constitutive reasons for
believing that p. Perhaps the existence of constitutive reasons for belief, even
in the absence of extrinsic reasons for belief, makes the consequence of the
evasive strategy brought out by the Undefeated Reasons argument seem less
significant.
Once again, I do not think that this maneuver—even if we accept it—is
enough to mitigate the force of the Undefeated Reasons argument. Notice
that claiming that the Undefeated Reasons argument is consistent with there
nonetheless being constitutive reasons for believing that p is tantamount to
suggesting that evidence for p constitutes a kind of reason for believing that
p that is not a building-block of relations of normative requirement. One
immediate consequence of this maneuver, then, is once again the denial of
the familiar picture of epistemic evaluations as prescriptive-normative. Most
of us don’t think of evidence as providing us with a lesser, non-binding kind
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of reason; yet constitutive reasons would have to be some such lesser kind if
they are taken as compatible with the Undefeated Reasons argument. So this
maneuver does not eliminate at least one the costly consequences of evasion
already mentioned.22
I suggest that these considerations—if not individually, then together—show
that if the Undefeated Reasons argument is sound, then the evasive strategy
is quite costly indeed. In the previous section, of course, I have argued that
the Undefeated Reasons argument is, in fact, sound. So I conclude that the
real costly consequence of evasion is sacrificing the possibility of undefeated
normative reasons for belief.
3.7 Conclusion
These considerations, notice, do not suggest that (DE) is false.
(DE): Some claims of the form ‘S oughtE to believe that p’ are true.
Perhaps some claims about what we ought to believe really are evaluative-
normative ought-claims. But contrary to what some have suggested, it matters
to normative epistemology that (DP) is true as well.
(DP): Some claims of the form ‘S oughtP to believe that p’ are true.
22Also, there are reasons—good reasons, I think—to reject the claim that the Undefeated
Reasons argument is consistent with there being constitutive reasons for believing that
p. That’s because this would require epistemic reasons to be a kind of reason that is
radically different from practical reasons. This suggestion, however, is implausible. See, e.g.
Kornblith (2002, ch. 5), Turri (2011, 384), Littlejohn (2012, 105-6), Booth (2012, 511-512),
and Schroeder (2015, sec. 3.2).
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It is important that some claims about what we ought to believe really are
prescriptive-normative. It is only if there are relations of normative requirement
binding S as an agent to some of her beliefs—that is, only if there are undefeated
normative reasons for believing that p—that we can make sense of common
claims, such as Grimm’s above, that epistemic evaluations are somehow binding.
But when (D) is understood as (DP), the deontic puzzle is still very much alive:
the Main Argument entails that (DP) is false, and resisting it seems to require
a denial of the independently plausible (I) or (OICP). So while the evasive
strategy allows us to retain most of the surface-features of ordinary normative
discourse, it requires silencing powerful intuitions (that we sometimes have
normative reasons to believe that p) as well as modifying other aspects of
one’s epistemology (the deontic aspects connected to having reasons, such
as the bindingness of epistemic evaluations). Whatever the merits of the
evasive strategy against the deontic puzzle, the strategy seems to me far from
uncontroversial and theoretically inexpensive.
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CHAPTER 4
DEONTOLOGICAL EVIDENTIALISM,
WIDE-SCOPE REQUIREMENTS, AND
PRIVILEGED VALUES
4.1 Introduction
John Locke is famous for prescribing a close connection between evidence and
belief. Here is a representative passage:
We should keep a perfect indifference for all opinions, not wish any
of them true, or try to make them appear so; but being indifferent,
receive and embrace them according as evidence, and that alone,
gives the attestation of truth. (Conduct, §34)
On one natural reading of this and other passages, Locke seems to endorse the
claim that I will call deontological evidentialism:
(DE) S ought to form and maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s
evidence.
The English ‘ought’ here expresses an authoritative relation of normative
requirement or obligation. Fully stated, (DE) is thus the claim that there is
an authoritative relation of normative requirement that holds between each
individual and the complex of actions and attitudes that constitute forming
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and maintaining one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s evidence.1 As some have
put it in different contexts, (DE) sees this normative requirement as “having a
grip” on us (cf. Korsgaard 1996, 44-6), as something that is “demanded” of us
(cf. Street 2012, 44), and as something “utterly different from anything else in
the universe” (cf. Mackie 1977, 38).
Locke’s argument for (DE) has two descriptive premises and one normative
premise. The first descriptive premise is the claim that God wants us to do
our best to avoid believing that p if p is false (cf. Essay, iv, xvii, 24). The
normative premise is the claim that if God wants us to φ then we have a
normative requirement to φ (cf. Essay, xx, xxviii, 7-8). From these it follows
that we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing that p
if p is false. The second descriptive premise is the claim that doing our best to
avoid believing that p if p is false is constituted by forming and maintaining
our beliefs in accordance with our evidence (cf. Essay, iv, xx, 3). From these
it follows that (DE) is true. Locke’s defense of (DE) is thus both theistic and
moral. We have a normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs in
accordance with our evidence because of a God-created moral requirement to
do our best to avoid believing that p if p is false.2
1The source of this normative authority is a matter of debate. Since the term ‘obligation’
is so often and so naturally associated with moral obligation, I will here give preference
to the more neutral term ‘normative requirement’. I will elide the ‘authoritative’ qualifier
throughout.
2Some argue that Locke took his evidentialism to be restricted to those propositions
that are of most importance to us (e.g. those about religion and morality). See Wolterstorff
(1996, 63-66) for a defense of this reading. Since Locke’s views are not my main focus, I will
put this exegetical detail to the side.
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To my knowledge, Locke is the first to argue explicitly for (DE). Yet those
who do not believe in God will naturally find this argument unconvincing.
Even some who do believe in God will likely disagree with Locke’s description
of what God wants of us and our beliefs. Perhaps, for example, God wants us
to believe in his existence, in his salvific actions, and so forth, not on the basis
of evidence but rather on the basis of trust and love and faith.3 There is a very
small audience, that is, for whom Locke’s argument has any pull. (This is no
refutation of his argument, of course; I will not offer one here.) Nonetheless,
(DE) remains alive and well. My interest in this paper is in examining two
alternative arguments in its defense.
Here is how I proceed. In the first section, I discuss Berit Brogaard’s (2014)
reply to W.K. Clifford’s well-known defense of (DE). My aim here is clarifying
her use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements
against Clifford. In the second section, I discuss how we can turn Stephen
Grimm’s (2009) recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity
into a novel argument for (DE). I argue, however, that the distinction between
narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements—used by Borgaard against Clifford—
is effective when used against Grimm as well. In the third section, I take
time to fill-in the details of Richard Feldman’s (2000, 2001, 2008) defense of
(DE) and I clarify the unstated commitments that it involves. In the fourth
section, I discuss Hilary Kornblith’s (2001) reply to Feldman’s defense. I argue
that Kornblith’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope
3See Plantinga and Wolterstorff (1983).
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requirements only allows for a reply that is incomplete: it correctly identifies
what is wrong with Feldman’s defense, but it provides the incorrect explanation
for why this is so. In the fifth and final section, I provide an alternative reply.
I argue that Feldman fails to appreciate the distinction between ought-claims
that are true relative to some arbitrary value and ought-claims that are true
relative to privileged values : values that have normative authority over us.4
4.2 The Consequentialist Moral Argument
According to Clifford, false beliefs always have negative moral consequences.
His prime example is of a shipowner whose false belief that his ship is seaworthy
costs the lives of several innocent families. Because of such inescapable negative
moral consequences, Clifford takes it that we have a normative requirement to
do our best to avoid believing that p if p false. Since doing our best to avoid
believing that p if p is false is constituted by forming and maintaining our
beliefs in accordance with our evidence, it once again follows that we have a
4Cowie (2014, 4003) argues that there is a presumptive case in favor of what he calls
intrumentalism about epistemic normativity: the claim that “there is reason to believe in
accordance with one’s evidence because this is an excellent means of fulfilling the goals that
one has, or should have.” His argument, however, is entirely negative. It is a product of his
(2014, 4004) criticism of what he takes as the only non-error-theoretic prominent alternative,
which he calls intrinsicalism about epistemic normativity: the claim that “there is reason to
believe in accordance with one’s evidence in virtue of a brutely epistemic normative truth
relating belief to evidence, or to some other epistemic property such as truth, or epistemic
rationality”. The Lockean views of epistemic normativity discussed here, however, do not
fit within either of these prominent categories. They explain epistemic normativity—unlike
intrinsicalism—but do not appeal in any way to our goals—unlike instrumentalism. This is
another reason—besides their historical influence and surface plausibility—why they deserve
the separate and careful treatment they receive here.
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normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with
our evidence. Call this the consequentialist moral argument for (DE):
The Consequentialist Moral Argument
1. False beliefs always have negative moral consequences.
2. If false beliefs always have negative moral consequences, then we have
a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing that p if p is
false.
3. So we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing
that p if p is false.
4. Doing our best to avoid believing that p if p is false is constituted by
forming and maintaining our beliefs in accordance with our evidence.
C. So we have a normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs
in accordance with our evidence.
Notice that the difference between the Locke’s theistic moral argument and
Clifford’s consequentialist moral argument is minimal. The latter appeals to
negative moral consequences while the former appeals to God’s binding desires.
Otherwise the arguments are identical. Yet notice the irony as well: Locke
relies on his religious beliefs in his defense of (DE) and Clifford offers a nearly
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identical argument, for the very same position, in his famous polemic against
religion. (DE), we can say, is an equal opportunity employer.5
Clifford’s moral consequentialist argument is often rejected on the basis
of simple counter-examples. Sometimes, for example, believing against the
evidence is life-saving and nothing else seems to hang in the balance. Perhaps
a patient in critical care will increase her chances of survival by a non-trivial
degree if she believes, against the evidence, that she is very likely to recover
(cf. Feldman 2006, 30). Even if this belief is false, it does not seem to have
negative moral consequences. So this seems to be a counter-example to premise
(1). Sometimes, for another example, believing against the evidence is simply
trivial and isolated. Perhaps a certain shopkeeper quite uncritically believes,
against the evidence, that the apples she just picked are the best apples in the
supermarket (cf. Haack 2001, 24). Even if this belief is false, it once again does
not seem to have negative moral consequences. So this seems to be another
counter-example to premise (1).
Recently, however, Berit Brogaard (2014) has offered an alternative reply
to Clifford’s consequentialist moral argument. Brogaard notes that beliefs only
give way to actions when coupled with dominant desires. If I believe that
kicking a dog will not cause it pain and yet have no desire to kick a dog, then my
belief will not by itself produce an act of kicking the dog. Similarly, if I have a
desire to kick a dog but do not believe that the dog in front of me is a dog, then
the desire will not by itself produce an act of kicking the dog. Brogaard thus
5I read Clifford differently from Brogaard (2014, 2). She takes him as committed to the
premise that “false beliefs could have morally harmful consequences” (my emphasis).
77
infers that Clifford was mistaken in thinking that negative moral consequences
gave rise to a normative requirement against forming and maintaining certain
beliefs. Since negative moral consequences are the consequences of actions, they
at best give rise to normative requirements against forming and maintaining
those things that can properly give way to actions: dominant belief-desire pairs.
While Clifford claims that we have a normative requirement to avoid false
beliefs, Brogaard claims that we have a normative requirement to avoid harmful
belief-desire pairs. But the latter requirement can be satisfied in two different
ways: we can either refrain from forming and maintaining the relevant belief or
we can refrain from forming and maintaining the relevant desire. As Brogaard
notices, this suggests that the difference between Clifford’s claim and hers
is in fact a difference in the scope of premise (2). While Clifford sees the
connection between belief and action as giving rise to a narrow-scope normative
requirement, Brogaard sees the same connection as giving rise to a wide-scope
requirement instead:
(narrow1) If false beliefs always have negative moral consequences, then
we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing that
p if p is false.
(wide1) If false beliefs always have negative moral consequences, then
we have a normative requirement to be such that, if we have a false belief
that p, then we refrain from forming the dominant desire d which, when
coupled with p, would give way to an action that has negative moral
consequences.
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If (narrow1) is true, then the Clifford’s consequentialist moral argument goes
through. But if (narrow1) is false and (wide1) is true instead, then the argument
is unsound. In fact, if Brogaard is right, then there is nothing particularly
worrisome about false beliefs in themselves. Any belief can become part of a
harmful belief-desire pair, so any belief can be such that one way of satisfying
our normative requirements is to refrain from believing it.6
Notice, however, that Brogaard’s reply to Clifford does not show that we
do not have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing that p
if p is false. It does not show, that is, that premise (3) is false. What it shows
instead is that Clifford’s defense of this claim—by way of premises (1) and (2)
of his consequentialist moral argument—is unsound. This is because premise
(2) is false: even if false believes always have negative moral consequences, it
does not follow from this that we have a normative requirement to do our best
to refrain from believing them. Put a bit differently, what Brogaard succeeds in
showing is that correctly understanding the relation between beliefs and actions
supports (wide1) instead of (narrow1). Yet there may be different arguments
for the claim that we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid
believing that p if p is false—arguments for Clifford’s premise (3) that do not
6Talk of wide and narrow scope is here talk about the place of the deontic operator in
the underlying logical structure of premise (2). Let ‘’ represent a normative requirement,
let ‘F’ stand for ‘false beliefs always have negative moral consequences’, and let ‘E’ stand
for ‘avoids believing that p if p is false’. Then (narrow1) has the form ∀x (Fx→Ex). Now
let ‘B’ stand for ‘has a false belief that p’ and let ‘R’ stand for ‘refrains from forming the
dominant desire d which, when coupled with p, would give way to an action that has negative
moral consequences’. Then (wide1) has instead the form ∀x (Fx→(Bx→Rx)). I will leave
the details about underlying logical structure merely implicit throughout. For a broader
discussion of wide and narrow scope requirements in connection to rationality, see Kolodny
(2005), Broome (2007), Schroeder (2009), and Way (2011).
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rely on Clifford’s premise (2). In fact, we have already seen one such argument.
For Locke, recall, God simply does not want us to have false beliefs about His
world, whatever the actions such beliefs may or may not produce. This shows
that Brogaard’s success against Clifford is compatible with (DE) being true.
The question I ask in the next section is thus the following: is there a sound
defense of the claim that we have a normative requirement to do our best to
avoid believing that p if p is false that does not appeal to either God’s binding
desires or to (narrow1)? I will consider and reject one such attempt.
4.3 The Grimm-Inspired Moral Argument
Stephen Grimm (2009, 253-4) claims that epistemic evaluations have a charac-
teristic kind of normative force:
To judge someone’s belief to be unjustified or irrational is thus
to judge that the person’s attitude towards the content of the
belief should be reconsidered, in some apparently binding sense of
‘should’... If I accept that a certain belief of mine is ‘inapt’ I seem
now to have a reason to do something about my attitude toward
the content of the belief.
On one natural reading, Grimm’s talk of epistemic evaluations as intimately
connected to a “binding sense of should” and to “reasons” reveals that he
takes epistemic evaluations to convey that certain normative requirements hold
between individuals and their beliefs. That is, though Grimm’s claims are about
epistemic evaluations such as “S is justified in believing that p,” he seems to
either take them as the same kinds of claim as (DE) or as intimately connected
to such claims—by entailment, implication, pragmatics, and so on. Grimm
(2009, 258-9), moreover, claims that these relations of normative requirement,
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conveyed by epistemic evaluations and holding between individuals and their
beliefs, have a moral source. So although Grimm does not defend (DE) himself,
it seems appropriate to examine the prospects for a Grimm-inspired attempt
to rescue the moral arguments we find in Locke and Clifford.7
As I’ve mentioned, Grimm’s own interest is in explaining the normative
force of epistemic evaluations—the fact that they are intimately connected to a
“binding sense of should” and to “reasons”. On one hand, it is implausible to
take this force as a product of the intrinsic value of all true beliefs. Intuitively,
true beliefs about the number of blades of grass on my lawn are not intrinsically
valuable, even if they may sometimes serve esoteric purposes or take part
in promoting idiosyncratic desires. On the other, restricting one’s views of
which true beliefs have intrinsic values while at the same time holding that
the normative force of epistemic evaluations is relative to these values seems
to commit us to the view that epistemic evaluations do not apply to certain
beliefs. If true beliefs about the number of blades of grass on my lawn are
not intrinsically valuable, then I could not be justified in having them even
after careful and diligent field research. Grimm’s claims about the nature
of the normative force of epistemic evaluations thus aim at explaining how
those evaluations apply to any and all beliefs without being committed to the
implausible claim that all of them have intrinsic value.
Here is how Grimm (2009, 258-9) puts his suggested explanation:
Even though we might not care less about some belief (or better,
some topic), it is nonetheless the case that other people might care
7Grimm (2009, 259 fn. 32) is in fact aware that his claims are, as he puts it, “Cliffordian.”
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about the topic a great deal... Given that someone... might depend
on us as potential sources of information about this topic, it seems
that we have an obligation not to be cavalier when we form beliefs
about the question... As a potential source of information for others,
we have an obligation to treat any topic or any question with due
respect.
There are at least two controversial claims worth highlighting from this passage.
First, the claim that, for any belief or topic, it is a relevant possibility that
someone might care about that topic a great deal. Second, the claim that, for
any belief or topic, we might find ourselves in a situation where someone who
cares a great deal about that belief or topic depends on us for information
about that belief or topic. These two claims are not obviously true, yet I will
not examine them here in any detail. Now notice what Grimm concludes from
these two claims: we have a normative requirement not to be cavalier when we
form our beliefs, and we have a normative requirement to treat any belief with
due respect. These are, of course, rather vague conclusions and it is unclear
to me how Grimm would prefer to make them more precise. I therefore do
not intend what follows as an interpretation of his own views. What is clear,
however, is that one way of making these conclusions more precise produces a
new moral argument for (DE). Call this the Grimm-inspired moral argument
for (DE):
The Grimm-Inspired Moral Argument
1. It is possible that there is someone who cares a great deal about
whether p and who will at some time depend on us for information about
whether p.
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2. If it is possible that there is someone who cares a great deal about
whether p and who will at some time depend on us for information about
whether p, then we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid
believing that p if p is false.
3. So we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing
that p if p is false.
4. Doing our best to avoid believing that p if p is false is constituted by
forming and maintaining our beliefs in accordance with our evidence.
C. So we have a normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs
in accordance with our evidence.
Here we take “doing one’s best to avoid believing that p if p is false” as an
interpretation of what it means to refrain from being cavalier about our belief
formation and of what it means to treat beliefs with due respect. Besides
premises (1) and (2), notice, the Grimm-inspired moral argument is identical
to the theistic and the consequentialist moral arguments that we find in Locke
and Clifford. Premises (1) and (2), that is, attempt to offer a defense of the
claim that we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing
that p if p is false, yet one that does not appeal to either God’s binding desires
or to the negative moral consequences of certain actions.8
8There is a consequentialist reading of premise (2) that makes this last claim false.
According to this reading, what makes us required to be good sources of information are
the negative moral consequences of the action of providing bad information. This is neither
the appropriate reading of Grimm’s intentions—to my mind—or the sense of premise (2)
that I intend here. I take it instead as the claim that there is something disrespectful
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This defense, however, fails. Premise (2) is once again false. It reflects
a mistaken picture of the normative requirements that we have in virtue of
the interests and needs of others. The picture is the following: we are each
required to put ourselves in a position where we can best assist anyone who may
need our assistance in promoting their (non-immoral or otherwise conflicting)
interests. But this seems excessive. It places, in fact, an intolerable moral
burden on each of us. There is an incredible variety of possible ways in which
the many interests and many needs of others may come to somehow depend on
us. In fact, there is simply no consistent combination of actions and attitudes
that amounts to putting ourselves in a position where we can best assist all
of these potential dependencies. Perhaps there is some reason in favor of
putting ourselves in a position where we can best assist each of these potential
dependencies. But the claims that we are required to put ourselves in a position
where we can best assist anyone who may need our assistance in promoting
their (non-immoral or otherwise conflicting) interests entails a widespread and
inescapable proliferation of normative dilemmas. This gives us good reason to
reject the picture of the normative requirements that we have in virtue of the
interests and needs of others that is reflected in premise (2). This also gives us
good reason to reject premise (2) itself.
There is, nonetheless, something that rings true about Grimm’s claims.
There seems to be some important connection between belief, testimony, and
about providing someone with bad information, whether or not there are negative moral
consequences to it. In this sense, premise (2) is akin to a Kantian appeal to the inherent
dignity of individuals.
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the respect we owe to individuals. But we can capture what is true and
important in the vicinity without accepting premise (2). While Grimm is
mistaken when he says that “as a potential source of information for others,
we have an obligation to treat any topic or any question with due respect,” it
seems true that as an actual source of information for someone, we have an
obligation to treat that someone with due respect. This is not an intolerable
moral burden. Though there is an incredible variety of possible ways in which
the many interests and many needs of others may come to somehow depend on
us, there is only a small amount of actual such dependencies at any given time.
In fact, the structure of the requirement that this reformulation of Grimm’s
suggestion yields shows that here there is a consistent combination of actions
and attitudes that consists in treating every person with an actual dependence
on us with due respect.
Here I take a page from Brogaard’s reply to Clifford. While Grimm claims
that we have a normative requirement to be good sources of information, I claim
that we have a normative requirement not to be bad sources of information.
But the latter requirement can be satisfied in two different ways: we can
either be good sources of information or we can refrain from being a source
of information in the first place. This suggests that the difference between
Grimm’s claim and mine is also a difference in the scope of premise (2). While
Grimm sees the respect we owe to individuals as giving rise to a narrow-scope
normative requirement, I see the same bond as giving rise to a wide-scope
requirement instead:
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(narrow2) If it is possible that there is someone who cares a great deal
about p and who will at some time depend on us for information about
whether p, then we have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid
believing that p if p is false.
(wide2) If it is possible that there is someone who cares a great deal
about p and who will at some time depend on us for information about
whether p, then we have a normative requirement to be such that, if we
inform someone about p, then we are a good source of information about
p.
If (narrow2) is true, then the Grimm-inspired moral argument goes through.
But if (narrow2) is false and (wide2) is true instead, then the argument is
unsound. It does not follow from (wide2) that we have a normative requirement
to do what puts us in a position to be good sources of information: doing our
best to avoid believing that p if p is false. What follows from (wide2) is merely
that we have a normative requirement to either do what puts us in a position
to be good sources of information with respect to whether p or refrain from
being a source of information about whether p at all.9
9One may worry that in trying to avoid the demandingness of Grimm’s view we have
swung too far towards the opposite extreme. On the suggested alternative, our epistemic
normative requirements may seem too easy to fulfill. In particular, the alternative seems to
lose an apparent virtue of Grimm’s view, namely, the fact that the interests of future people
give rise to normative requirements that bind us now. This worry, as I see it, misconstrues
the proposed alternative. The requirement to be such that, if we inform someone about p,
then we are a good source of information about p, does bind us now and, moreover, it arises
due to the possibility that someone who cares about p might come to depend on us in the
future. On this matter, the Grimmean view and the alternative are in agreement; they differ
merely in the nature of the requirement that they identify. I am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for bringing this worry to my attention.
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Just as Brogaard’s reply to Clifford, of course, my claims here do not show
that we do not have a normative requirement to do our best to avoid believing
that p if p is false. What they show—if successful—is rather that a defense of
this claim by way of premises (1) and (2) of the Grimm-inspired moral argument
is unsound. Since it is implausible that the respect we owe to individuals gives
rise to an intolerable moral burden, (narrow2) is false. And premise (3) does
not follow from the more plausible (wide2). Is there a defense of premise (3)
that does not appeal to God’s binding desires, (narrow1), or (narrow2)? I will
consider and reject one such suggestion next.
4.4 The Epistemic Point-Of-View Argument
Richard Feldman (2000, 679) accepts that we ought to form and maintain
our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. Moreover, he sees himself as
showing that Locke’s evidentialism can be separated from Locke’s own apparent
commitment to doxastic voluntarism (cf. Feldman 2001, 89-90), and as showing
that Clifford’s evidentialism can be separated from Clifford’s own moral defense
of it (cf. Feldman 2006, 20). It seems we have good reason to take Feldman
as attempting to provide new and better grounds for (DE). In this section,
I want to clarify the argument that he offers. The argument appeals to the
epistemic point-of-view, to what’s valuable from that point-of-view, and to a
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certain sense of English ‘ought’. I will first clarify each of these three elements
before stating his argument with some precision.10
I have an uncle who is a teacher. I also have an uncle who is a businessman.
With some abstraction, we can say that I have an uncle who at times plays
the role of the teacher, and that I have an uncle who at times plays the role
of the businessman. With a bit more abstraction, we can say that there is a
way to see things from the teacher point-of-view, and that there is a way to see
things from the businessman point-of-view. We can make sense, for example,
of a school administrator who says:
“I used to be a teacher, you know? So, from the teacher point-
of-view, I see that we need smaller classrooms. But now I am a
businesswoman. And, from the businesswoman point of view, I see
that we need our classrooms to get even bigger.”
There is a tacit appeal here to the different roles that one can play in life and
an explicit appeal to the point-of-views that we take from within these roles.
At any rate, I take it that we have an intuitive grasp of what this administrator
means.
In the sense just mentioned, it seems we each play a variety of roles in life.
Some of these roles, as the two examples just above suggest, correspond to our
professions. But not every role that we play are jobs. Some of us play the role
of the husband, for example, and some of us play the role of the father. All of
us, however, play the role of the believer. That is, we are all engaged in the
activity of forming, maintaining, and revising our beliefs. Accordingly, just as
10My discussion here puts together as a unified picture the claims we find in Feldman
(2000, 676), Feldman (2001, 87-9), and Feldman (2008, 349-52).
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with every role, there is a way to see things from that point-of-view. This is
the believer’s point-of-view. If we have an intuitive grasp of what it means to
make claims about the teacher’s point of view, perhaps we have an intuitive
grasp of what it means to make claims about the believer’s point-of-view as
well.
We can move from an understanding of the believer’s point-of-view to an
argument for (DE) once we accept three substantive principles. The first is the
claim that there is a correct way to perform each role. We can call this the
correctness principle:
(correctness) For each role, there is a correct way to perform that role.
Take the role of the teacher. It seems there is a correct way to perform that role,
such that one can perform it badly and even try but fail to perform it in the
first place. A teacher who grades her student’s math work on the basis of how
many times her favorite number is mentioned, for example, is not performing
well in the role of the teacher. Take the role of the businessman. It seems there
is a correct way to perform that role as well. A businessman who routinely
sells his product for less than what it costs to produce it, for example, is not
performing well in the role of the businessman. The same is true, of course, of
the role of the believer. It seems there is a correct way to perform that role as
well.
The second principle answers a very natural question: what determines the
correct way to perform a certain role? The answer is that the correct way to
perform a role is determined by what is valuable from the point-of-view of that
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role. For each role R, that is, there is an associated notion of R-value. We
can determine the correct way to perform a certain role R by examining which
actions are most conducive to the things or states that are R-valuable. We can
call this the value principle:
(value) The correct way to perform some role R is determined by what
is R-valuable.
Take the role of the teacher once again. Some things and states are valuable
from the point-of-view of the teacher—they are teacher-valuable. Perhaps these
include explaining things clearly, being patient, being unbiased, being a fair
grader, and so on. The correct way to perform the role of the teacher, then,
is determined by reference to these teacher-valuable actions and states. This
is why grading a student’s math work on the basis of how many times your
favorite number is mentioned counts as performing badly in the role of the
teacher. The same is true of the role of the believer. There are actions and
states that are valuable from the point-of-view of the believer—actions and
states that are believer-valuable—and these are the actions and states that
determine the correct way to perform the role of the believer.
We are almost in a position to see how we can move from an understanding
of the believer’s point-of-view to an argument for (DE). What is missing is
a third substantive principle, this time about a certain sense of the English
‘ought’. It seems there is a sense of ‘ought’ that is used to indicate correct
performance in a certain role. These are what we can call role oughts. Ought-
claims that employ role oughts—claims of the form “S oughtR to φ,” where
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‘oughtR’ indicates the employment of a role ought—are made true by what is
valuable from the point-of-view of the relevant role. We can call this the ought
principle:
(ought) The claim ‘S oughtR to φ’ is true iff φ-ing maximizes what is
R-valuable.
Take the role of the teacher for one last time. Consider the claim that a teacher
oughtR to give good lectures. If this is true, it is true because giving good
lectures maximizes what is valuable from the teacher’s point of view. Similarly,
consider the claim that a businessman oughtR to make profitable deals. If this
is true, it is true because making profitable deals maximizes what is valuable
from the businessman’s point of view. In precisely this sense, the claim that a
believer oughtR to φ is true depending on whether φ-ing maximizes what is
valuable from the believer point-of-view.
Consider how Feldman (2008, 351) puts all of this together:
There is a sense of ‘ought’ that depends upon the proper carrying
out of a particular role... What I ought to do in my role as a teacher
is give interesting lectures and grade in an unbiased way... Similarly,
I think, as a believer I ought to follow my evidence. That is the
right way to carry out that role.
I will follow Feldman in referring to the point-of-view of the believer as the
epistemic point-of-view. I will refer to relevant sense of ‘ought’ as the epistemic
role ought: oughtER. The heart of Feldman’s defense of (DE) can thus be
stated as the following claim: we oughtER to form and maintain our beliefs in
accordance with our evidence since forming and maintaining beliefs according
to our evidence maximizes what is valuable from the epistemic point-of-view.
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Since Feldman takes himself as rescuing Locke’s and Clifford’s evidentialism
from doxastic voluntarism and from appeals to morality, respectively, we have
reason to believe that Feldman takes epistemic role oughts to express our
sui generis epistemic normative requirements.11 Call this the point-of-view
argument for (DE):
The Point-of-View Argument
1. We are all performing the role of the believer.
2. If S is performing the role of the believer, then S oughtER to form and
maintain one’s beliefs according to one’s evidence.
3. So we oughtER to form and maintain our beliefs according to our
evidence.
4. If we oughtER to form and maintain our beliefs according to our
evidence, then we have a normative requirement to form and maintain
our beliefs in accordance with our evidence.
C. So we have a normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs
in accordance with our evidence.
With appropriate restrictions on the quantifier, perhaps premise (1) is true.
Premise (2), however, requires some careful defense. Feldman’s defense of it
11In this way, Feldman rejects his earlier claim (Feldman 1988, 240-3) that epistemic
ought-claims should be understood in the same way as we understand the ‘ought’ in ‘we
ought to pay our mortgage’. As he sees it, the latter is a case of a contractual ought, yet
there is no sense in which we are bound by any contract (explicit or implicit) to believe in a
certain way.
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turns on the claim that rationality is what is fundamentally valuable from
the epistemic point-of view, and on his claim that rationality is a matter of
forming and maintaining one’s beliefs according to one’s evidence.12 This is
a controversial and substantive claim, yet one that I will not examine here
in any detail. My interest is rather on premise (4). It attempts to capture
the connection between role oughts and normative requirements. In the next
section, I will discuss very briefly Kornblith’s argument that premise (4) is
false. As we will see, considerations of scope are once again recruited against
(DE)—this time, however, without success.13
4.5 Kornblith’s Incomplete Reply to Premise (4)
Kornblith (2001, 238) claims that role oughts lack normative force. I take this
to mean that role oughts do not “have a grip” on us, do not state something
that is “demanded” of us, do not involve the “binding sense of should,” and
do not indicate anything about our “reasons.” The relations expressed by role
oughts, that is, do not have the kind of authority over us that is characteristic
of relations of normative requirement. If this is right, however, then premise
(4) is false. Nothing follows about our normative requirements from the mere
fact that the kind of relation expressed by a role ought obtains. I think this is
exactly right. But Kornblith’s explanation of why this is the case is mistaken.
12See Feldman (2008, 346-7).
13See Jon Altschul (2014, 252-254) for the claim that, contra Feldman, role-oughts are
not counterexamples to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. I will not discuss this worry
here.
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Though Kornblith correctly identifies what is wrong with Feldman’s defense of
(DE), he nonetheless provides an incorrect explanation for why this is so. His
reply to Feldman, as I will put it, is incomplete.
According to Kornblith (2001, 237), role oughts do not carry normative
force because they do not detach:
If one wants to be a good tyrant, perhaps one ought to be particularly
brutal. Nevertheless, we would not say, even of someone who did
in fact want to be a good tyrant, that he ought to be particularly
brutal... This contrasts with the epistemic case, where we not only
want to say that if someone wants to be a good believer, he or she
should believe in certain ways; we also wish to endorse the claim
that individuals ought, without qualification, to believe in those
ways which, as a matter of fact, flow from good performance of
the role of being a believer. Since being a tyrant or a con artist
or a thief is just as much of a role as being a believer, what is the
relevant difference here that allows us to detach the ought judgment
in the case of believers, but prevents us from detaching the ought
judgment in the case of tyrants, con artists, and thieves?
Kornblith here is not denying the existence of role oughts. He is not denying
that, if one is a tyrant, then one oughtR to be particularly brutal. Kornblith
is instead claiming that role oughts such as this, even if true, do not indicate
that those who satisfy the antecedent thereby have a normative requirement to
what is stated in the consequent. This, however, is just to say that role oughts
give rise to wide-scope, instead of narrow-scope, normative requirements. Let
‘’ represent a normative requirement, let ‘T’ stand for ‘playing the role of
the tyrant’, and let ‘C’ stand for ‘being particularly cruel’. Now consider for
comparison:
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(tyrantNarrow) If we are playing the role of the tyrant, then we have a
normative requirement to be particularly cruel. ∀x (Tx→Cx)
(tyrantWide) We have a normative requirement to be such that, if we
are playing the role of the tyrant, then we are particularly cruel. ∀x
(Tx→Cx)
If the normative requirements produced by role oughts have wide-scope struc-
ture, then Kornblith is correct in suggesting that they do not detach. We
cannot infer that S has a normative requirement to be particularly cruel from
(tyrantWide) and the claim that S is playing the role of the tyrant. That is,
though the following inference is valid:
1. ∀x (Tx→Cx)
2. Tx
C. Cx
The following inference is not :
1. ∀x (Tx→Cx)
2. Tx
C. Cx #
But if this is true of role oughts in general, as Kornblith suggests, then premise
(4) of the point-of-view argument is false and the inference from (3) to (C)
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invalid. Instead of (4), the connection between role oughts and normative
requirements is best captured by the following:
4*. We have a normative requirement to be such that, if we are play-
ing the role of the believer, then we form and maintain our beliefs in
accordance with our evidence.
And it does not follow from (4*) that we have a normative requirement to form
and maintain our beliefs according to our evidence, even if we cannot help but
satisfy the antecedent. In this non-detachable sense, Kornblith seems correct
in claiming that role oughts in general, and epistemic role oughts in particular,
seem to lack normative force.14
But this is not quite right. Wide-scope ought-claims can have normative
force despite their non-detachability. The difference between wide and narrow
scope is merely that the former gives the relevant agent two ways of satisfying
their normative requirements: either explain things clearly or cease being a
teacher; either be particularly cruel or cease to be a tyrant; either believe
according to your evidence or cease being a believer. Recall the earlier example:
(tyrantWide) We have a normative requirement to be such that, if we
are playing the role of the tyrant, then we are particularly cruel. ∀x
(Tx→Cx)
Though, as mentioned, the following inference is invalid:
14See Brogaard (2014) for the appeal to wide-scope requirements in a maneuver against
Clifford’s defense of (DE).
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1. ∀x (Tx→Cx)
2. Tx
C. Cx #
The following inference is not :
1. ∀x (Tx→Cx)
C. ∀x ¬(Tx ∧ ¬Cx)
Even if we grant Kornblith’s criticism—that role oughts only give rise to wide-
scope normative requirements—we can still say, for example, that we have a
normative requirement not to be a tyrant who is not particularly cruel. Though
role ought claims do not detach, that is, this fact alone does not show that they
fail to make authoritative demands on us. It can be binding that we satisfy
our requirements in one of the two ways; it can be binding that we do not both
play a role and fail to act as we oughtR. Feldman is still allowed the (weaker)
claim that we have a normative requirement not to be a believer who does
not form and maintains his beliefs in accordance with his evidence. So though
Kornblith’s reply to Feldman may be sufficient for showing that his defense of
(DE) fails—since the non-detachability of role oughts is sufficient for showing
that premise (4) is false—there is a gap between that reply and the explanation
for it that is on offer—the claim that role oughts lack normative force. In the
next section, I offer an alternative explanation for why premise (4) is false that
leaves no similar gap. It shows that premise (4) is false precisely because role
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oughts lack normative force, whatever the logical structure of the normative
relation they express.15
4.6 Normative Requirements and Privileged Values
No doubt the English ‘ought’ is ambiguous in various ways. Sometimes an
ought-claim indicates something about what is likely to occur, as in “your ankle
ought to heal in two weeks time.” Sometimes an ought-claim indicates what
would be ideal, as in “someone ought to volunteer at the shelter.” Sometimes an
ought-claim indicates the best way to achieve a certain end of ours, as in “you
ought steal that car in order to escape from the police officers who are chasing
you.” And so on.16 So perhaps Feldman is right that there is also a sense of
‘ought’ where it indicates the correct way to perform a certain role. But not all
ought-claims express something about the relation of normative requirement
that can hold between an individual and a certain action or attitude. This
is perhaps trivial if we consider ought-claims that are not about individuals
and ought-claims that are not about anyone in particular. But these are not
the only cases. Some ought-claims of the form ‘S ought to φ’ can be true of
15In later work, in fact, Kornblith (2002, ch.5) may well be relying on the normative force
of wide-scope normative requirements. This is because he argues that epistemic normativity
is regular instrumental normativity where the antecedent is always satisfied. Since it is an
open and lively question whether instrumental normativity has a narrow-scope or a wide-
scope structure (see the aforementioned Kolodny (2005) and Broome (2007), for example),
Kornblith’s own account of epistemic normativity may well be committed to wide-scope
structures being capable of normative force.
16This is not to suggest these various senses of the English ‘ought’ betray a difference in
semantic structure and/or syntactic behavior. See, e.g. Finlay and Snedegar (2014).
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someone S and a certain action or attitude φ without thereby expressing that
φ-ing is required of S.
It will be useful to distinguish, in general, between ought-claims that do
and ought-claims that do not express a claim about a relation of normative
requirement. I will call the former prescriptive ought-claims and the latter
evaluative ought-claims. We can say that evaluative ought-claims express a
mere evaluation of a certain state of affairs, given a certain guiding value. More
exactly, evaluative ought-claims express that a certain state of affairs obtains
in those possible worlds ranked highest by a certain value. Similarly, we can
say that prescriptive ought-claims express evaluations in this way as well. But
these are not mere evaluations. Prescriptive ought-claims, instead, express that
a certain state of affairs obtains in those possible worlds ranked highest by a
certain privileged value: a value that has normative authority over us. What
distinguishes ought-claims of the form ‘S ought to φ’ that express a normative
requirement, then, is the kind of value that guides the evaluation. Only those
that are guided by privileged values “have a grip” on us, state something that is
“demanded” of us, involve the “binding sense of should,” and indicate something
about our “reasons.” None of this, notice, makes any reference to scope.17
17I take this to be a Moorean point. In the second preface to the Principia, Moore (1903,
3) says: “it cannot be too emphatically insisted that the predicate which... I call ‘good’, and
which I declare to be indefinable, is only one of the predicates for which the word ‘good’ is
commonly used to stand... [T]he predicate I am concerned with is that sense of the word
‘good’ which has to the conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ a relation which makes it the sense
which is of the most fundamental importance for Ethics.” I am here suggesting something
similar regarding ‘ought’, values, and normative requirements. Thanks to Miles Tucker for
pointing this out to me.
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Admittedly, it is not easy to give an account of what makes a certain value
privileged, and thereby of what gives an ought-claim normative authority over
us. Without some such account, perhaps the distinction between evaluative
and prescriptive ought-claims that I am suggesting is not entirely clear. (I will
have more to say about privileged values below.) Nonetheless, it is quite easy
to see that ought-claims employing role oughts are paradigmatic examples of
evaluative ought-claims. Consider an illustration. Suppose a father tells his son
“you ought to be a Patriots fan.” Suppose the son has no interest in sports in
general and so demurs. There seems to be a clear sense in which it is not at all
true that the son ought to be a Patriots fan: there is no normative requirement
for him doing so. But now suppose the father explains himself in the following
way:
“Listen, you were born in Boston. You have no choice but to play
the role of the New Englander, though you can do it poorly or do it
well. Performing well in this role, however, requires being a Patriots
fan.”
The father is here explaining what he meant by his original claim. He intended
to make a claim about a role ought. He has identified what maximizes New
England value—being a Patriots fan—and has inferred that one therefore New-
England-role-ought (oughtNER) to be a Patriots fan. If we grant that the father
is correct about what is valuable from the point-of-view of the New Englander
(and the details about this are irrelevant for the present point), and grant
that the ‘ought’ in his utterance was the New-England-role-ought, then we
must also grant that his claim was true: his son oughtNER to be a Patriots fan.
Nonetheless, our initial assessment remains unaltered: there is no normative
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requirement for the son to be a Patriots fan. So his father’s claim, though true,
must not be a claim about normative requirements. New England value, that
is, is not a privileged value.
One may worry that the role of the New Englander is a gerrymandered sort
of role in a way that the role of the teacher or the believer is not. (I myself
find it hard to see a principled distinction here.) But similar illustrations can
multiplied. Suppose that father and son are robbing a bank. Suppose the father
tells the son “you ought to threaten the life of the security guard.” Suppose
the son has no interest in threatening anyone’s life and so demurs. Once again,
there seems to be a clear sense in which it is not at all true that the son ought
to threaten the life of the security guard: there is no normative requirement
for him doing so. But now suppose the father explains himself in the following
way:
“Listen, you are currently robing a bank. You have no choice but to
play the role of the bank robber, though you can do it poorly or do
it well. Performing well in this role, moreover, requires threatening
the life of the security guard.”
The father is here explaining what he meant by his original claim. He intended
to make a claim about a role ‘ought’. He has identified what maximizes bank-
robbing value—threatening the life of the security guard—and has inferred that
one therefore bank-robbing-role-ought (oughtBRR) to threaten the life of the
security guard. If we grant that the father is correct about what is valuable
from the point-of-view of the bank robber (and again the details about this are
irrelevant for the present point), and grant that the ‘ought’ in his utterance
was the bank-robber-role-ought, then we must also grant that his claim was
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true: his son oughtBRR to threaten the life of the security guard. Nonetheless,
our initial assessment once again remains unaltered: there is no normative
requirement for the son to threaten the life of the security guard. So his
father’s claim, though true, must not be a claim about normative requirements.
bank-robbing value, that is, is also not a privileged value.
If we recognize the role of the teacher and teacher-role-oughts, then I think
we must also recognize the role of the bank robber and bank-robber-role-oughts.
Either way, the point can be made quite generally. If we hold fixed some value
x, whatever x is, then there is an easily definable sense of ‘ought’—oughtx—
according to which it is true that S oughtx to do what maximizes x. But not
all of these evaluations—and not all of the useful ones, and not all of the ones
salient in several different contexts, and so on—express normative requirements.
As I’m suggesting, we have a normative requirement to perform a certain action,
or to take on a certain attitude, only when doing so promotes a privileged value,
a value that has normative authority over us. And ought-claims express these
normative requirements only when they express evaluations that are guided
by these privileged values. What the two illustrations just above are intended
to show, then, is that role-values, qua role-values, are not privileged values:
they do not have normative authority over us. Role oughts, therefore, express
mere evaluations instead of normative requirements. If this is right, however,
then premise (4) is false. Nothing follows about our normative requirements
from the mere fact that the kind of relation expressed by a role ought obtains.
This time, moreover, premise (4) is false precisely because role oughts lack
normative force, whatever their scope and structure.
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Perhaps Feldman disagrees. When speaking of the role of the believer, in
particular, Feldman (2000, 676) says that “anyone engaged in this activity
ought to do it right.” On one reading, Feldman is here claiming that, for any
activity A, anyone engaged in A ought to do it right. If we take him here
as making a prescriptive ought-claim—that is, as claiming that we have a
normative requirement to do it right—then we can take him as disagreeing
with me on the normative authority that role oughts have over us. This seems
just false to me. New-Englander-role-oughts and bank-robber-role-oughts have
no normative authority over anyone. I’m not sure what else to say to convince
someone who thinks otherwise. On another reading, however, Feldman is here
saying that there is something special about the epistemic role ought that
distinguishes it from the kinds of role oughts that I’ve been considering. Here
we take him as saying something specific about the role of the believer, namely,
that we are required to perform it right. I find this suggestion much more
plausible. As I see it, this is just to claim that epistemic value is a privileged
value. Perhaps that is true. What my criticism aims to show, however, is that
epistemic value, if truly authoritative over us, is not so by virtue of being a
role-value. Defending the claim that epistemic values are privileged values,
that is, requires a very different kind account.18
18Let me make five clarifications about my criticism of Feldman’s defense of (DE). First,
I am not claiming that there are no epistemic role oughts. Second, I am not assuming that
only the moral sense of the English ‘ought’ expresses a claim about normative requirements.
Third, I am not assuming that there is a sense of ‘ought’ that expresses the notion of an
all-things-considered ought, a claim about what is best once we take into consideration all
true ought-claims. Fourth, I am not suggesting that sui generis epistemic value cannot give
rise to sui generis epistemic normative requirements. Fifth, I am not ignoring Feldman’s
(2000, 676) injunction that “it is our plight to be believers.” This seems to suggest a feature
103
None of this, however, suggests that Feldman (2008, 355) is mistaken when
he concludes that he has identified a sense of ‘ought’ that can make certain
deontological claims in epistemology true. For all I’ve said, it may well be true
that we oughtER to form and maintain our beliefs according to our evidence.
But to the extent that one finds plausible that the claim that we ought to
form and maintain our beliefs according to our evidence expresses a relation of
normative requirement, then to that extent one should find implausible that
Feldman’s point-of-view argument for (DE) goes through. The fact that we
oughtER to form and maintain our beliefs according to our evidence goes no
distance towards showing that there is an authoritative relation of normative
requirement that holds between each individual and the complex of actions and
attitudes that constitute forming and maintaining one’s beliefs in accordance
with one’s evidence. Feldman’s claims about role oughts, that is, go no distance
towards his professed goal of placing the views of Locke and Clifford on newer
and better grounds.
of epistemic role oughts that distinguishes it from more ordinary role oughts, such as the
teacher role ought. Moreover, one might think that this distinguishing feature is enough to
justify the claim that epistemic role oughts express normative requirements after all. This is
not the case. On this point, Kornblith (2001, 237-8) said it best: “Many people are forced
into horrible roles; they are put in positions over which they have no choice. Some are forced
into slavery; others into prostitution. Much as they may have no choice about playing certain
roles, we don’t want to say in these cases that, whatever the role, they ought to perform
them well.”
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4.7 Privileged Values and the Nature of Normativity
What distinguishes ought-claims expressing a normative requirement is the kind
of value that guides the evaluation. Only those that are guided by privileged
values “have a grip” on us, state something that is “demanded” of us, involve
the “binding sense of should,” and indicate something about our “reasons.”
My argument in the previous section has been that role-values, as a kind of
value, are not privileged values. This means that indicating that some value
X is a role value is not an adequate way of indicating that X is a privileged
value—no more than indicating that someone’s name is Peter is an adequate
way of indicating that he is American. My argument, however, leaves open
whether any particular role-value is, in fact, a privileged value, even if not in
virtue of the very fact of being a role value as well. More importantly, with
respect to epistemic normativity, my argument leaves open whether Feldman’s
basic axiology, though not his argument for it, is correct. Perhaps it is, in
fact, the value of rationality that grounds our normative requirement to believe
according to our evidence. Even if Feldman’s defense of this claim in terms
of the epistemic point-of-view fails, perhaps rationality is a privileged value
for some other reason nonetheless. Two natural questions suggest themselves:
which values are, then, privileged? And why are they so? I don’t have the
space here to answer these questions in the detail that they deserve, but I want
to conclude by clarifying what it would take to answer them and by indicating
the outlines of my own view.19
19Notice that my criticism of Feldman in the previous section is independent of any
positive account of privileged values. So long as we have it clear that role values, as a kind
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What needs explaining is why some values have authority over us while
other do not. One option is to claim that the privileged status of some values
as authoritative is simply a primitive. It is a brute fact that the value of
beneficence gives rise to reasons that make demand on us, while the value of
maleficence does not; it is a brute fact that the value of justice gives rise to
reasons that make demand on us, while the value of injustice does not. It
is unclear to me, however, whether this option offers any explanation at all.
Another option, which I endorse, takes a constructivist route by claiming that
there is an explanatory connection between the privileged status of some values
and those things that we most deeply care about: privileged values are those
that we would endorse under conditions of ideal reflection. On this account,
these values give rise to reasons that make binding demands on us because
they reflect who we really are.20
Similarly, an account of epistemic normativity must explain the connection
between epistemic requirements and privileged values. One option is identifying
certain epistemic values as privileged—truth or rationality, for example—and
justifying that identification. Yet what reason do we have for thinking that
truth or rationality, like beneficence, make binding demands on us? I don’t
know of a good answer to this question.21 Another option is to connect
epistemic requirements to non-epistemic privileged values. We have seen
of value, fail to have authority over us, claiming that X is a role-value will be an inadequate
explanation of its authority.
20For the constructivist approach to normativity, see Railton (1986), Lewis (1989), Smith
(1994), Koorsgard (1996), and Street (2008).
21See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) for discussion.
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this option deployed already with Clifford and Grimm, where the privileged
values giving rise to epistemic normative requirements were the non-epistemic
values of welfare and dignity. I endorse a similar instrumentalist account of
epistemic normativity, together with the constructivist account of privileged
values outlined just above. Whatever the normative requirements we have
with respect to the forming and maintaining of our beliefs, on my view, we
have them as instrumental requirements for the fulfillment and advancement
of those things that we most deeply care about.22
4.8 Conclusion
All three arguments for (DE) that I’ve considered seem defective. Clifford’s
consequentialist moral argument depends on a mistaken view of the structure
of the normative requirement that arises from the relation between belief and
action. Similarly, the Grimm-inspired moral argument depends on a mistaken
view of the structure of the normative requirement that arises from the relation
between beliefs, testimony, and the respect we owe to individuals. Lastly,
Feldman’s point-of-view argument depends on a mistaken view of the authority
that role-values have over us. Locke’s deontological evidentialism—the claim
that there is a relation of normative requirement that holds between each of us
and the complex of actions and attitudes consisting in forming and maintaining
22For the instrumentalist approach to epistemic normativity, see Stich (1990), Kornblith
(2002), and Cowie (2014). For a complete articulation and defense of a constructivist
epistemic instrumentalism, see [omitted for blind review]. I am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for the encouragement to add the brief positive remarks that compose this section.
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our beliefs in accordance with our evidence—seems to remain hostage to his
wildly unpopular claims about God’s binding desires. Perhaps it remains itself
as a product of belief against the evidence.
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CHAPTER 5
DEONTOLOGICAL EVIDENTIALISM AND THE
PRINCIPLE THAT OUGHT IMPLIES CAN
5.1 Introduction
John Locke (1706, §34) is famous for prescribing a close connection between
evidence and belief:
We should keep a perfect indifference for all opinions, not wish any
of them true, or try to make them appear so; but being indifferent,
receive and embrace them according as evidence, and that alone,
gives the attestation of truth.
W.K. Clifford (1877, 70) is famous for prescribing quite the same:
It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything
on insufficient evidence.
On one natural reading of these and other passages, Locke and Clifford seem
to endorse deontological evidentialism:
(DE) S ought to form and maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s
evidence.1
1Richard Feldman (2000, 679; 2008, 351) accepts (DE) as well. He argues, moreover,
that (DE) can be separated from Locke’s apparent commitment to doxastic voluntarism (cf.
Feldman 2001, 89-90) and from Clifford’s moral argument in its defense (cf. Feldman 2006,
20).
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The English ‘ought’ here expresses an authoritative relation of normative
requirement or obligation. Fully stated, (DE) is thus the claim that there is
an authoritative relation of normative requirement that holds between each
individual and the complex of actions and attitudes that constitutes forming
and maintaining one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s evidence.2 As some have
put it in different contexts, (DE) sees this normative requirement as “having a
grip” on us (cf. Korsgaard 1996, 44-6), as something that is “demanded” of us
(cf. Street 2012, 44), and as something “utterly different from anything else in
the universe” (cf. Mackie 1977, 38).
This paper resists a certain argument for (DE). The argument depends on
two principles. The first principle is a particular account of the nature of the
relation of normative requirement. Call it normative rationalism:
(NR) There is a normative requirement for S to φ if and only if (and
because) there is most normative reason for S to φ.3
2The source of this normative authority is a matter of debate. Since the term ‘obligation’
is so often and so naturally associated with moral obligation, I will here give preference
to the more neutral term ‘normative requirement’. I will elide the ‘authoritative’ qualifier
throughout.
3This is one way of expressing the view made famous by W.D. Ross (1930). We find it
more recently in Scanlon (1998), Broome (1999), Raz (2002), Skorupski (2010), and Parfit
(2011). See Schroeder (2007, 10-15) for the difference between normative, explanatory, and
motivating reasons. Notice that (NR) is neutral with respect to the nature of normative
reasons themselves. It favors neither consequentialism nor Kantianism, neither objectivism
nor subjectivism, neither realism nor anti-realism, and so on. Whatever the nature of
normative reasons, (NR) simply claims that they are ontologically prior to, or are the
grounds for, the relation of normative requirement that can hold between a certain individual
and a certain attitude or action.
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The second principle places a constraint on what can count as a normative
reason for belief. Call it only evidence:
(OE) Consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a
belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true.
From (NR) and (OE), it follows that only evidence that p is true can ground a
normative requirement to believe that p. Support for (DE) follows from the
addition of modest non-skeptical assumptions.
My focus here is on (OE). Why should we think that it is true? Suppose
I am an average meteorologist with an interview scheduled with the local
news. Suppose my chances of doing well in this interview would significantly
increase if I formed the belief that I am the best meteorologist in town. This
consideration—that believing that p would increase my chances of getting
something that I want—seems to be a normative reason for forming the belief
that I am the best meteorologist in town. Yet (OE) says this is not so. Since
this result is not obviously correct, the appeal to (OE) in an argument for (DE)
requires antecedent support for (OE) itself. In this paper, I discuss the relation
between a recent argument for (OE) and the principle that ought implies can.
I argue, more exactly, that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects the
principle that ought implies can already has a reason to resist either (a) one of
the argument’s premises or (b) the argument’s role in providing support for
(DE).
Here is how I proceed. In the first section, I explain how Nishi Shah (2006)
and Ward Jones (2009) extract a constraint on what can count as a reason
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for belief from a constraint on what can count as a reason for action that is
familiar from the work of Bernard Williams. I then explain how this constraint
serves as a premise in what I will call the Transparency Argument for (OE).
In the second section, I defend the first direction of my argument: anyone
who antecedently accepts that the principle that ought implies can is false
already has good reasons to reject premise (1) of the Transparency Argument.
In the third section, I defend the second direction of my argument: anyone
who accepts that the principle that ought implies can is true already has good
reasons for either rejecting premise (2) of the Transparency Argument or for
denying the argument’s role in providing support for (DE). In the concluding
section, I discuss the conditions under which one can, in fact, accept both the
premises of the Transparency Argument as well as its role in providing support
of (DE). Nonetheless, I identify a serious worry about the possibility of these
conditions obtaining.
5.2 Reasons, Deliberation, and Transparency
It is well known that Bernard Williams took there to be an essential connection
between reasons for action and deliberation. This is because reasons are
essential in the explanation of our intentional actions and because they could
not play this explanatory role if they were not also essential elements of our
process of deliberation. Williams’ example of Owen Wingrave illustrates what
he had in mind. As Williams (1981, 106) puts it, Owen’s family wants him
to join the army, though he himself has no such desire and in fact “hates
everything about military life and what it means.” This is supposed to be
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a case where no amount of careful deliberation about his desires, projects,
and commitments could motivate Owen to heed his family’s wishes. There
is simply nothing about Owen’s own self which deliberation could identify as
being furthered by that action. For Williams, this is tantamount to simply
saying that there is no reason for Owen to join the army.4
There is some disagreement, however, about how to state Williams’ claims
with more precision. On one reading, Williams is here identifying an essential
connection between normative reasons for action and motivation. If a certain
consideration is a normative reason for me to φ, that is, then I must be capable
of becoming motivated to φ after careful deliberation about what to do. Call
this the motivation constraint on reasons:
(motivation) If consideration c is a normative reason for S to φ, then,
as a result of careful deliberation, S can be motivated to φ.5
On another reading, Williams is here identifying an essential connection between
normative reasons for action and effective deliberation. If a certain consideration
is a normative reason for me to φ, that is, then I must be capable of not only
becoming motivated to φ but also of φ-ing on the basis that consideration. Call
this the basis constraint on reasons:
4Williams focuses on the contrast between claims of the form ‘A has reason to φ’ and
claims of the form ‘there is a reason for A to φ.’ He claims that any attempt to understand
the latter expression in a way where it does not collapse into the former expression—in a way,
that is, which expresses what he calls an external reason—sacrifices the essential connection
between reasons and deliberation. I am here using ‘there is a reason for A to φ’ neutrally
throughout.
5See Garcia (2004, 233-5) and Smith (2013, 102) for examples of this reading.
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(basis) If consideration c is a normative reason for S to φ, then, as a
result of careful deliberation, S can φ on the basis of c.6
Notice the contrast between (motivation) and (basis). According to the former,
careful deliberation must be capable of producing a certain kind of attitude;
according to the latter, it must be capable of producing a certain kind of
action. While both constraints on normative reasons are inspired by Williams’
claim that there is an essential connection between reasons for action and
deliberation, the former constraint is weaker than the latter.7
It will not matter here which of these constraints best captures what
Williams himself had in mind. Nor will it matter that Williams’ claims, and
these principles, are controversial in themselves. What will matter, instead,
is that only (basis) can be used as an argument for (OE). (The reasons for
leaving (motivation) aside will become evident just below.) For our purposes,
moreover, what will matter is a version of (basis) where it states a general
constraint on normative reasons for belief :
(b-basis) If consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or
maintain a belief that p, then, as a result of careful deliberation, S can
form or maintain a belief that p on the basis of c.8
6See Shah (2006, 484) for an example of this reading.
7It is difficult to make sense of the modality of the ‘can’ in these principles. Part of
difficulty bears a family resemblance to issues about deviant causal chains in the literature
on intentional action and turns on understanding the nature of what Williams (1993, 35)
later called a “sound deliberative route.” I will leave these difficulties aside for now.
8See Shah (2006, 486) and Jones (2009, 149).
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We can infer (b-basis) from (basis) if we take it that what is true of normative
reasons for performing some action is also true of normative reasons for taking
on some attitude, such as belief. I find this a rather plausible suggestion.9
Of course, some particular consideration may count as a normative reason for
action while not counting as a normative reason for belief as well. Nonetheless,
if a general principle is true of normative reasons for action, then whatever the
elements that count as normative reasons for belief in particular, that principle
is true of them as well. The argument for (OE) that I will consider, at any
rate, depends on this assumption.10
We can see the argument from (b-basis) to (OE) once we turn our focus
to empirical facts about our belief formation. No one denies that many of
our beliefs are formed on the basis of wishful thinking. Sometimes a desire
to win an argument produces a rather strong belief that one’s interlocutor
is misinformed. Sometimes a deep fear of failure produces the belief that
everything will work out fine. Sometimes, in fact, the mere spatial-location of
a consumer good—being the rightmost—seems to produce the belief that it
9I am not alone. See Kearns & Star (2009, 219-221), Turri (2011, 384), and Booth (2012,
511-512).
10Notice that (b-basis) allows one to resist the first premise of Cowie’s (2014, 4007)
argument for instrumentalism about the normativity of evidence: “there is reason to believe
in accordance with one’s evidence (or value in so believing) because it is of great practical
utility” (my emphasis). His argument, roughly, is that those who find other sources for the
normativity of evidence must explain the “striking coincidence” of these normative facts. If
(b-basis) is true, however, then practical utility alone is not sufficient to ground the existence
of a reason for belief. If (b-basis) is true, that is, then there is no coincidence to explain in
the first place. In his discussion of attempts to brush away the existence of a coincidence,
Cowie (2014, 4012-3) is remiss in not considering this possibility.
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is better than otherwise identical goods.11 In these and other cases, the force
behind the formation and maintenance of our beliefs is not an indication that p
is true. These beliefs, that is, are not formed on the basis of the evidence that
we have for p. Yet it seems as if nothing but an indication of p’s truth—nothing
but our evidence for p—can affect our conscious forming and maintaining of
beliefs. Call this constraint transparency :
(T) If, as a result of careful deliberation, S can form or maintain a belief
that p on the basis of c, then c is evidence that p is true.12
If I am offered a million dollars in exchange for forming the belief that the
Moon is made of cheese, for example, I may become convinced that forming
this belief is desirable. But I will not be able to consciously form this belief on
the basis of its desirability. To consciously form a certain belief, it seems, I
must have an indication that this belief is true. (T) seems to be an empirically
observed psychological fact.
Together, however, (b-basis) and (T) entail (OE):
The Transparency Argument for (OE)
1. If consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain
a belief that p, then, as a result of careful deliberation, S can form or
maintain a belief that p on the basis of c. (b-basis)
11See Nisbett & Wilson (1977) for these and other well-known experiments. See Kornblith
(2014, 20-26) for a detailed summary of the large body of empirical literature documenting
the misfortunes of unreflective belief-formation.
12See Moran (2001) and Shah & Velleman (2005) for careful discussions of transparency.
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2. If, as a result of careful deliberation, S can form or maintain a belief
that p on the basis of c, then c is evidence that p is true. (T)
3. Consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a
belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. (1,2)13
The reason why (motivation) cannot be used in a similar argument should
be clear. There is no psychological constraint that prevents a non-evidential
consideration from producing a mere motivation for believing that p. As
Pascal’s (1670, 124) wager illustrates so well, becoming convinced that belief
in God is prudentially best can motivate me into active attempts to obtain it.
Pascal himself recognized this point and recommended disciplined church-going
as an effective method for inducing belief in God. But being so convinced
cannot, by way of conscious deliberation, itself produce the desired belief. The
way in which the Transparency Argument is part of a longer argument for
(DE) should be clear as well. If only evidence can give us normative reasons for
belief, and if normative requirements are produced by the balance of undefeated
normative reasons, then a normative requirement to believe that p can only
obtain when there is undefeated evidence for p. In the relevant sense of ‘ought’,
modest non-skeptical assumptions deliver that one ought to form and maintain
one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s evidence.
13We find versions of this argument in Shah (2006, 487) and Jones (2009, 150).
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5.3 What if OIC is False?
The sense of ‘ought’ that matters presently, recall, is the sense where it express
that a relation of normative requirement obtains, that someone is obligated to
perform a certain action or to take on a certain attitude. The version of the
principle that ought implies can that is of present interest, then, is a version
that places a certain control-constraint on when such facts about requirements
can be the case. Roughly, the principle says that S ought to φ only if S has a
choice as to whether or not to φ, or only if it is up to S whether or not S φ’s.
Here are two corresponding endorsements (my italics):
By the time honored principle that “ought implies can,” one can be
obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice as to whether to
do A. (Alston 1988, 259)
If the fact is I am sad and I consider this proposition, then whether
or not I accept it is simply not up to me; but then accepting this
proposition cannot be a way in which I can fulfill my obligation
to the truth, or, indeed, any obligation to try to bring about some
state of affairs. (Plantinga 1993, 38)
These are different ways to express a familiar and widely accepted control-
constraint on normative requirements. Putting together these ways of thinking
about ought and can, we can say more carefully that the version of the principle
that ought-implies-can which matters presently is therefore the following:
(OIC): If there is a normative requirement for S to φ, then S has control
over whether S φ’s.
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In this section, I will argue that anyone who accepts some of the most common
arguments against (OIC) already has good reasons to reject premise (1) of the
Transparency Argument: (b-basis). I will focus on two counter-examples.
One reason to think that (OIC) is false is the existence of direct counter-
examples. Suppose Karen is a kleptomaniac. Suppose her kleptomania is so
compulsive that whenever she has the opportunity to shoplift with perceived
impunity she quite literally lacks the power to do otherwise. Suppose Karen
even describes these cases by saying that “something takes over and I’m no
longer in control.” If all of this is right, then according to (OIC) it is not the
case that Karen is required to refrain from stealing, say, a new watch at Macy’s
when she notices that she is alone. At that time, she has simply no control over
whether she steals it. We, of course, would be required to refrain from stealing
it in a similar situation. But not Karen. Karen flouts no normative requirement
when she goes ahead and steals the watch. To some, this assessment of Karen’s
situation seems straightaway false: of course Karen has a requirement to refrain
from stealing the watch (cf. Blum 2000, 287). Saying otherwise makes hash of
our intuitions and our linguistic and social practices. But one cannot reject
this assessment without also rejecting (OIC). So those who think that Karen,
in this case, has a requirement to refrain from stealing the watch thereby have
a counter-example to (OIC).14
14Some direct counterexamples to (OIC), however, are more contrived. Graham (2011a,
345-6), for example, exploits cases where (i) “it is plausible that the moral permissibility
of A’s φ-ing depends on the moral impermissibility of B’s ψ-ing,” and where (ii) “it is
not plausible that rendering B incapable of refraining from ψ-ing would render A’s φ-ing
morally impermissible.” If there are cases of which (i) and (ii) are true, then there are
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Another reason to think that (OIC) is false is the existence of indirect
counter-examples. Suppose Black, an evil neurosurgeon, can manipulate Jones
in such a way that will ensure that Jones kills Smith. Black observes Jones
and will only intervene if Jones is about to decide not to kill Smith. But Black
never has to show his hand. Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to and does
kill Smith. This is Frankfurt’s (1969, 836) famous counter-example to the claim
that being blameworthy for φ-ing requires having control over whether one φ’s.
But this case doubles as an indirect counter-example to (OIC) if one accepts
the following bridge principle:
(bridge) S is blameworthy for φ-ing only if S ought to refrain from
φ-ing.15
This is a plausible principle. Why would someone be blameworthy for doing
what one is permitted to do? Assuming a broadly Strawsonian approach, why
should we resent someone who acts in perfect accordance with their normative
requirements? If (bridge) is true, however, and if Frankfurt’s famous case
indeed establishes what it intended to establish, then (OIC) is false. So those
who think that Black is blameworthy and think that (bridge) is true thereby
have a counter-example to (OIC) as well.
Perhaps these are two good reasons to be suspicious of (OIC). My aim here
is not defending them. Instead, my aim is showing that those who take these
counterexamples to (OIC). Graham goes on to identify one such case, and to defend various
attempts to resist the assessment that (i) and (ii) are true of it.
15Fischer (2006, 25) uses this principle to argue against (OIC). See Graham (2011b, 6)
for resistance.
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considerations as reasons for rejecting (OIC) already have good reasons for
rejecting premise (1) of the Transparency Argument. We can see this in three
short steps.
First, notice that combining (NR) with a rejection of (OIC) is incompatible
with a control-constraint on normative reasons in general. Given (NR) and a
denial of (OIC), we can infer that it is possible for there to be most reason
for S to φ even if S does not have control over whether S φ’s. If the cases of
Karen the kleptomaniac and of Jones’ Frankfurtian murder of Smith are cases
of normative requirements without agential control, that is, then (NR) tells
us that these are also cases of undefeated normative reasons without agential
control. Yet if there is most reason for S to φ, then there is a consideration
c which is a normative reason for S to φ—there being most reason, of course,
just being the claim that there is an abundance of a certain thing, namely,
normative reasons. So given (NR) and a denial of (OIC) we can rather infer
that it is possible for there to be a consideration c which is a normative reason
for S to φ even if S does not have control over whether S φ’s.
Second, notice that combining (NR) with a rejection of (OIC) is also
incompatible with with (basis). Consider:
The Argument Against (basis):
1. It is possible that there is a consideration c which is a normative
reason for S to φ and S does not have control over whether S φ’s.
2. If it is possible that there is a consideration c which is a normative
reason for S to φ and S does not have control over whether S φ’s, then it
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is possible that there is a consideration c which is a normative reason for
S to φ and S cannot, as a result of careful deliberation, φ on the basis of
c.
3. So it is possible that there is a consideration c which is a normative
reason for S to φ and S cannot, as a result of careful deliberation, φ on
the basis of c. (1,2)
The reasoning captured just above shows that premise (1), and if (3) is true,
of course, then (basis) is false. Moreover, it is hard to resist premise (2).
Recall the cases that have convinced some that (OIC) is false. In Karen’s
case, she is a kleptomaniac who is required to refrain from stealing a watch
even though she has no control over whether she steals it. Karen simply
cannot refrain from stealing the watch in the situation that she is in. Once she
finds herself with the opportunity to steal with impunity, she cannot help but
steal. This very same case, however, is also a case where Karen cannot refrain
from stealing the watch, as a result of careful deliberation, on the basis of a
consideration in favor of not stealing it. In general, in fact, if Karen simply
cannot φ at t, then Karen a fortiriori cannot φ at t, as a result of careful
deliberation, on the basis of a consideration for φ-ing. Perhaps this is because
she cannot carefully deliberate about that consideration in her situation at
all; perhaps this is because her careful deliberation about that consideration
in that situation is ineffective. Either way, it remains true that when Karen’s
kleptomania takes over, Karen cannot refrain from stealing the watch, as a
result of careful deliberation, on the basis of the consideration that there is for
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not stealing it. But since Karen is nonetheless required to refrain from stealing
the watch, there is, in fact, a normative reason to refrain from stealing it. So
there is a normative reason for Karen to refrain from stealing the watch even
though she cannot, as a result of careful deliberation, refrain from stealing
the watch on the basis of that normative reason. The same is true, mutatis
mutandis, in Black’s case: if Black simply cannot refrain from killing Smith,
then Black a fortiriori cannot refrain, as a result of careful deliberation, from
killing Smith on the basis of a consideration that there is for not killing him.16
Third, notice that the Argument Against (basis) is effective against (b-basis)
as well. Recall that (b-basis) derives from (basis) under the assumption that if
a general principle is true of normative reasons for action, then, whatever the
elements that count as normative reasons for belief in particular, that principle
is true of them as well.17 But the conclusion of the Argument Against (basis)
is itself a general principle governing (at least) reasons for action. I see no
principled way of claiming that (basis) gives grounds for (b-basis)—as the
Transparency Argument requires us to say—while at the same time resisting
that (3) similarly gives grounds for the following:
16Notice that even if one thinks that Karen is not required to refrain from stealing the
watch, or that Karen does not lack control over whether she steals it, one can still be moved
by this bit of reasoning in defense of premise (2). Premise (2), that is, captures my claim
that those who already deny (OIC) already have a good reason to reject (basis) as well.
17This is different from saying that every true ought-claim is constrained by the same
general principles. There are many counterexamples to the suggestion that every ought-claim
requires control. Feldman (1988, 674-6) discusses contractual and role oughts, for example,
and Chrisman (2012, 603) discusses oughts that express state norms. These ought-claims,
however, are not claims about normative reasons.
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3*. It is possible that there is a consideration c which is a normative
reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p and S cannot, as a result
of careful deliberation, form or maintain that belief on the basis of c.
If (3*) is true, however, then (b-basis) is false. If this is right, then those who
antecedently reject (OIC) already have a good reason to reject (b-basis) as
well. That is, those who antecedently reject (OIC) already have a good reason
to reject premise (1) of the Transparency Argument for (OE).
5.4 What if OIC is True?
Not everyone denies (OIC). For our purposes, it is enough to see why some
think that both of the counter-examples suggested above fall short. Wedgwood
(2013, 76), for example, thinks that cases of compulsion such as Karen’s are
not in fact cases where Karen does not have the power to refrain from stealing
the watch:
Such compulsions seem broadly similar to powerful addictions; and
although such addictions are typically at least partial excuses or
mitigating factors... it seems that they typically do not completely
remove the agent’s ability to choose otherwise.
According to Wedgwood, that is, Karen does have control over whether she
steals the watch after all, even after having the opportunity to steal it with
perceived impunity and feeling, in some weaker sense, compelled to do it. If
Wedgwood is right, then Karen’s case, and cases of compulsion and addiction
in general, cannot be direct counter-examples to (OIC). This is one way to
defend (OIC). Graham (2011b, 6), for another example, thinks that the bridge
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principle required to go from an assessment of Black as blameworthy to a
denial of (OIC) is false. This is because (bridge) is in tension with cases
of blameworthy permissible-doing. Here is one of the cases Graham offers as
illustration:
Unbeknownst to Caleb, Jack is about to mercilessly torture 15
innocent children to death. The only way to prevent Jack from
doing so is to kill him. On a whim, Caleb kills Jack merely for the
fun of it.18
According to Graham, this is a case where Caleb is blameworthy for killing
Jack even though it is not the case that Caleb ought to refrain from killing Jack.
If Graham is right, then Frankfurt cases such as Black’s cannot be indirect
counter-examples to (OIC): since one can be blameworthy for φ-ing without
being required to refrain from φ-ing, showing that one can be blameworthy
for something that is out of one’s control is not tantamount to showing that
one can be required to perform actions or to take on attitudes that are beyond
one’s control. This is another way to defend (OIC).19
Perhaps these are two good reasons to accept (OIC). My aim here, once
again, is not defending them. Instead, my aim is showing that those who
accept (OIC) already have good reasons for either rejecting premise (2) of
18Graham (2011b, 6-7) offers three more cases against (bridge). One of them aims to
show the possibility of blameworthy obligation-fulfilling, and two of them aim to show that
these cases do not depend on ignorance of any kind.
19Littlejohn (2012, 3) argues against Graham (2011a) that he has not identified a coun-
terexample to (OIC). His argument turns on identifying an alternative explanation to the
moral permissibility of the relevant action which does not depend on the moral impermissi-
bility of the other relevant action (see fn. 14). His argument depends on accepting a certain
principle about the legitimate use of violence on passive threats, and on rejecting Graham’s
rejection of that principle. This is yet another way to defend (OIC).
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the Transparency Argument or for denying the argument’s role in providing
support for (DE). We can see this in three short steps as well.
First, notice that (OIC) places a control-constraint on normative require-
ments in general. But given the grounding of normative requirements on
normative reasons provided by (NR) and the assumption that the principles
governing normative reasons are uniform irrespective of their objects, there
is no reason to resist a version of (OIC) where the variable ‘φ’ picks out the
specific attitude of belief. Similarly, there is no reason to resist a version of
(OIC) where the variable ‘φ’ picks out the complex of actions and attitudes
that constitutes forming and maintaining one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s
evidence:
(OIC*): If there is a normative requirement for S to form and maintain
one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s evidence, then S has control over
whether S forms and maintains one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s
evidence.
If one resists the counter-examples that are offered against the control-constraint
(OIC) imposes on normative requirements in general, that is, then one ipso
facto resists similar qualms against the control-constraint that (OIC*) imposes
on normative requirements for forming and maintaining beliefs in particular.
In the terminology we find in Alston and Plantinga, (OIC*) is the claim
that the relevant normative requirement obtains only if we have a choice as
to whether or not we form or maintain our beliefs in accordance with our
evidence, only if it is up to us whether or not we form or maintain our beliefs in
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accordance with our evidence. Do we have such a choice? Call an affirmative
answer to this question doxastic voluntarism; call a negative answer to it
doxastic involuntarism. We can now state the argument from this section in
the form of a dilemma:
The Voluntarist Dilemma: Doxastic voluntarism is either true or
false:
(Horn #1) If doxastic voluntarism is true, then (T) is false.
(Horn #2) If doxastic voluntarism is false, then (DE) is false.
Enlisting the Transparency Argument as support for (DE), it turns out, is in
trouble either way.
Second, suppose someone accepts (OIC*) and accepts doxastic voluntarism.
This is someone who accepts two claims: (a) we can have a normative require-
ment to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence only if
forming and maintaining our beliefs in accordance with our evidence is within
our control, and (b) it is within our control whether we form and maintain our
beliefs in accordance with our evidence. This seems to be a position Wedgwood
(2013, 77-79) is willing to defend:
If a reasoner exercises the capacity to come to have a certain level of
confidence in a proposition p at a certain time t, the reasoner must
also have had the power not to come to have that level of confidence
at that time... We can also make sense of the suggestion that we
have control over our beliefs and intentions because we can exercise
our reasoning capacities, and the way in which we exercise those
reasoning capacities will determine what we believe and intend.
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His aim, in fact, is precisely that of articulating a sense of control that can allow
us to accept deontic claims about beliefs without having to abandon (OIC).
On its face, of course, there is nothing objectionable about this position. But
if one says that whether or not we form and maintain our beliefs in accordance
with our evidence is, in fact, within our control, then one is thereby denying
the alleged psychological fact of transparency, captured above by (T). (T) is
precisely the claim that forming and maintaining our beliefs in accordance with
our evidence is not a choice. When we form and maintain beliefs unconsciously,
we have no control; when we form and maintain them consciously, we have
no control over whether to follow the evidence. According to (T), that is, we
are never in a position where it is up to us whether we believe in accordance
with our evidence. So anyone who accepts (OIC*) and doxastic voluntarism
already has a good reason to reject premise (2) of the Transparency Argument
for (OE).
Third, suppose that someone accepts (OIC*) and accepts doxastic involun-
tarism instead. This is someone who accepts two claims: (a) we can have a
normative requirement to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our
evidence only if forming and maintaining our beliefs in accordance with our
evidence is within our control, and (b) it is not within our control whether we
form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. This is finally
a position which allows one to accept both premises of the Transparency Argu-
ment: (b-basis) and (T). Moreover, there seems to be nothing objectionable
about this position on its face. But, given (OIC*), (DE) is true only if forming
and maintaining one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s evidence is within one’s
128
control. And, given doxastic involuntarism, it is not within our control to
form and maintain our beliefs in this way. So anyone who accepts (OIC*) and
doxastic involuntarism already has a good reason to reject (DE) itself. Perhaps
surprisingly, the only position which allows one to accept both premises of the
Transparency Argument for (OE) is a position which precludes the use of (OE)
in an argument for (DE).
5.5 Conclusion
I have been examining the prospects of an argument for (DE) that turns on (NR)
and (OE). Since (OE) is not particularly obvious, it requires rather substantive
support. Yet the most clearly stated argument in its defense precludes the use
of (OE) in an argument for (DE). The conjunction of three claims delivers
this result: those who antecedently reject (OIC) already have good reason
to reject premise (1) of the Transparency Argument; those who antecedently
accept (OIC) and accept doxastic voluntarism already have good reason to
reject premise (2) of the Transparency Argument; and those who accept (OIC)
and accept doxastic involuntarism already have good reason to reject (DE)
itself. We can now state my overall argument in this paper in the form of a
trilemma:
The OIC Trilemma: (OIC) is either true or false:
(Horn #1) If (OIC) is false, then (b-basis) is false.
(Horn #2) If (OIC) is true and doxastic voluntarism is true, then (T)
is false.
129
(Horn #3) If (OIC) is true and doxastic involuntarism is true, then
(DE) is false.
This, I think, is bad news for the Transparency Argument, for (OE), and for
(DE).
Yet this is not, perhaps, the final word. Perhaps the OIC Trilemma merely
reveals the conditions required for accepting the Transparency Argument and
its role in providing support for (DE). First, one must resist the common
counter-examples to (OIC). Second, one must accept doxastic involuntarism.
This allows one to accept both premises of the Transparency Argument: (b-
basis) and (T), respectively. But one cannot accept (OIC). Since accepting
premise (1) requires accepting doxastic involuntarism, accepting (OIC) with it
would force accepting the denial of (DE). The third condition, then, is providing
a novel rejection of (OIC) that is tailor-made for avoiding any tension with
(basis). Nothing of what I said above excludes this possibility. Perhaps, that
is, there is a way to reject (Horn #1).
This possibility, however, is problematic for the Transparency Argument. At
the beginning of section 1, recall, I suggested that Williams’ defense of (basis)
turned on the connection between normative reasons and the explanation of
our intentional actions. But this defense of (basis) has been criticized even
by those who agree with William’s constraint. The worry is simple: we can
explain intentional actions by appealing to our beliefs about our reasons just
as well as by appealing to the reasons themselves (cf. Anomaly 2008, 475).
Normative reasons, that is, are explanatorily superfluous in this case. Despite
the shortcomings of this defense of (basis), however, Williams-sympathizers
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suggest that we can accept it on different grounds: by appealing to (OIC).
Accepting (OIC), that is, allows us to say that if someone simply could not
perform some action or take on some attitude after careful deliberation, then
this person cannot as well have a normative reason for performing this action
or for taking on this attitude. Consider Anomaly (2008, 476):
In the example [of Owen Wingrave] there is no discernible route
from his current motivational set (or, if we wish, psychological
profile) to some utterly different set in virtue of which Owen would
be convinced that honor or tradition requires him to join [the army].
In the absence of such a route, we naturally conclude that he lacks a
reason to join because he cannot be motivated by the considerations
advanced by his father without becoming an utterly different person.
(His emphasis)
I will not examine here whether Anomaly is correct in suggesting that we
find this argument from (OIC) to (basis) in Williams. I will also not examine
whether the first argument—based on the explanation of intentional actions—is
defective in the ways that he and others have suggested. I mention these
suggestions only to highlight the problem that they seem to raise. The third
condition for accepting the Transparency Argument and its role as support for
(DE) is providing a novel rejection of (OIC) that is tailor-made for avoiding
any tension with (basis). Naturally, this will be a terribly thorny condition to
satisfy if the best argument for (basis) depends on (OIC) itself.
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CHAPTER 6
AMPLIATIVE TRANSMISSION AND
DEONTOLOGICAL INTERNALISM
6.1 Introduction
The literature on the inferential transmission of justification has so far focused
almost exclusively on competent deductive inferences: on cases where (i) p
follows deductively from q and r, and (ii) S infers p from q and r because
of awareness of that relation. Since competent deductions seem so secure,
transmission failure has taken center stage.1 But this narrow focus is misguided.
Ampliative inferences present philosophically interesting cases of successful
transmission instead.
Consider the following transmission principle discussed very briefly by
Weatherson (2008, 568):
Blamelessness Ampliative Transmission (BAT):
If:
(a) S believes that believing that p is justified (call this higher-order
belief q)
1See, for example, Wright (2003, 2004) and Davies (2004).
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(b) S is epistemically blameless in believing that q
Then:
(c) If S forms the belief that p on the basis of q, then S is epistemically
blameless in believing that p.
Condition (c) defines a certain ampliative inference that is claimed to transmit
blamelessness whenever conditions (a) and (b) obtain. Though (BAT) seems
harmless, Weatherson has argued that it causes a serious problem for versions
of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame: views
where being justified in believing that p is being blameless in believing that p.
I agree. But Weatherson denies that a similar argument can be pushed against
versions formulated in terms of epistemic praise. Here I disagree. (BAT), I will
argue, creates a serious problem for any version of deontological internalism
where justification is a positive appraisal of someone’s epistemic agency.
Here is how I proceed. After some clarifications (section 1), I mount a
two-stage defense of (BAT): I argue that (BAT) is intuitively plausible (section
2), and I argue that the most common alleged causes of transmission failure do
not apply to it (section 3). I then argue that my two-stage defense of (BAT)
supports similar ampliative transmission principles focused on the related
deontological notions of epistemic praise and epistemic responsibility (section
4). Finally, I consider Weatherson’s argument from (BAT) and argue that his
resistance to the soundness of similar versions is implausible (section 5).
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6.2 Clarifying (BAT)
I begin by answering three clarificatory questions: What exactly does it mean to
transmit? What exactly does the transmitting? What exactly gets transmitted?
Transmission is the phenomena where a belief that p has some epistemic
property in virtue of a distinct belief that q having that same epistemic
property. At a minimum, transmission requires causation: if my belief that q
plays no causal role in the formation or maintanance of my belief that p, then
my belief that q cannot transmit any epistemic properties to my belief that
p. (BAT) is thus a claim about how a belief can have the epistemic property
of blamelessness in virtue of a causally relevant belief having that epistemic
property as well. This answers the first question.
I will understand the inference codified in “forms the belief that p on the
basis of q” as the mental act of (i) believing that q and (ii) having that belief
as a partial cause of one’s belief in p. In the case of (BAT), this amounts to
performing the following inference:
1. I am justified in believing that p.
2. Therefore p.
Such inferences are level-lowering since the believer infers the lower-level belief
that p from the higher-level belief that she is justified in believing that p. Such
inferences are ampliative since q does not entail p—I will assume throughout
that justification does not entail truth.2 So whenever someone accepts (2) on
2See Littlejohn (2012) for discussion and disagreement on this point.
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the basis of (1)—in the sense just defined—I will say that she has performed
a level-lowering ampliative inference. And whenever someone accepts (2) on
the basis of (1) in the absence of any defeaters for (1), I will say that she has
performed a competent level-lowering ampliative inference. (BAT) is thus the
claim that blamelessness transmits through competent level-lowering ampliative
inferences. This answers the second question.
Mirroring the distinction between warrant and doxastic justification in the
literature on transmission, I will here distinguish between (i) the ground for
blamelessness (that which makes it blameless for S to believe that p at t),
and (ii) blamelessly believing that p (a belief that is appropriately connected
to existing grounds for blamelessness). Just as one can have warrant for a
certain belief and yet fail to be doxastically justified in believing it, one can
similarly have grounds for blamelessly believing a certain belief and yet fail
to be blameless in believing it. I will here take (BAT) as a claim about the
transmission of blameless belief and not as a claim about the transmission
of grounds for blamelessness.3 (BAT) is thus the claim that blameless belief
transmits through competent level-lowering ampliative inferences. This answers
the third question.
3I am here following Tucker (2010, 502-507). This is important since it allows for
inferences that do not transmit warrant (or grounds for blamelessness) to sometimes count
as transmission success by virtue of transmitting doxastic justification (or blameless belief).
This will be relevant in section 3 below.
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6.3 The Intuitive Defense of (BAT)
A subject satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of (BAT) when she is blameless in
believing that she is justified in believing that p. How should we understand the
notion of blamelessness at stake? Here it is helpful to turn to a hypothetical case
sometimes used as an argument for internalism about justification. Suppose that
John’s inferential habits accord with all the true internal epistemic standards
for belief formation and maintenance. Perhaps John always gathers as much
evidence as it is reasonable to expect of him; perhaps John never believes
what his total evidence does not support; perhaps John always believes what
he believes on the basis of appropriate epistemic grounds; perhaps John even
fully endorses these true internal epistemic standards; and so on. We can say
that John is in this way reflectively ideal. Now suppose that an evil demon is
ensuring that all of John’s beliefs about the external world are nonetheless false.
The argument for internalism about justification that I have in mind turns on
the conviction that while John lacks knowledge (by having false beliefs), and
lacks reliability (by only having processes that produce a preponderance of
false beliefs), he is nonetheless justified in his false beliefs about the external
world. He is justified, that is, by virtue of his ideal reflection.4
Here is how this case is relevant for our present purposes: whatever we say
about John’s epistemic justification for believing that, say, the sun is shinning,
it seems hard to deny that John is blameless in believing it. John, after all, is
being deceived despite his best efforts : everything that is under John’s control
4See Cohen (1984) and Pryor (2001), for example, for arguments of this sort. See
Weatherson (2008, 564-567) for discussion.
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is being executed to perfection; John is not being derelict in any of his epistemic
duties; and so on. There are simply no grounds for blaming John for having
that false belief. Quite the contrary, in fact: John’s ideal reflection is the
very ground for his blamelessness. While it is controversial whether or not
justification has a substantive connection to truth—and, more exactly, how
that connection should be understood—the connection to truth seems entirely
beside the point when the evaluation in question is focused on blame. Only
facts about the agent matter for this kind of deontological evaluation, and
John seems beyond reproach.
Similarly, it seems hard to deny that John’s ideal reflection would be just
as appropriate for grounding higher-order beliefs. Suppose that John has
been informed by an unreliable source that he is being deceived by an evil
demon. Knowing that the source is unreliable, but wanting to be extra careful
nonetheless (unreliable sources sometimes are right), John suspends his belief
that the sun is shinning and proceeds to examine whether he is justified in
holding that belief after all. “I can’t account for the behavior of evil demons,”
he thinks to himself, “but I can account for mine.” After the kind of ideal
reflection defined above, suppose John forms the belief that he is justified
in believing that the sun is shinning. “As far as I can tell,” he concludes,
“believing that p is entirely appropriate from my epistemic position.” Just
as ideal reflection seems enough to ground John’s blamelessness in believing
that the sun is shinning, ideal reflection seems here enough to ground John’s
blamelessness in believing that he is justified in believing that the sun is
shinning.
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A case of ideal reflection like John’s (after being challenged and having
confirmed the internal credentials of his belief), then, seems to be a case where
conditions (a) and (b) of (BAT) are satisfied: John believes that he is justified
in believing that the sun is shinning and John is blameless in that higher-order
belief. Now suppose that John performs the following competent level-lowering
ampliative inference:
1. I am justified in believing that the sun is shinning.
2. Therefore the sun is shinning.
According to (BAT), John is now blamelessly believing that the sun is shinning.
This seems correct to me. John’s ideal reflection, on its own, seemed sufficient to
make him blameless in believing that the sun is shinning. It seems odd to suggest
that the same ideal reflection cannot make him blameless in believing that
very same thing once we add a blameless higher-order belief as an intermediary
step.
6.4 (BAT) and Transmission Failure
Put generally, an inference will fail to transmit blameless belief just in case the
conclusion is not blamelessly believed in virtue of being based on a blamelessly
believed premise. In John’s case, we have already seen that the relevant
premise—‘I am justified in believing that the sun is shinning’ (q)—is, plausibly,
blamelessly believed. What could then prevent q from transmitting this
epistemic property to John’s conclusion that ‘the sun is shinning’ (p)? There
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are four main alleged causes of transmission failure that are discussed in the
literature. Neither, however, applies to (BAT).5
One alleged cause of transmission failure is simple premise circularity—
an inference of the form “x therefore z therefore x.” But John’s inference
is clearly not premise-circular in this simple way. Another alleged cause of
transmission failure is failure to resolve doubt. If John’s inference from q to
p cannot resolve John’s doubts about p, that is, then perhaps it has failed to
transmit blamelessness from q to p (cf. Wright 2003, 63). Whatever we think
about the truth of this conditional, its antecedent seems false in John’s case
anyway. In our story, John first suspends his belief that the sun is shinning,
but only to remove his doubts about it by way of his competent level-lowering
ampliative inference. John’s inference seems in this way entirely capable of
resolving doubt. This is a stipulation, of course, but there is no reason to think
that John’s case is conceptually incoherent.
A more involved alleged cause of transmission failure is having an inefficient
structure. This happens when the following two conditions are satisfied. First,
there is some ground G that is sufficient by itself to make belief in premise q
blameless and is also sufficient by itself to make belief in conclusion p blameless.
Second, S nonetheless bases her belief that p in her belief that q, which is
itself supported by G (cf. Wright 2002, 334). In our case, John’s inference
5Discussion of transmission failure has so far focused on the epistemic properties of
warrant and doxastic justification. My discussion below adapts these claims to the present
context where the relevant epistemic property is blamelessness. My references in the text
should then be understood as indications of where to find similar claims about either warrant
or doxastic justification, as opposed to where to find corroborations of the claims I am
making about blame.
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does, in fact, have an inefficient structure. John’s ideal reflection is sufficient to
make him blameless in believing that he is justified in believing that the sun is
shining, as well as straightaway blameless in believing that the sun is shinning.
And yet John arrives at the latter via the former. So if having an inefficient
structure is in fact a cause for transmission failure, then (BAT) is false.
Having an inefficient structure is not, however, cause for transmission failure.
We can see this first by counterexample, following Tucker (2010, 512):
The perceptual evidence that warrants me in believing... that there
are exactly twenty-five people in the room, seems to be an equal
warrant for the conclusion... that there are fewer than one hundred
people in the room. The deduction [in this case], therefore, has an
inefficient structure... It nonetheless seems clear that it transmits
(doxastic) justification to its conclusion.
This seems correct and, moreover, applicable to the epistemic property of
blamelessness. What it brings out is the importance of distinguishing be-
tween transmission of grounds for blamelessness (or warrant) and transmission
of blameless belief (or doxastic justification). An inference with ineffective
structure cannot provide a ground for its conclusions since the ground for at
least one of its premises is already itself ground for the conclusion. John’s
ideal reflection, for example, is already grounds for both q and p and John’s
inference is not what is providing p with those grounds. But inferences with
inefficient structures can nonetheless provide the conclusion with an appro-
priate connection to the relevant grounds (cf. Tucker 2010, 513-4). John has
grounds for blamelessly believing that p, but is only blameless in that belief
when his belief is appropriately connected to those grounds for blamelessness.
This is the sense in which John’s inference transmits blameless belief without
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transmitting grounds for blamelessness: it provides an appropriate connection
between John’s ideal reflection and his belief that the sun is shinning. (BAT)’s
inefficient structure, therefore, is no reason to think that it is false.
Consider one final alleged cause of transmission failure: robust premise
circularity. This happens when one is justified in believing some premise in
virtue of already being justified in believing the conclusion (cf. Tucker 2010,
214-16). But John’s is not a case of this kind either. John’s blamelessness for
believing that q does not in any way depend on his blamelessness for believing
that p. John’s beliefs share a common ground for blamelessness—John’s ideal
reflection—but neither belief is itself a part of that ground.
6.5 Extending (BAT)
I have mounted a two-stage defense of (BAT) in sections 2 and 3. I’ve argued
that (BAT) is intuitively plausible and that the most common properties
suggested in the literature as reasons for transmission failure do not apply to
it. It seems we have good reason to think that (BAT) is true.
(BAT), however, can be extended to the related deontological notions of
epistemic praise and epistemic responsibility. Consider:
Praiseworthiness Ampliative Transmission (PAT):
If:
(a) S believes that believing that p is justified (call this higher-order
belief q)
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(b1) S is epistemically praiseworthy in believing that q
Then:
(c1) If S forms the belief that p on the basis of q, then S is epistemically
praiseworthy in believing that p.
and
Responsibility Ampliative Transmission (RAT):
If:
(a) S believes that believing that p is justified (call this higher-order
belief q)
(b2) S is epistemically responsible in believing that q
Then:
(c2) If S forms the belief that p on the basis of q, then S is epistemically
responsible in believing that p.
Since the most common properties suggested in the literature as reasons for
transmission failure are all formal properties as opposed to properties of the
content of the relevant inferences, it follows that these properties do not apply
to (PAT) and (RAT) if they do not apply to (BAT). This means that my
defense of (BAT) in section 3 serves as a defense of (PAT) and (RAT) as well.
This is one reason for thinking that they are true.
(PAT) and (RAT), moreover, seem equally intuitive. Think of John once
again. Everything that is under John’s control is being executed to perfection;
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John is not being derelict in any of his epistemic duties; and so on. I’ve
already suggested that there are therefore no grounds for blaming John for
having the false belief that the sun is shinning. What grounds could there
be for withholding praise or claiming that John is not being epistemically
responsible? I can see no such grounds. John’s ideal reflection, instead, seems
quite appropriate as ground for his epistemic praiseworthiness and responsibility.
In both these cases, as with blamelessness, the connection to truth seems entirely
beside the point and the efforts of the agent seem to measure up. This is
another reason for thinking that (PAT) and (RAT) are true.
6.6 Trouble for Deontological Internalism
Deontological internalism, as I will have it, is the claim that justification should
be defined in agent-focused deontic terms. Many versions of deontological
internalism so construed are currently in vogue.6 Weatherson, however, has
argued that (BAT) creates a serious problem for versions formulated in terms
of epistemic blame and has denied that a similar problem can be created for
versions focused on epistemic praise. We are now in a position to see that
Weatherson is mistaken in this last point.
Consider the following version of deontological internalism:
6See, e. g., BonJour (2010), Booth (2012), Petersen (2013), and Smithies (forthcoming).
Notice that my definition of deontological internalism leaves out deontological views where
justification is permissible belief. Some of these views are externalist (e.g. Goldman 2009),
but some are internalist as well (e.g. Wedgwood 2012). So there is a sense of “deontological
internalism” that is not my target here.
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Blame (B): S is justified in believing that p iff S is blameless in believing
that p.
Think of John one more time. (B) suggests that John’s belief that the sun
is shinning is justified precisely because it is blameless. Now consider the
following principle of false reflection:
False Reflection (F): It is possible for S to have a justified but false
belief that her belief that p is justified.
Those who deny that justification and truth can ever come apart will naturally
deny (F) as well. Those who do not deny that justification and truth can
ever come apart will find it difficult to reject (F) in a way that is not ad hoc.
Suppose that John considers whether to believe that p. He first reflects on what
he takes as his evidential base; he then reflects on which inferential principles
lead from his evidence to justified beliefs; he then finally reflects on whether
there are any defeaters that are relevant in this situation. If justification and
truth can sometimes come apart, then it is possible for John to have a justified
but false belief about the contents of his evidential base, or about the relation
between that base and p, or even about the presence of defeaters. Human ideal
reflection, after all, is not perfectly ideal.7
Together, however, (BAT), (B) and (F) entail a contradiction (cf. Weather-
son 2008, 568-9):
7Importantly, none of these mistakes need to be attributable to John, as long as the
relevant mental states are non-transparent. See Williamson (2000, ch. 4) for an influential
argument that all interesting mental states are non-transparent.
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The Transmission Argument Against Blame:
1. S justifiedly, but falsely, believes that she is justified in believing p.
(Instance of F)
2. On the basis of this belief, S comes to believe that p.
3. S blamelessly believes that she is justified in believing that p. (1, B)
4. S blamelessly believes that p. (2, 3, BAT)
5. S is justified in believing that p. (4, B)
6. S is justified in believing that p and S is not justified in believing that
p. (1, 5)
The Transmission Argument suggests that (B) should be rejected.8 If I’m correct
about (PAT) and (RAT), moreover, then similar transmission arguments can
8One might worry that there is no contradiction between (1) and (5) since (1) is a claim
about what S is justified in believing before performing the relevant level-lowering inference.
Taken in this way, that is, (1) says nothing about what S is justified in believing after
performing that inference. Let me make two comments about this worry. First, I take it that
(1) is, in fact, a claim about what S is justified in believing after the relevant level-lowering
inference. The appropriate paraphrase of S’s justified belief in this case would be: “I’m
looking at my reasons for p and I believe that believing that p is justified for me.” When
one forms this justified higher-order belief, that is, one does not yet have the lower-order
belief as well. We can say that (1) is future-directed in this way. Second, notice that the
level-lowering inference that S performs subsequently simply connects p to the grounds that
S mistakenly believes are good enough. The level-lowering inference, that is, is not itself a
part of those grounds. (See my discussion of inferences with ineffective structure in section
2.) This means that the justifying power of those grounds with respect to p stay the same
throughout. This is important, otherwise (1) would be false. When taken in this way—where
(1) is future-directed and where the subsequent inference does not alter the grounds for
p—(1) is both a true instance of F and in tension with (5). I’m grateful to an anonymous
referee for bringing this worry to my attention and to Chris Tucker for discussion of the
issue.
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be pushed against versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of
epistemic praise and epistemic responsibility. What are Weatherson’s reasons
for resisting these extensions?9
(PAT) is a conditional, so it is false only if there can be instances where
(a) and (b1) are true while (c1) is false. Weatherson (2008, 569) suggests one
such instance: ‘the inference from I am justified in believing that p to p is
not praiseworthy if the premise is false’ (his emphasis). Perhaps it is fair
to take him here as suggesting, more exactly, that S’s belief that p is never
praiseworthy if arrived at via a competent level-lowering ampliative inference
where q is false. But this is very hard to maintain.
The extreme version of this suggestion would be that one can never be
praiseworthy in believing something false. This would mean denying that only
facts about the agent matter for the kind of epistemic evaluation that is focused
on praise. But there are at least three reasons for resisting this denial and one
further reason for resisting this suggestion in general.
First, the denial seems intuitively false: John’s ideal reflection does seem
to ground his praiseworthiness in believing that the sun is shinning. As I’ve
mentioned in section 4, the intuitive defense of (BAT) in section 2 seems
equally good as a defense of (PAT), and the agent-centeredness of deontic
evaluations is central to that defense. Second, the denial seems at odds with
our evaluations of moral praiseworthiness. Suppose a soldier jumps on top of a
9Weatherson only discusses epistemic praise, so I’ll focus exclusively on his reasons
against (PAT). My claims in its defense, however, apply mutatis mutandis as a defense of
(RAT).
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live grenade intending to sacrifice his life for the safety of the group. Suppose
that his action causes the opposing side to send a mortar bomb next, this
time killing five-times more people than they would’ve otherwise. Whatever
we say about the rightness or wrongness of this soldier’s action—perhaps we
think the consequences matter for that assessment—it seems intuitive that he
is nonetheless praiseworthy for his sacrifice. Moral praiseworthiness, that is,
seems agent-centered. Third, both of these intuitive judgments are buttressed
by widely accepted accounts of moral and epistemic praiseworthiness. On
these accounts, both praise and blame are evaluations of someone’s reason-
responsiveness : S is praiseworthy or blameworthy for φ-ing, that is, when S φ’s
as a result of responding to what S perceives as sufficient reasons to φ. This is
because praise and blame are assessments of the quality of someone’s will, and
because the quality of someone’s will is revealed by how one responds to what
one perceives as one’s reasons.10 Taken together, these three considerations
give us good reason for thinking that only facts about the agent matter for the
kind of epistemic evaluation that is focused on praise.
But these reasons, at any rate, can be put aside. This extreme suggestion
would make it impossible for the antecedent of (PAT) to be true in the kinds of
cases that are supposed to show it false. Challenging (PAT), that is, requires
accepting that one can in fact be praiseworthy in believing something false.
10For versions focused on moral praise and blame, see, e.g., Fischer & Ravizza (1998,
62-91) and Arpaly (2006, 16-7; 19); for versions focused on epistemic praise and blame, see,
e.g., Ryan (2003, 70-74) and Hieronymi (2008, 359-363). I have argued elsewhere that our
lack of voluntary control over our beliefs makes talk of epistemic praise and blame simply
inappropriate (cf. Oliveira 2015, 393). My argument here is independent of that argument.
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The moderate version of this suggestion would be that one can never
transmit the praiseworthiness of a false belief. Here one avoids the main
problem facing the extreme version just considered. But given the kind of
transmission that is at stake in (PAT), this would mean denying that a false
belief which is appropriately connected to grounds that make it praiseworthy
can ever serve to appropriately connect another belief to grounds that would
make it praiseworthy. Intuitively, once again, this seems false, specially when
we notice that such failure cannot be explained by claiming that the relevant
grounds are not good enough to make the further belief praiseworthy. The
suggestion here would have to be that the quality of one’s reflection would have
been enough to make one praiseworthy in believing that p, had one not instead
inferred p from some further belief also made praiseworthy by the quality of
that reflection. But I’ve already suggested that this is implausible (section
2). Once we reflect on the kind of transmission that is at stake in these cases,
that is, then we see that even the moderate version of Weatherson’s suggestion
should be rejected.
6.7 Conclusion
Since the two-stage defense of (BAT) mounted on sections 2 and 3 gives us
good reason to think that (PAT) and (RAT) are true, versions of the Transmis-
sion Argument work equally well against versions of deontological internalism
formulated in terms of epistemic praise and epistemic responsibility. As I have
just argued, attempts to resist these damaging extensions are implausible. The
moral, in fact, is quite general: if one attempts to draw a close connection be-
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tween justification and an evaluation of how well the believer has carried herself
given her situation—has she been blameless? has she been responsible? has
she been praiseworthy?—then very plausible ampliative transmission principles
and very plausible transmission arguments will lead one into a contradiction.
Justification, that is, should be distinguished from the deontological appraisal
of epistemic agency.
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CHAPTER 7
NON-AGENTIAL PERMISSIBILITY IN
EPISTEMOLOGY
7.1 Introduction
There is a sense in which you are justified in believing a certain proposition p
by simply having reasons that support it. Call this propositional justification.
There is another sense in which you are justified in believing that p only if you
base your belief that p on those very reasons you have that support it. Call
this doxastic justification. So you can be propositionally justified in believing
that the defendant is guilty after hearing all of the evidence, for example, while
at the same time failing to be doxastically justified: perhaps you simply have
not formed that belief in the first place; perhaps you have formed it on the
basis of reasons that do not support it after all. Call all of this the received
wisdom.
Some have recently disagreed. Specifically, some have claimed that the
requirements for doxastic justification are not as strong as the received wisdom
seems to suggest. I here argue that at least one instance of such disagreement
is based on faulty grounds. Close examination of these grounds and faults,
however, illuminates the nature of permissibility in epistemology.
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Consider Paul Silva’s argument against the received wisdom.1 He begins
with a plausible guiding assumption:
A: Doxastic justification and moral justification are, essentially, the
notions of doxastic permissibility and moral permissibility.
To judge that some act or doxastic attitude is justified, according to Silva
(2014, 4), “is to judge that that act or attitude is permissible.” I here accept
this guiding assumption (cf. Goldman 2009 and Wedgwood 2012). But talk of
justification is in general ambiguous between what we can call a bare and a
rich conception:
Bare Moral Justification (MJb): S is morally justified iff S does the
right thing.
Rich Moral Justification (MJr): S is morally justified iff S does the
right thing for the right moral reasons.
Bare Doxastic Justification (DJb): S is doxastically justified iff S
believes the right thing.
Rich Doxastic Justification (DJr): S is doxastically justified iff S
believes the right thing for the right doxastic reasons.
1Silva’s argument has a positive and a negative stage. The positive stage consists in
an argument against the received wisdom, while the negative stage consists in criticisms of
alternative motivations for it. I here focus exclusively on the positive stage of his argument,
and I take my criticisms as further motivation for the received wisdom.
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Each of these conceptions associates the notion of justification with a certain
positive evaluative feature. Given (A), however, deciding between DJb and
DJr requires determining which of the relevant features maps onto the specific
notion of doxastic permissibility. Similarly, given (A), deciding between MJb
and MJr requires determining which of the relevant features maps onto the
specific notion of moral permissibility. The remaining features, those not
associated with permissibility of either kind, should be conceptualized some
other way.
Given (A) and a grasp of the alternative conceptions, we can state Silva’s
argument against the received wisdom in this way:
Silva Against Wisdom (SAW):
1. MJb captures the notion of moral permissibility.
2. If MJb captures the notion of moral permissibility, then DJb captures
the notion of doxastic permissibility.
3. So DJb captures the notion of doxastic permissibility.
Two defensive strategies come to mind almost immediately. One can reject
premise 2 by denying (A), claiming that justification, in one or either case,
is not essentially a notion of permissibility. Perhaps it is instead essentially
the notion of requirement, or responsibility, or fittingness, or goodness, or
something else. Alternatively, one can reject premise 1 by denying that MJb
captures the notion of moral permissibility, claiming instead that doing the
right thing for the wrong moral reasons is always impermissible. SAW is
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defective if either of these defensive strategies works, though I here leave their
details and plausibility to the side.
In what follows, I argue that premise 2 of SAW must be rejected for a
different reason. First, I argue for a fundamental difference between moral
and doxastic permissibility. Next, I argue that the corresponding notions of
moral and doxastic justification reflect this difference in a way favorable to the
received wisdom. Lastly, I argue that one of Silva’s key maneuvers in making
plausible the rejection of the received wisdom falls apart.
7.2 Non-Agential Permissibility
Support for premise 2 comes from what I will call the strong parity principle
(cf. Silva 2014, 6):
Strong Parity Principle: What is true of the structure of moral per-
missibility is true of the structure of doxastic permissibility.
If there is strong parity between the two notions of permissibility, then we have
a good reason to accept that ‘MJb iff DJb’ and ‘MJr iff DJr’: if it is true that
the moral notion has no basing requirement, then strong parity implies that
the doxastic notion has no basing requirement either; conversely, if the doxastic
notion has a basing requirement, then strong parity implies that the moral has
a basing requirement as well. The strong parity principle is thus silent on what
is characteristic of permissibility (on what makes an act or belief permissible),
simply allowing us to infer the structure of one notion when having insight into
the structure of the other—hence the need for premise 1.
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But strong parity should be rejected. There is in fact a fundamental
difference between the notions of moral and doxastic permissibility that removes
our warrant for taking it that whatever goes for the moral notion also goes for
the doxastic notion, and vice versa. The difference is this: one is a notion of
agential permissibility, while the other is a notion of non-agential permissibility.
We are agents with respect to our actions; that means that our actions are
under our voluntary control. To say that certain actions are permitted, then,
is to say that certain deployments of our agency do not violate the norms
guiding our choice of available options. But we are not similarly agents with
respect to our beliefs. That is, our beliefs are not similarly under our voluntary
control. To say that certain beliefs are permitted, then, cannot be to say that
certain deployments of our agency do not violate the norms guiding our choice
of available options: we have no relevant agency in the doxastic case, and there
are no corresponding available choices to be made.2
This fundamental difference between moral and doxastic permissibility—
between agential and non-agential permissibility—is in fact a reflection of
the deeper distinction between the prescriptive and the evaluative senses of
2We must be careful to distinguish between having control over the kind of believer one
is and having control over a particular token belief. The orthodoxy since Alston (1989) is
that we sometimes have the former but never the latter, and that the former by itself is not
enough for agency with respect to a particular token belief. Recently, however, some have
suggested that (in some sense or another) we sometimes have the latter kind of control (cf.
Weatherson (2008) and Peels (2014)). I do not have space to address these challenges here.
My view, at any rate, is that the empirical facts about the extent of our reflective agency
are bleaker than even what is supposed by the Alstonian orthodoxy (cf. Kornblith (2012,
73-107).
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the English ‘ought’.3 In its prescriptive sense, the claim that ‘S ought to φ’
expresses a requirement-relation between an agent and a course of action. This
is the sense of ‘ought’ common from moral and prudential normativity. In
its evaluative sense, however, the claim that ‘S ought to φ’ expresses simply
that, according to a relevant standard, the state of affairs of ‘S φ-ing’ is ideal.
This is the sense of ‘ought’ familiar from claims such as ‘the world ought to
be just’, where no agent and no action is involved. The agential notion of
permissibility, then, is the notion of consistency with some relevant prescriptive
‘ought’: there is a requirement-relation between an agent and a course of action,
and φ-ing does not violate that requirement-relation. A bit differently, the
non-agential notion of permissibility is the notion of consistency with some
relevant evaluative ‘ought’: there is a state of affairs that is ideal, according to
a relevant standard, and ‘S φ-ing’ does not prevent that state of affairs from
coming about.
The notion of moral permissibility is thus fundamentally different from the
notion of doxastic permissibility. While the former is an agential notion, the
latter is a non-agential notion; while the former is a claim about consistency
with a certain requirement-relation, the latter is a claim about consistency with
a relevant ideal. This is good reason to reject the strong parity principle: what
is true of an agential notion about requirements may well differ from what is
true about a non-agential notion about ideals.
3See Schroeder (2011) for detailed discussion and defense of this distinction, and see
Chrisman (2008) for the view where ‘ought to believe’ always deploys the evaluative sense of
the English ‘ought’.
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7.3 Praise and Blame
Most will agree that ‘doing the right thing for the right reason’ is more ideal
than simply ‘doing the right thing’. Both are positive evaluative features,
but the former has an added good-making element. This suggests that the
notion of doxastic permissibility, an evaluative notion about consistency with
what is ideal, is best captured by DJr. At the same time, it seems plausible
that what is required of us as agents often falls short of what is ideal. This
suggests that the notion of moral permissibility, a prescriptive notion about
consistency with a requirement-relation, is best captured by MJb. So we not
only have reasons for rejecting the strong parity principle, we also have reasons
for believing that something specific that is true of moral permissibility—no
basing requirement—is not true of doxastic permissibility. This is just what
the received wisdom would have us say.
In fact, the received wisdom gains even further support when we recognize
that one of Silva’s (2014, 8-9) key maneuvers in making its rejection plausible
falls apart. Since Silva accepts both MJb and DJb, and since he does not
wish to deny that ‘doing the right thing for the right reason’ is a positive
evaluative feature of some sort, he needs to tell a plausible story about which
concept that happens to be. In the moral case, some such story seems readily
available: cases of right actions based on bad moral reasons are naturally taken
as cases of blameworthy yet permissible actions. Suppose you believe that
pressing a certain button will cause incredible undeserved pain to thousands of
people, when in fact it will only cause incredible deserved pleasure to them;
suppose you press the button for that nasty reason; then it seems intuitive
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that you are blameworthy for so doing, while doing it was a permissible action
nonetheless (cf. Haji 1997). So MJr, we can say, fails to distinguish between
the concepts of permissibility and praiseworthiness, running them together as if
two necessary features of the former. Isn’t there a similarly plausible doxastic
story to be told? Just as in the moral case, perhaps cases of believing the right
thing for the wrong doxastic reasons can be naturally taken as blameworthy
yet permissible believing. Perhaps DJr also fails to distinguish between the
concepts of permissibility and praiseworthiness, running them together as if
two necessary features of the former.
Whatever we say about the plausibility of the moral story, clarity on the
doxastic notion of permissibility reveals that the doxastic story is not at all
forthcoming. This is because talk of praise and blame is appropriate only in the
context of agents and requirement-relations. If S is an agent who is required to
φ, then S can be praiseworthy and blameworthy for φ-ing or not. There was
a certain requirement, after all, a requirement which S’s action could flaunt
or satisfy, and we rightly praise or blame S according to her voluntary choice.
But if S is not an agent with respect to φ-ing, and if, consequently, ‘S φ-ing’ is
simply an ideal state of affairs instead of a requirement, then there is no sense
in which S can be praised or blamed: there are no requirements in this context,
after all, no alternative actions that can flaunt or satisfy them, and no agent to
voluntarily choose between them.4 A clock ought to strike every hour on the
4Fischer (2006, 24-25), for example, uses precisely this principle—that S is blameworthy
for φ-ing only if S prescriptively ought to φ—to argue from Frankfurt-style cases to a rejection
of the ought-implies-can principle.
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hour, but there is no sense in claiming that a clock is blameworthy for being
fast.
7.4 Conclusion
While the notions of praise and blame may provide us a plausible story
regarding the concept associated with the positive evaluative feature of ‘doing
the right thing for the right moral reasons’, there is no correlative plausible story
regarding ‘believing the right thing for the right doxastic reasons’. Silva’s key
maneuver in support of DJb thus falls apart. But we have already undermined
his positive reasons for accepting DJb over DJr anyway. And if we take DJr over
DJb instead, as reflection on the non-agential nature of doxastic permissibility
suggests we do, then we simply have no need for an alternative story mirroring
the role of praise and blame in the moral case. This is also what the received
wisdom would have us say.5
5The fact that we are not agents with respect to our beliefs has direct and indirect
implications for several alternative notions of doxastic justification. Notions of justification
as praiseworthiness or blamelessness are most directly affected. But notions of doxastic
justification as responsible belief may be indirectly affected as well. I cannot pursue those
implications here.
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